盲目的披露

IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Aaron Kolb, Marilyn Pease, Daniel W. Sacks, Joshua Quick
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们开发并测试了一种“盲目披露”理论。发送方根据一个初步的私有信号来选择是否公开信息。在这种独特的平衡中,与文献中经典的解开结果相反,发送者只有在他们的初步信号超过一个截止时才会透露。这种切断规则导致在风险厌恶或道德风险的环境中部分揭露,并且披露随着不确定性而减少。利用一所大型大学中公开和未公开成绩的独特管理数据,我们发现该模型与2020年春季学生通过切换到可选的及格或不及格成绩来隐藏字母成绩的选择是一致的。(jel d81, d82, i23)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blind Disclosure
We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private signal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature’s canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in environments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclosure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisclosed grades in a large university, we find that the model is consistent with student choices during spring 2020 to conceal letter grades by switching to optional pass-fail grades. (JEL D81, D82, I23)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
4.20%
发文量
86
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