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Blind Disclosure 盲目的披露
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210182
Aaron Kolb, Marilyn Pease, Daniel W. Sacks, Joshua Quick
{"title":"Blind Disclosure","authors":"Aaron Kolb, Marilyn Pease, Daniel W. Sacks, Joshua Quick","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210182","url":null,"abstract":"We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private signal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature’s canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in environments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclosure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisclosed grades in a large university, we find that the model is consistent with student choices during spring 2020 to conceal letter grades by switching to optional pass-fail grades. (JEL D81, D82, I23)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135658667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market 参考定价作为进入的威慑:来自欧洲药品市场的证据
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210053
Luca Maini, Fabio Pammolli
{"title":"Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market","authors":"Luca Maini, Fabio Pammolli","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210053","url":null,"abstract":"External reference pricing (ERP), the practice of benchmarking domestic drug prices to foreign prices, generates an incentive for firms to withhold products from low-income countries. Using a novel moment inequality approach, we estimate a structural model to measure how ERP policies affect access to innovative drugs across Europe. We find that ERP increases entry delays in eight low-income European countries by up to one year per drug. The European Union could remove these delays without replacing ERP by compensating firms through lump-sum transfers at the cost of around €18 million per drug. (JEL L13, L51, L65)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"433 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135703270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Front Matter 前页
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.15.2.i
{"title":"Front Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1257/mic.15.2.i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.15.2.i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"559 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts 契约下稳定高效的资源配置
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210109
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
{"title":"Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts","authors":"Bobak Pakzad-Hurson","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210109","url":null,"abstract":"Consider indivisible-object allocation with contracts, such as college admissions, where contracts specify majors. Can a designer guarantee a stable and (student) efficient matching? I show that contracts put stability and efficiency at odds; a necessary condition to ensure these properties is student-lexicographic priorities—schools must rank contracts from “second-tier” students consecutively. I present the weakest restriction guaranteeing stability and efficiency, and characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for any mechanism within a general class to deliver a stable and efficient matching in an incentive compatible manner. I apply this result to two well-known mechanisms: deferred acceptance and top trading cycles. (JEL C78, D82, D86, I23)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47282527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes 提高标准:认证门槛和市场结果
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210179
Xiang Hui, M. Saeedi, G. Spagnolo, S. Tadelis
{"title":"Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes","authors":"Xiang Hui, M. Saeedi, G. Spagnolo, S. Tadelis","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210179","url":null,"abstract":"Certification of sellers by trusted third parties helps alleviate information asymmetries in markets, yet little is known about the impact of a certification’s threshold on market outcomes. Exploiting a policy change on eBay, we study how a more selective certification threshold affects the distribution of quality and incumbent behavior. We develop a stylized model that shows how changes in selectivity change the distribution of quality and prices in markets. Using rich data from hundreds of online categories on eBay.com , we find support for the model’s hypotheses. Our results help inform the design of certification selectivity in electronic and other markets. (JEL D82, L11, L15, L86)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42891936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Reference Dependence and Attribution Bias: Evidence from Real-Effort Experiments 参考依赖与归因偏差:来自真实努力实验的证据
IF 2.4 2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210031
Benjamin Bushong, Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch
{"title":"Reference Dependence and Attribution Bias: Evidence from Real-Effort Experiments","authors":"Benjamin Bushong, Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210031","url":null,"abstract":"We document a form of attribution bias wherein people wrongly ascribe sensations of positive or negative surprise to the underlying disutility of a real-effort task. Participants in our experiments learned from experience about two unfamiliar tasks, one more onerous than the other. We manipulated expectations about which task they would face: some participants were assigned their task by chance, while others knew their assignment in advance. Hours later, we elicited willingness to work again on that same task. Participants assigned the less (more) onerous task by chance were more (less) willing to work than those who knew their assignment in advance. (JEL C91, D84, D91, M54)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45735380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Competition in Pricing Algorithms 定价算法的竞争
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210158
Zach Y. Brown, Alexander MacKay
{"title":"Competition in Pricing Algorithms","authors":"Zach Y. Brown, Alexander MacKay","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210158","url":null,"abstract":"We document new facts about pricing technology using high-frequency data, and we examine the implications for competition. Some online retailers employ technology that allows for more frequent price changes and automated responses to price changes by rivals. Motivated by these facts, we consider a model in which firms can differ in pricing frequency and choose pricing algorithms that are a function of rivals’ prices. In competitive (Markov perfect) equilibrium, the introduction of simple pricing algorithms can increase price levels, generate price dispersion, and exacerbate the price effects of mergers. (JEL D21, D22, D43, G34, L13, L81)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135504218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Debunking Rumors in Networks 揭穿网络谣言
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200403
Luca Paolo Merlino, Nicole Tabasso
{"title":"Debunking Rumors in Networks","authors":"Luca Paolo Merlino, Nicole Tabasso","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200403","url":null,"abstract":"We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals’ incentives to verify. (JEL D83, D85, L82, Z13)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136019480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Front Matter 前页
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.15.1.i
{"title":"Front Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1257/mic.15.1.i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.15.1.i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136169082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Information Theory of Efficient Differential Treatment 有效差别待遇的信息论
2区 经济学
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200400
Emil Temnyalov
{"title":"An Information Theory of Efficient Differential Treatment","authors":"Emil Temnyalov","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200400","url":null,"abstract":"When are differential treatment policies—such as preferential treatment, affirmative action, and gender equity policies—justified by efficiency concerns? I propose a nonparametric assignment model where a policymaker assigns agents to different treatments or positions to maximize total surplus, based on the agents’ characteristics and noisy information about their types. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the agents’ signal structures, which characterize whether surplus maximization requires differential treatment or not, and study how the bias and informativeness of signal structures determine the efficiency implications of differential treatment. I examine implications of this model for inequality, decentralization, and empirical work. (JEL D63, D82, D83, I23, I24, J71)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136177747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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