{"title":"具有内型逆向选择的市场","authors":"Anh Nguyen, Teck Yong Tan","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210112","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her “type”—defined by the number of lemons that she owns—and which units in her endowments are the lemons (“ within-type adverse selection”). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold λ ∗, with types having less (more) than λ ∗ units of lemons selling only their lemons (selling their entire endowment). We provide conditions for a distribution shift that give Pareto-improving allocations. (JEL D82, D86, L15)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection\",\"authors\":\"Anh Nguyen, Teck Yong Tan\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/mic.20210112\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her “type”—defined by the number of lemons that she owns—and which units in her endowments are the lemons (“ within-type adverse selection”). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold λ ∗, with types having less (more) than λ ∗ units of lemons selling only their lemons (selling their entire endowment). We provide conditions for a distribution shift that give Pareto-improving allocations. (JEL D82, D86, L15)\",\"PeriodicalId\":47467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210112\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210112","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her “type”—defined by the number of lemons that she owns—and which units in her endowments are the lemons (“ within-type adverse selection”). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold λ ∗, with types having less (more) than λ ∗ units of lemons selling only their lemons (selling their entire endowment). We provide conditions for a distribution shift that give Pareto-improving allocations. (JEL D82, D86, L15)
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