Security Studies最新文献_第7页

Tripwires and Alliance Reassurance: An Exchange – The Authors Reply 绊网与联盟保证:一种交流——作者回复

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140599

Brian Blankenship, Erik Lin-Greenberg

引用次数: 0

Accommodative Signaling in Cyberspace and the Role of Risk 网络空间中的适应信号与风险的作用

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140601

Fiona S. Cunningham

引用次数: 0

Can Cyberattacks Reassure? Half Measures as a De-Escalation Strategy 网络攻击能让人放心吗？减半措施作为降级策略

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140600

Brandon K. Yoder

{"title":"Can Cyberattacks Reassure? Half Measures as a De-Escalation Strategy","authors":"Brandon K. Yoder","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140600","url":null,"abstract":"How can states de-escalate a crisis and avoid spiraling toward war? Doing so requires the actors to reassure each other of their willingness to issue and commit to concessions. Yet reassurance is fundamentally difficult: states have incentives to misrepresent their aims as moderate in order to dupe the other into offering concessions and drawing down its military readiness, only to renege and issue further demands in the future. Thus, credible signaling mechanisms are essential for peaceful crisis resolution. Adding to a growing literature on credible reassurance, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan offer an intriguing new theory of crisis de-escalation built around the distinct properties of cyber technology. They argue that states caught in an escalatory spiral can use cyberattacks to signal their willingness to compromise and give the opponent an opportunity to reciprocate. Thus, a seemingly provocative action can instead convey restraint and alleviate tensions. Two features of cyberattacks underpin this counterintuitive claim: they are relatively harmless compared to other military operations, and their origins are ambiguous, which facilitates plausible deniability. The “low harm” aspect signals restraint because the attacker foregoes more destructive coercive tools at its disposal. Because an attacker with maximalist goals would","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"757 - 763"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46614485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Cyber Operations and Signaling: An Exchange – The Authors Reply 网络操作和信号：交流——作者回复

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140603

E. Lonergan, Shawn W. Lonergan

引用次数: 0

How Women Shape the Course of War: Women’s Suffrage and the Election of 1916 妇女如何影响战争进程:妇女选举权和1916年的选举

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2129439

Joslyn Barnhart, Robert F. Trager

{"title":"How Women Shape the Course of War: Women’s Suffrage and the Election of 1916","authors":"Joslyn Barnhart, Robert F. Trager","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2129439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2129439","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Studies have shown that across time and place, women, on average, are less supportive of the use of force than men. This implies that extensions of the franchise to women provide an opportunity to evaluate theories of democratic constraint on foreign policy decision making. In this article, we theorize democratic constraint on war and peace, arguing that it is a common latent constraint on elite actions and an active constraint when one party is pre-committed to a foreign policy position. We use the extraordinary—yet unexplored—case of the 1916 US presidential election to identify the democratic constraint on foreign policy and of women’s votes in particular. This case represents an early step of women into the electoral realm at the national level and provides unique evidence of leader selection due to changes in public opinion because of the uneven extension of women’s suffrage to US states. Reelected on a platform of: “He kept the United States out of war,” Woodrow Wilson would fail to avoid war in Europe, but he did pursue cooperative policies with Mexico that very likely prevented a second Mexican-American war.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"703 - 735"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45292040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Co-Optation at the Creation: Leaders, Elite Consensus, and Postwar International Order 创立时的合作:领导人、精英共识与战后国际秩序

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2133628

Austin Carson, Matthew J. Conklin

引用次数: 0

Estimating Alliance Costs: An Exchange 估算联盟成本:一个交换

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2101324

Alex Cooley, Daniel H. Nexon

{"title":"Estimating Alliance Costs: An Exchange","authors":"Alex Cooley, Daniel H. Nexon","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2101324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2101324","url":null,"abstract":"In their ambitious article, Joshua Alley and Matthew Fuhrmann ask how “alliance commitments affect US military spending.” Their answer: each alliance, on average, adds $11–$22 billion to the annual defense budget. Given the number of US defense pacts, that would mean formal alliances accounted for over $735 billion of the 2019 defense budget. This finding, if true, suggests that Donald Trump was right to claim that alliances are “much too costly for the US.” In this reply, we show that supporters of contemporary US grand strategy can rest easy. Given the actual size of US defense budgets, Alley and Fuhrmann’s estimates cannot be correct. Even if their statistical models produced plausible numbers, the article remains deeply flawed. First, the article conflates its spending estimates with fixed costs. How much the United States spends, either directly or indirectly, on its formal alliances is almost entirely a matter of policy decisions and political processes; the United States can reduce the “average cost” of its formal alliances any time it wants to—by cutting the defense budget. Nothing about defense pacts forces Congress to appropriate funds for, say, another aircraft carrier or new generation of strike aircraft. For the same reason, we see no particular reason to think that if the United States shed an alliance (or ten) tomorrow then Congress would reduce military spending. Second, the key grand-strategy debate between “restrainers” and “engagers” concerns whether the United States should dramatically reduce its security commitments or military presence in some combination of Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Knowing the average “price tag” per defense pact does not help us decide which, if any, of those regions the","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"510 - 532"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44988888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Norm Diffusion through US Military Training: An Exchange 规范在美国军事训练中的传播:一种交流

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2103333

Rachel Tecott, Heidi A. Urben, Sharan Grewal

{"title":"Norm Diffusion through US Military Training: An Exchange","authors":"Rachel Tecott, Heidi A. Urben, Sharan Grewal","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2103333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2103333","url":null,"abstract":"In “ Norm Diffusion through US Military Training in Tunisia, ” Sharan Grewal argues that foreign soldiers who study in the United States come to absorb the entire pattern of American civil-military relations, and not just the good parts. The article describes the “ politicization of the [US] military, ” focusing on its increasing support for military personnel voting and retired officers serving in key political roles. 1 Noting that the US military deliberately aims to transmit liberal civil-military relations norms to its foreign trainees, the article investigates whether it also inadvertently transmits the “ unhealthy ” elements of American civil-military relations. 2 To answer the question, Grewal conducts interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel (some who trained in France, and some who trained in the United States), and finds a positive relationship between training in the United States and Tunisian officers ’ support for a more political military. This essay proceeds in four parts. The first situates Grewal ’ s article within the wider literature on security assistance and recipient civil-military relations. The second part discusses the article ’ s contributions. The third section argues that the study, though well-designed and well-executed, should not lead readers to significantly update their priors on the major questions moti-vating most scholars and practitioners of security assistance and civil-military relations. The fourth section briefly highlights areas for future research.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"533 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59614067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Logic of Choice: China’s Binding Strategies toward North Korea, 1965–1970 选择的逻辑：中国对朝鲜的约束性战略，1965–1970

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2097891

Chengzhi Yin

引用次数: 1

To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability 购买战争却出卖和平？雇佣军与内战后的稳定

IF 1.8 2区社会学

Security Studies Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890

Corinne Bara, Joakim Kreutz

引用次数: 0