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The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information 好、坏和复杂:不完全信息下的产品设计
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210114
Vladimir Asriyan, Dana Foarta, Victoria Vanasco
{"title":"The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information","authors":"Vladimir Asriyan, Dana Foarta, Victoria Vanasco","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210114","url":null,"abstract":"We study the joint determination of product quality and complexity. In our model complexity affects how difficult it is for an agent to acquire information about product quality. An agent can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. We find that complexity is not a necessary feature of low-quality products. An increase in designer–agent alignment leads to more complex but better-quality products. However, higher product demand or lower competition among designers leads to more complex and lower-quality products. We relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence. (JEL D82, D83, G23, L15, L51, L84)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135658666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Dynamic Privacy Choices 动态隐私选择
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210100
Shota Ichihashi
{"title":"Dynamic Privacy Choices","authors":"Shota Ichihashi","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210100","url":null,"abstract":"I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the consumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy policy, it collects information by committing to gradually decreasing the level of privacy protection. In the long run consumers lose privacy and receive low payoffs but choose high activity levels. In contrast, the platform with weaker commitment power may attain the commitment outcome or fail to collect any data depending on consumer expectations regarding future privacy protection. (JEL C93, D11, D82, D83, D84, L86)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions 在选择中学习:与可观察行动的职业关注
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200192
T. Tony Ke, Christopher Li, Mikhail Safronov
{"title":"Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions","authors":"T. Tony Ke, Christopher Li, Mikhail Safronov","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200192","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores potential inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in a dynamic career concerns context. In a firm-worker relationship, the worker performs public tasks that have trade-offs between productivity and informativeness. We show that the first-best outcome can be obtained with short-term contracts if the wage can depend on the task choice. This provides an explanation for wage jumps at promotions—the worker is assigned the more productive but less informative task after promotion. If task choice is not contractible, then inefficiency arises: the worker has an endogenous bias toward informativeness, while the firm is biased toward productivity. (JEL D82, D83, D86, J24, J31, M51)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? The Pros and Cons of Charismatic Leadership 掌舵的是柯克还是斯波克?魅力型领导的利弊
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170407
Benjamin E. Hermalin
{"title":"At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? The Pros and Cons of Charismatic Leadership","authors":"Benjamin E. Hermalin","doi":"10.1257/mic.20170407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170407","url":null,"abstract":"Charismatic leaders are often desired. At the same time, experience, especially with demagogues, as well as social science studies, raise doubts about such leaders. This paper offers explanations for charismatic leadership’s “mixed report card.” It offers insights into why and when charismatic leadership can be effective; which, when, and why certain groups will prefer more to less charismatic leaders; and how being more charismatic can make leaders worse in other dimensions, particularly causing them to work less hard on their followers’ behalf. (JEL D72, D83, M54)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complexity and Procedural Choice 复杂性和程序选择
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210032
J. Banovetz, Ryan Oprea
{"title":"Complexity and Procedural Choice","authors":"J. Banovetz, Ryan Oprea","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210032","url":null,"abstract":"We test the core ideas of the “automata” approach to bounded rationality, using simple experimental bandit tasks. Optimality requires subjects to use a moderately complex decision procedure, but most subjects in our baseline condition instead use simpler (often suboptimal) procedures that economize on “states” in the algorithmic structure of the rule. When we artificially remove the mental costs of tracking states by having the computer track and organize past events, subjects abandon these simpler rules and use maximally complex optimal rules instead. The results thus suggest that the main type of complexity described in the automata literature fundamentally influences behavior. (JEL C91, D12, D91)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43969356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection 具有内型逆向选择的市场
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210112
Anh Nguyen, Teck Yong Tan
{"title":"Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection","authors":"Anh Nguyen, Teck Yong Tan","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210112","url":null,"abstract":"We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her “type”—defined by the number of lemons that she owns—and which units in her endowments are the lemons (“ within-type adverse selection”). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold λ ∗, with types having less (more) than λ ∗ units of lemons selling only their lemons (selling their entire endowment). We provide conditions for a distribution shift that give Pareto-improving allocations. (JEL D82, D86, L15)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47302186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Targeted Product Design 目标产品设计
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200474
Heski Bar-Isaac, Guillermo Caruana, V. Cuñat
{"title":"Targeted Product Design","authors":"Heski Bar-Isaac, Guillermo Caruana, V. Cuñat","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200474","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an intuitive representation of product design in which firms locate inside a circle and consumers in its outer circumference. Designs trade off horizontal and vertical transport costs. Our setting encompasses all linear demand rotations. Firms with lower quality or higher marginal costs choose niche designs that cater to specific consumers at the expense of alienating the rest. Firms choose intermediate designs or more polarized ones, instead, depending on the convexity of the vertical transport cost. We examine such design choices in monopoly, duopoly, and monopolistic competition settings. (JEL D21, D24, D42, D43)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42661616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability 感知之门：框架相关合理性的理论与证据
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210082
G. Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso
{"title":"The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability","authors":"G. Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210082","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart’s choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawareness of some attributes. To test the model, our experimental design brings about multiple frames by varying subjects’ awareness of several attributes. (JEL C72, C78, C91, D83)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41406556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions 逆向选择和隐藏作用下的最优任务调度
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210126
M. Agastya, Oleksii Birulin
{"title":"Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions","authors":"M. Agastya, Oleksii Birulin","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210126","url":null,"abstract":"A Principal owns a project consisting of several tasks. Tasks differ, both in their innate success probabilities and their incremental benefits. Moreover, only specialists can perform these tasks. Subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, in what order should the Principal commission the tasks, and when should she terminate the project? What investments into changing tasks’ characteristics yield the highest marginal profit? These are typical issues that arise in sequencing R&D activities and other sequential production processes. We show that, despite informational constraints, a simple index—a task’s effective marginal contribution—determines the optimal schedule/mechanism. (JEL D82, L23, L24, L65, M11, O31)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43107556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers 具有数据敏感消费者的最优非线性定价
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210190
Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
{"title":"Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers","authors":"Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210190","url":null,"abstract":"We study monopolistic screening when some consumers are data sensitive and incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals information to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between data-sensitive and classical consumers using privacy mechanisms that consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option. A privacy mechanism is optimal for large privacy costs and leaves classical consumers better off than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. When privacy preferences become public information, data-sensitive consumers and the monopolist gain, whereas classical consumers lose. Our results are relevant for policies targeting consumers’ data awareness, such as the European General Data Protection Regulation. (JEL D11, D42, D82, D83, L12)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43551007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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