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Mutual Outsourcing in a Vertically Related Market With Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility 纵向关联市场中的相互外包与战略性环境企业社会责任
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-20 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70048
Lili Xu, Xinying Fan, Sang-Ho Lee
{"title":"Mutual Outsourcing in a Vertically Related Market With Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Lili Xu,&nbsp;Xinying Fan,&nbsp;Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/manc.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70048","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study considers mutual outsourcing firms in a vertically related market and examines their strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) activities. We demonstrate that ECSR adoption reduces mutual outsourcing firms' profits, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma situation, but enhances welfare regardless of competition modes. We also find that Cournot competition generates higher levels of ECSR and welfare than Bertrand competition, whereas Cournot competition (under low substitutability) or asymmetric competition (under high substitutability) emerges as an equilibrium in the endogenous choice of competition modes. Finally, we provide policy discussions on input pricing strategies, showing that a discriminatory wholesale price reduces welfare when products are less substitutable, whereas its effects on ECSR and profits depend on the competition mode; in contrast, a mutual outsourcing price regulation consistently decreases mutual outsourcing firms' ECSR and profits but may improve welfare when products are highly substitutable under Bertrand competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"571-588"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70048","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Workforce Gender Diversity Affect Firm Productivity in India? 劳动力性别多样性是否影响印度企业生产率？
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-25 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70045
Sanjay Kumar Mangla, Chih-Hai Yang
{"title":"Does Workforce Gender Diversity Affect Firm Productivity in India?","authors":"Sanjay Kumar Mangla,&nbsp;Chih-Hai Yang","doi":"10.1111/manc.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70045","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The relationship between workforce gender diversity and firm productivity is a long-standing issue in economic literature. The institutional and social factors make India as a unique case for examining this issue. But despite having an abundant labor force, evidence from India is rare. Drawing upon a firm level panel data, spanning from 2017 to 2022, this study provides new evidence on relationship between workforce gender diversity and firm productivity in India where the former has a significant positive association with the latter. In particular, this relationship demonstrates a non-linear pattern and is more prevalent in the service sector. Several robustness checks validate these findings. Our further analysis addresses the issue of non-disclosure of female workers' information; and its estimation results support our main findings.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"508-523"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous Choice of Reciprocal Trade Policies With Network Externalities 具有网络外部性的互惠贸易政策的内生选择
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-19 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70044
Seonyoung Lim
{"title":"Endogenous Choice of Reciprocal Trade Policies With Network Externalities","authors":"Seonyoung Lim","doi":"10.1111/manc.70044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70044","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines how network externalities shape the strategic interaction of trade policies between home and foreign countries. Incorporating reciprocal trade policy into an import-competing model under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we show that the endogenous choice of trade policies depends critically on the strength of network effects. Under Cournot competition, weak network externalities yield an Intervention–Non-intervention outcome, where the home country imposes tariffs while the foreign country opts for free trade. However, when network externalities are sufficiently strong, two equilibria arise: Intervention–Non-intervention or Non-intervention–Intervention, implying that the home country may prefer free trade. Under Bertrand competition, strong network externalities lead the foreign country to subsidize exports rather than impose an export tax. Moreover, depending on the degree of network effects, three distinct equilibria emerge. These findings suggest that when network externalities are strong, the trade policy preferences of the two trading countries converge, making an equilibrium in which the home country adopts free trade and the foreign country pursues export subsidies Pareto optimal.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"483-496"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental Externalities and Optimal Commodity Taxation Under ECSR: Revisiting the Origin-Destination Principle Trade-Off 经济社会责任下的环境外部性与最优商品税收：重新审视原产地-目的地原则权衡
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-12 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70046
Tsaur-Chin Wu, Hsiu-Wei Chang, Chia-Jen Chang
