{"title":"Logic of Choice: China’s Binding Strategies toward North Korea, 1965–1970","authors":"Chengzhi Yin","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2097891","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to induce North Korea to drift away from China. This challenged China’s security, given escalated tension between China and the Soviet Union in this period. To counter the Soviet policies, China used binding strategies, which are a state’s attempt to maintain or enhance its alignment with its security partners. I argue that China chose coercive binding as its primary strategy because it had strong leverage over North Korea. Meanwhile, China deployed accommodative binding to complement its primary strategy. In this article, I first develop a theoretical framework to explain how a state chooses its binding strategies. I then apply this theory to the Chinese-North Korean-Soviet triangle in the late 1960s. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical and policy implications, such as the importance of examining how states mix different types of binding strategies.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"483 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Security Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097891","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to induce North Korea to drift away from China. This challenged China’s security, given escalated tension between China and the Soviet Union in this period. To counter the Soviet policies, China used binding strategies, which are a state’s attempt to maintain or enhance its alignment with its security partners. I argue that China chose coercive binding as its primary strategy because it had strong leverage over North Korea. Meanwhile, China deployed accommodative binding to complement its primary strategy. In this article, I first develop a theoretical framework to explain how a state chooses its binding strategies. I then apply this theory to the Chinese-North Korean-Soviet triangle in the late 1960s. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical and policy implications, such as the importance of examining how states mix different types of binding strategies.
期刊介绍:
Security Studies publishes innovative scholarly manuscripts that make a significant contribution – whether theoretical, empirical, or both – to our understanding of international security. Studies that do not emphasize the causes and consequences of war or the sources and conditions of peace fall outside the journal’s domain. Security Studies features articles that develop, test, and debate theories of international security – that is, articles that address an important research question, display innovation in research, contribute in a novel way to a body of knowledge, and (as appropriate) demonstrate theoretical development with state-of-the art use of appropriate methodological tools. While we encourage authors to discuss the policy implications of their work, articles that are primarily policy-oriented do not fit the journal’s mission. The journal publishes articles that challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of international security studies. Security Studies includes a wide range of topics ranging from nuclear proliferation and deterrence, civil-military relations, strategic culture, ethnic conflicts and their resolution, epidemics and national security, democracy and foreign-policy decision making, developments in qualitative and multi-method research, and the future of security studies.