{"title":"The GBPUSD Exchange Rate Over the Last 50 Years","authors":"Nektarios A. Michail","doi":"10.1111/manc.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the reasons behind the long-run depreciation of the Sterling against the US Dollar. Using data that range from January 1971 to July 2023 and a Vector Error Correction model, the results show that higher UK inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as the relative overperformance of US markets since 2010 are the main reasons behind the depreciation from 2.41 to 1.29 over the course of 54 years. Other than these two factors, interest rates also appear to have played a role, especially in the 1970s–80s, since the relatively higher bond yields in the UK appear to have prevented the exchange rate from further depreciating. When extending the model to include economic policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk, the above results remain the same, with policy uncertainty having a negative impact on the exchange rate since 2015.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 6","pages":"569-580"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145196917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price Discrimination, Two-Part Tariff, and Hold-Up","authors":"Daehong Min, Doojin Ryu","doi":"10.1111/manc.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the impact of price discrimination on the investment decisions of downstream firms in an intermediate good market. The setting consists of two downstream firms with different marginal costs—one lower than the other—and a monopolistic supplier. The firms decide whether to invest in reducing their marginal costs, with investment costs becoming sunk after the decision. Once these costs are revealed, the supplier offers discriminatory two-part tariff contracts. Under discriminatory pricing, a unique equilibrium emerges in which the hold-up problem prevents any investment. However, prohibiting price discrimination mitigates this issue, enabling the more efficient downstream firm to invest in equilibrium. The ban on price discrimination has mixed effects on social welfare. We demonstrate that in some cases, the positive effects of the ban outweigh the negative ones, ultimately enhancing social welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 6","pages":"558-568"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145196533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Firm's Innovation Decision When Consumers Can Wait for the Better Product","authors":"Mengyang Chi","doi":"10.1111/manc.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies a monopolist's innovation decision and product pricing when selling a durable good to long-lived consumers. In the two-period model, a monopolist is concerned with whether to attempt a risky product innovation at the intermediate date. When consumers can wait for the better product, three equilibria exist, only one of which allows the firm to innovate. In two other equilibria, consumers either all run to buy early or all run to buy late, both preventing the firm from innovation. The result implies that innovation and welfare improvement can be at risk even in a market with rational players.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 6","pages":"549-557"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145197173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Robots, Labor Income Share and Labor Productivity: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Wongi Kim","doi":"10.1111/manc.12524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12524","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper empirically investigates the effects of robot adoption on labor income share and labor productivity. To this end, I use two distinct datasets: country-industry panel data and Korean firm-level panel data. The results using two different datasets consistently reveal that robot adoption negatively affects labor income share but positively affects labor productivity. The results can be explained by Acemogulu and Restrepo (2017)'s theoretical framework.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 6","pages":"535-548"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145196583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intergenerational Transmission of Between-Group Occupational Disparity: Some Indian Evidence","authors":"Dipankar Das, Anjan Ray Chaudhury","doi":"10.1111/manc.12523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12523","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>During the development process inter alia convergence or divergence among the people vis-à-vis convergence or divergence of well-defined groups in the dimensions of well-being is rather common in any society. The relative strength of improvement or deterioration of the members across the groups from one to the next generation de facto determines this convergence or divergence of the groups in some specific dimension. To put it another way, we may explain the convergence or divergence of the groups in some specific dimension by examining the relative strength of upward and downward mobility of the members of these groups from one to the next generations in the respective dimension. From this point of view, one previous study proposes two summary measures of the persistence of between-group inequality. We employ these summary measures on Indian data to investigate the persistence of occupational inequality across social groups non-parametrically. However, before using these summary measures we examine the structural properties of these measures by using a set of axiomatic properties.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 6","pages":"520-534"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145196523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disclosure of R&D Knowledge With Partial Cross-Ownership in a Vertically Mixed Market","authors":"Ting Zhang, Zhaoxin Qi, Dongdong Li","doi":"10.1111/manc.12522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12522","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this paper, we investigate the impact of partial vertical cross-ownership on optimal R&D knowledge disclosure in a vertically mixed market with an upstream firm supplying competing downstream public and private firms. The results show that under vertical separation and forward cross-ownership, the downstream public firm fully discloses its R&D knowledge, whereas the downstream private firm does not disclose its R&D knowledge. Under backward cross-ownership, both downstream public and private firms fully disclose their information. Furthermore, we find that the upstream firm and the downstream private firm favor backward cross-ownership. Finally, we find that privatization policies lead to higher social welfare, but their impact on R&D knowledge disclosure varies among different downstream firms.