{"title":"Environmental Externalities and Optimal Commodity Taxation Under ECSR: Revisiting the Origin-Destination Principle Trade-Off","authors":"Tsaur-Chin Wu,&nbsp;Hsiu-Wei Chang,&nbsp;Chia-Jen Chang","doi":"10.1111/manc.70046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70046","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper explores the choice of origin versus destination tax principles in an open economy with strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR). Conceptualizing ECSR as collective reputation, we analyze how pollution scope and consumer awareness shape the optimal regime. Under localized pollution, the origin principle generally dominates due to rent-shifting efficiency, although a non-monotonic sandwich result emerges at intermediate trade costs. Under global pollution, we challenge the conventional view that the destination principle is universally superior for preventing a race to the bottom. We identify a novel reputation rescue mechanism: in the high-ECSR regime, the origin principle reclaims superiority because its production subsidies are essential to sustain collective reputation and preserve market viability. These findings offer a rationale for the policy divergence between the EU's CBAM and the US IRA.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"524-546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision 公共物品供给的内生制度形成
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-23 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70042
Daehong Min, Doojin Ryu
{"title":"Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision","authors":"Daehong Min,&nbsp;Doojin Ryu","doi":"10.1111/manc.70042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70042","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We revisit an existing framework of endogenous institution formation for public good provision, incorporating heterogeneous players to address the question, “Who joins an institution that sanctions only its members to provide a public good?” We analyze two models with different sources of heterogeneity. Considering players with heterogeneous wealth levels and valuations of the public good, our first model suggests multiple equilibria at which institution formation is successful. Formation requires each member's valuation to exceed a threshold linked to her contribution ratio. Correlations between valuations and wealth levels influence the equilibrium set's size. Our second model examines sequential decision-making, uncovering a first-mover advantage in which non-members free-ride on the institution as a second-order public good.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"497-507"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70042","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Balance Sheet Adjustment and Monitoring With and Without a Capital Constraint 有无资本约束的资产负债表调整与监控
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-06-12 Epub Date: 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70033
Alfred V. Guender, Onur A. Koska
{"title":"Balance Sheet Adjustment and Monitoring With and Without a Capital Constraint","authors":"Alfred V. Guender,&nbsp;Onur A. Koska","doi":"10.1111/manc.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70033","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper analyses loan monitoring and balance sheet management by a bank under unconstrained and constrained (binding capital-asset ratio) profit maximization. The loan-deposit spread plays a pivotal role in bank behaviour only in the unconstrained case. Following a loss of capital, a capital-unconstrained bank perfectly insulates its loan portfolio by a matching increase of deposits, so long as the marginal cost of raising additional deposits is constant or zero. In this case, a bank's monitoring is not affected by a loss of capital either. In sharp contrast, a loss of capital causes a capital-constrained bank's monitoring to increase while both deposits and loans shrink substantially. Balance sheet adjustment and monitoring thus vary dramatically, depending on the capital position of the bank relative to prescribed requirements.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 4","pages":"353-360"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148237545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantitative Effects of Employment Protection in OECD Labor Markets 经合组织劳动力市场中就业保护的数量效应
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-06-12 Epub Date: 2026-01-31 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70036
Joaquín Naval, José I. Silva
{"title":"Quantitative Effects of Employment Protection in OECD Labor Markets","authors":"Joaquín Naval,&nbsp;José I. Silva","doi":"10.1111/manc.70036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70036","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the quantitative role played by Employment Protection Legislation over employment and on-the-job training in the presence of dual labor markets across OECD economies. We extend the search and matching model by introducing formal education and investment decisions in training by firms, and a gap in firing costs between fixed-term and unlimited contracts. The quantitative analysis shows that the model accounts well for cross-country variation in employment and reasonably well for productivity, while it captures only a modest share of the dispersion in training and temporary employment. Decomposing the sources of heterogeneity, we find that differences in firing costs explain only 2%–20% of the observed cross-country dispersion, whereas education accounts for most of the variation in employment and productivity, and also explains part of the cross-country differences in training.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 4","pages":"398-412"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148238246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Optimal Bribe: Price Versus Quantity Competition in Oligopolies 最优贿赂：寡头垄断中的价格与数量竞争
