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Judicial Mechanism Design 司法机制设计
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220100
Ron Siegel, Bruno H. Strulovici
{"title":"Judicial Mechanism Design","authors":"Ron Siegel, Bruno H. Strulovici","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220100","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of defendants’ private information about their guilt; highlight forces that may underlie certain features of existing systems, such as plea bargaining and binary verdicts and the separation of fact-finding and sentencing; and indicate directions for possible improvements of criminal trials, such as varying the standard for conviction across crimes. (JEL D82, K41, K42)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42393450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality 均衡筛选与分类不平等
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210391
Mogens Fosgerau, Rajiv Sethi, Jörgen Weibull
{"title":"Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality","authors":"Mogens Fosgerau, Rajiv Sethi, Jörgen Weibull","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210391","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefully to screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria, and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receive different equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment by destabilizing the least active equilibrium. The endogeneity of screening enables powerful comparative statics, which we use to unify different strands in the literature on discrimination. (JEL D63, D82, D83, J24, J31, J71, M51)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135872121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games 统计对策中的相似纳什均衡
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220049
Rossella Argenziano, I. Gilboa
{"title":"Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games","authors":"Rossella Argenziano, I. Gilboa","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220049","url":null,"abstract":"A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x, y) . In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots. (JEL C72, C73)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42067234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Spillover in Multi-Good Adverse Selection 多优逆向选择中的信息溢出
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190287
Bingchao Huangfu, Heng Liu
{"title":"Information Spillover in Multi-Good Adverse Selection","authors":"Bingchao Huangfu, Heng Liu","doi":"10.1257/mic.20190287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190287","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes information spillover in a multi-good adverse selection model in which a privately informed seller trades two different goods in two different markets. Buyers learn the seller’s information from both the market they participate in and the trading outcomes in the other market. We identify a sufficient negative correlation condition under which information spillover reduces efficiency loss. We also discover a novel type of coordination friction that leads to multiple equilibria, which can be welfare-ranked by the number of initial no-trade periods. When the sufficient negative correlation condition fails, the efficiency loss is the same as in the case without information spillover. (JEL D82, D83, L15)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135872122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Front Matter 前页
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.15.3.i
{"title":"Front Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1257/mic.15.3.i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.15.3.i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135872868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Influence Campaigns 影响活动
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210387
Evan Sadler
{"title":"Influence Campaigns","authors":"Evan Sadler","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210387","url":null,"abstract":"Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people’s opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new measure of influence, and I highlight how opinion fluctuations impact influence campaigns. If agents interact less frequently with those holding different opinions, the variance of public opinion decreases. Consequently, a risk-averse planner focuses on persuading a large majority of agents in a small set of tightly knit groups, while a risk-loving planner makes much broader appeals. (JEL D11, D72, D83, D85, Z13)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135931311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Development of an instrument for measuring sustainability in the reverse logistics of a bakery company in Villahermosa, Tabasco 在塔巴斯科州Villahermosa的一家面包店公司开发一种测量可持续性的逆向物流工具
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-07-30 DOI: 10.35429/jm.2023.12.7.1.6
Osiris Cecilia RAMOS-PARDO, Leticia López-Valdivieso, Hortensia Eliseo-Dantés, Brissa Roxana DE LEÓN-DE LOS SANTOS
{"title":"Development of an instrument for measuring sustainability in the reverse logistics of a bakery company in Villahermosa, Tabasco","authors":"Osiris Cecilia RAMOS-PARDO, Leticia López-Valdivieso, Hortensia Eliseo-Dantés, Brissa Roxana DE LEÓN-DE LOS SANTOS","doi":"10.35429/jm.2023.12.7.1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35429/jm.2023.12.7.1.6","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this research is to explore in the applicable theoretical perspectives, which innovation factors can be empirically studied in work teams. For that purpose, an integrative review of the literature was carried out using the methodology of search and evaluation for inclusion. A coherent classification, based on theory, was obtained for the innovation factors in work teams that could guide subsequent studies in real life to contribute to the lack of this type of studies reported in the literature.","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"19 23-24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78155716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased Beliefs in Search Markets 搜索市场中的偏见
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210007
Tobias Gamp, Daniel Krähmer
{"title":"Biased Beliefs in Search Markets","authors":"Tobias Gamp, Daniel Krähmer","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210007","url":null,"abstract":"We study the implications of biased consumer beliefs for search market outcomes in the seminal framework due to Diamond (1971). Biased consumers base their search strategy on a belief function that specifies for any (true) distribution of utility offers in the market a possibly incorrect distribution of utility offers. If biased consumers overestimate the best offer in the market, a novel type of equilibrium may emerge in which firms make exceptionally favorable offers in order to meet biased consumers’ unreasonably high expectations, which then become partially self-fulfilling. Consequently, the presence of biased consumers may improve the welfare of all consumers. (JEL D11, D21, D83, D84)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45949310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking 相对财富关注、高管薪酬和管理风险
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200325
Q. Liu, Bo Sun
{"title":"Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking","authors":"Q. Liu, Bo Sun","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200325","url":null,"abstract":"This paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns affect equilibrium contracting and systemic risk-taking. We find that such externalities can generate pay for luck as an equilibrium strategy. In expectation of pay for luck in other firms, tying managerial pay to luck provides insurance to managers against a compensation shortfall relative to executive peers. We also show that an effort-inducing mechanism exists: managers have additional incentives to exert effort in utilizing investment opportunities, which helps them keep up with their peers during industry movements; however, pay for luck that is efficient within firms can nonetheless exacerbate aggregate fluctuations, especially during periods of heightened market risk. (JEL D81, D82, D86, G51, M12, M52)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43934571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents 太好了，不可能是真的？噪声剂的保留规则
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200472
F. Espinosa, Debraj Ray
{"title":"Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents","authors":"F. Espinosa, Debraj Ray","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200472","url":null,"abstract":"An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: “if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.” We consider extensions and applications, including non-normal signal structures, dynamics with term limits, risky portfolio management, and political risk-taking. (JEL D72, D82, G11, G41)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48053721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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