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 6","pages":"505-519"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145197276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mind the Gap: Government Investment Announcement and Implementation","authors":"Fernando Garcia-Barragan","doi":"10.1111/manc.12515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12515","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy to investigate the effects of government investment on macroeconomic variables and social welfare. The analysis focuses on the role of the gap between the announced size and actual implementation. In general, government investment shocks bring positive results for output in the short- and long-run, although they may cause consumption crowding out in the short-run. However, anticipated government investment lowers the consumption crowding-out effect. Higher levels of implementation relative to the announced investment positively impact output and consumption in the medium- and long-run. The benefits to the economy are greater when the productivity of public capital is higher. Moreover, the study uncovers a trade-off between social welfare and the government multiplier: Full or over-implementation of public investment results in significant social welfare gains without compromising the benefits in terms of the government multiplier.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 4","pages":"398-410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144206778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vertical Separation With Split-Off Under Passive Ownership","authors":"Chuyuan Zhang, Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/manc.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12514","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines a vertical structure model where an integrated firm sells intermediate goods to downstream firms and produces final goods while a rival firm holds partial passive ownership (PPO) of the integrated firm. We investigate the effects of vertical separation with a split-off under a downstream PPO when the integrated firm competes with both the rival firm and downstream firms in the final goods market. We find that separation decreases input price and final goods production by the split-offed firm while increases consumer surplus and domestic welfare if the downstream firms are competitive, or when the degree of PPO is not sufficiently low. We also demonstrate that a split-off under downstream PPO is more profitable but socially undesirable than the other separation types, including split-off under upstream PPO and spin-off. Finally, we provide some discussions on the variant scenarios and show that our main findings are robust.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 4","pages":"388-397"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144207064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Transfer Payments Stimulative?—Sometimes","authors":"M. Iqbal Ahmed, George Anaman, Steven P. Cassou","doi":"10.1111/manc.12513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12513","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the stimulative effects of transfer payments on macroeconomic aggregates using impulse response functions, forecast error variance decompositions, and spending multipliers in state-dependent time series econometric models. It is shown that under symmetric response assumptions, positive transfer payment impulses lead to positive effects on gross domestic product, personal income and personal consumption. However, when an asymmetry linked to economic conditions is used, it is found that transfer payment effects are asymmetric and have significant positive effects on macroeconomic variables during economic recessions but are not very stimulative during economic expansions. A deeper analysis shows that the stimulus effects during economic recessions results primarily from the recent special programs undertaken during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 recession. These results indicate that policy which uses transfer payments as economic stimulus for the economy during expansionary economic conditions will not see much benefit. Furthermore, transfer payment policy expansions during recessionary economic conditions do not offer much stimulus except when the programs are unusually large as seen during the Great Recession and the COVID recession. Results for forecast error variance decompositions and spending multipliers reinforce these findings. Transfer payment programs are often motivated by both the benefits to recipients, and the stimulative benefit to the economy. These results show that, outside of the periods where extraordinary transfer payment expansions occur, the economic stimulus effects of transfer payment programs are small and that transfer payments should only be motivated by the benefits to the recipients.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 4","pages":"368-387"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.12513","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144206947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Natural Experiment in Education Reform: The Case of Upper-Secondary Curriculum Compression","authors":"Tinna Laufey Ásgeirsdóttir, Gisli Gylfason, Gylfi Zoega","doi":"10.1111/manc.12504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12504","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We use a change in Iceland's education system as a natural experiment to measure the effect of years spent in upper-secondary school on subsequent first-year outcomes at university. The duration of Iceland's upper-secondary education was shortened by 1 year through compression of the curriculum. We find that shorter upper-secondary education, 3 years instead of the previous four, leads to first-year university students completing fewer credits, getting a lower average grade in completed courses, and being more likely to drop out. We find that this negative effect of the reform disproportionately affected the academic performance of male students and those who previously demonstrated weaker academic abilities, thus increasing academic disparities.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 4","pages":"319-367"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144206327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}