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-06-12 Epub Date: 2026-01-17 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70022
Vishavdeep Sharma, Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar
{"title":"The Optimal Bribe: Price Versus Quantity Competition in Oligopolies","authors":"Vishavdeep Sharma,&nbsp;Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar","doi":"10.1111/manc.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze an entry deterrence model between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, where the incumbent strategically offers bribes to local officials to raise entry barriers. Our focus is a three-stage Bertrand game under incomplete information in a differentiated goods market. Unlike prior research assuming implicit entry costs, we explicitly model bribery as a strategic decision in an oligopolistic setting and compare the optimal bribe between Bertrand and Cournot competition. We find that the optimal bribe decreases sharply under Bertrand competition as product substitutability increases and remains lower than in Cournot competition, while for complementary goods, bribery is higher under Bertrand. We establish and prove a zero net cross-effects property, showing that price responsiveness to market size and marginal cost both vary with competition intensity but perfectly offset each other. These results highlight how entry deterrence strategies depend on the nature of competition and type of goods, helping policymakers to design effective regulations and anti-corruption policies that promote fair market entry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 4","pages":"378-397"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148238032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cross-Ownership and Endogenous R&D Risk in Cournot Triopoly 古诺三寡头中的交叉所有权与内生研发风险
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-06-12 Epub Date: 2026-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70038
Mingqing Xing, Ally Quan Zhang
{"title":"Cross-Ownership and Endogenous R&D Risk in Cournot Triopoly","authors":"Mingqing Xing,&nbsp;Ally Quan Zhang","doi":"10.1111/manc.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70038","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine how cross-ownership influences firms' endogenous R&amp;D risk-taking in a Cournot triopoly, where two “insider” firms hold passive equity stakes in each other, and a third firm remains unaffiliated. Firms invest in stochastic R&amp;D that lowers marginal costs and choose their risk level—measured by outcome variance—prior to quantity competition. Cross-ownership affects insiders through financial alignment and R&amp;D spillovers, both intensifying with stronger equity links. Solving the two-stage game, we find that cross-ownership yields asymmetric, nonlinear impacts on innovation strategy. When spillover sensitivity is low, insiders undertake higher-risk R&amp;D than the outsider; when sensitivity is high, this ranking may reverse. Increased cross-ownership always dampens the outsider's R&amp;D risk, while insiders' risk rises with cross-holdings when spillovers are weak, but follows a U-shaped pattern when spillovers are strong. Enabling R&amp;D collaboration does not affect the outsider, but can reduce insiders' risk-taking when spillovers are substantial. However, when spillovers are exogenous and independent of equity ties, insiders' risk increases monotonically with cross-ownership. These results identify information-sharing sensitivity as the key moderator of ownership networks' innovation risk-taking, offering implications for competition and innovation policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 4","pages":"421-437"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148237666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political and Institutional Development in England 英国的政治和制度发展
IF 1.1 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-06-12 Epub Date: 2026-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70039
Mark Koyama
{"title":"Political and Institutional Development in England","authors":"Mark Koyama","doi":"10.1111/manc.70039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70039","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper revisits the political and institutional development of England from the Magna Carta to the Glorious Revolution. I argue that institutional change in this period is best understood through the lens of coalition formation. Political elites had heterogeneous preferences over first two, and then three, recurring axes of disagreement: constitutional prerogatives, foreign policy, and after the Reformation, religion. Institutional change occurred when shocks caused coalitions to form, fracture, and realign. I discuss three episodes. First, due to defeat in France, a baronial coalition was able to check the power of the king through the Magna Carta. Second, the Reformation introduced religion as a new axis of conflict, ultimately giving rise to organized political parties during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679–1681. Third, the Glorious Revolution succeeded when James II's pro-Catholic policies shattered the Tory coalition that had sustained the late Stuart monarchy. Using data on 750 Exclusion Crisis MPs, I document the structure of these political alignments empirically, and discuss how the defection of Tory elites was decisive in 1688.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 4","pages":"438-449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148237994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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