{"title":"The Syllabus as Curriculum: A Reconceptualist Approach; by Samuel D. Rocha, ,Routledge, 2022, 234 pp.","authors":"Barbara S. Stengel","doi":"10.1111/edth.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"399-405"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ethics of Belief Debate and the Norm of Teaching","authors":"Ben Kotzee","doi":"10.1111/edth.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The debate about the ethics of belief is a classic and it has given rise to wide-ranging debates in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, as well as in ethics. In epistemology, the question is what the norms of belief are — should one believe what is true, what is well-evidenced, what is pragmatic or what? — and this question translates, in the philosophy of language, to a parallel question regarding what one should assert. Given that teaching often works through assertion, it deserves to be asked in similar vein what the norms of teaching are, and in this paper Ben Kotzee explores the touchpoints between the ethics of belief, the ethics of assertion, and the ethics of teaching. He examines the ways in which teaching should be governed by the same norms as those that govern belief and assertions. He argues that the strongest contender to be the norm of teaching is a knowledge norm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"374-398"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should Teachers Promote Vaccination?","authors":"Ruth Wareham","doi":"10.1111/edth.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Covid-19 pandemic brought the importance of vaccination and public attitudes toward it firmly to the fore. However, vaccine hesitancy and refusal remain significant barriers to global uptake, with post-pandemic declines in routine immunization contributing to disease outbreaks worldwide. Research shows that education plays a vital role in vaccination acceptance. But, while vaccine hesitancy is higher in those with lower education levels, in affluent countries, vaccine refusal is more prevalent among the highly educated. This suggests it may stem from epistemic vice rather than mere ignorance. Furthermore, not all concerns about vaccination are due to wrongheaded scientific beliefs. Some involve moral or religious claims about which seemingly reasonable people disagree. Given these complexities, should teachers promote vaccination? If so, should this extend beyond scientifically evidenced propositions to include the moral and civic virtues of immunization? Drawing on recent philosophical work on teaching controversial issues, Ruth Wareham argues that teachers are warranted in promoting both the scientific case for vaccine safety and efficacy and the moral case for vaccination <i>qua</i> civic duty. Indeed, she maintains that the case for teaching vaccination directively is particularly defensible since robust arguments can be made for it using either of the two most plausible positions on delineating and teaching controversial issues — namely, the epistemic criterion and the political criterion — as well as a pluralist approach that seeks to combine them.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"227-259"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Symposium Introduction: Educating Responsible Believers","authors":"Michael Hand, Nicholas C. Burbules","doi":"10.1111/edth.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A central aim of education, at the primary, secondary, and postsecondary levels, is to bring it about that students believe responsibly. We want students to form new beliefs, and revise existing beliefs, on the basis of the best available evidence, argument, and testimony. We do not want them to cling dogmatically to beliefs acquired in childhood, nor to be warily skeptical of new information, nor to lurch haphazardly from one set of beliefs to another. Responsible believers are willing to subject their beliefs to critical scrutiny, to give new candidates for belief a fair hearing, and to amend their convictions when there is reason to do so.</p><p>Where the truth is known, our aim as educators is to impart knowledge: to bring it about that students hold true beliefs and understand what justifies them. Sometimes this will be achieved by presenting the evidence or rehearsing the argument that provides the warrant for a belief. At other times it will be achieved by testifying to the existence of evidence or argument that cannot, for one reason or another, be presented or rehearsed in the classroom. The goal in those cases is to share with students such knowledge as is available in the various theoretical and practical domains for which we are preparing them.</p><p>Where the truth is not known, our aim is to assist students in thinking clearly and independently about what to believe. There are controversies and dilemmas in all domains of action and inquiry that students must learn to navigate with due regard for relevant epistemic and normative considerations. They must work out for themselves when to take a stand on an unsettled question — and what stand to take — and when to remain agnostic. As educators we cannot do this work for our students: our role is to guide and support them on the road to becoming responsible believers and decision-makers.</p><p>How might these educational aims be realized? What types of pedagogical intervention promote responsible belief and what types of intervention impede it? What skills and techniques, what habits and norms, what intellectual traits and virtues, do responsible believers need? What forms of psychological resistance and cognitive bias stand in the way of clear and independent thinking, and what can be done to overcome these? What are the external forces that militate against responsible belief, that push students in the direction of dogmatism and gullibility, that cloud their judgment and undermine their confidence, that reinforce their prejudices and trap them in echo chambers? And are there educational measures by which we can realistically hope to counter these forces?</p><p>These are the questions that animated the Educating Responsible Believers project, a collaboration between faculty and graduate researchers at the University of Birmingham (UK) and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (US). Generously funded by the Birmingham-Illinois Partnership for Discovery, Engagement and Educati","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"188-191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Teaching Open-Mindedness for Challenging Classrooms","authors":"Seunghyun Lee","doi":"10.1111/edth.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Whether open-mindedness (OM) counts as an admirable epistemic aim of education has been a surprisingly contentious matter. Skeptics point out that OM is only contingently truth-conducive and that open-minded students may be maladaptive to the hostile epistemic environment outside school. Here, Seunghyun Lee contends that, while these critiques are not without merit, they overlook the possibility of epistemic inhospitality within classrooms, and so mischaracterize the significance of open-mindedness in education. Viewing malicious forms of credibility influence — namely from <i>echo chambers</i> and <i>epistemic preemption</i> — as a serious deterrent against our educational efforts, Lee argues that these epistemic practices point to the necessity of open-mindedness in education and, simultaneously, to its difficulty. He concludes by analyzing and offering potential strategies for classroom-based instruction.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"292-314"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Educating Open-Mindedness through Philosophy in Schools","authors":"Danielle Diver","doi":"10.1111/edth.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Closed-mindedness is a characteristic trait of irresponsible believers. For this reason and others, educators should actively discourage closed-mindedness in their students. One way to do this is to cultivate its opposing virtue: open-mindedness. Drawing on the work of William Hare, Danielle Diver defends the status of open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue and explains why it is truth-conducive, even in epistemically hostile environments. Diver goes on to argue that open-mindedness is fundamental to the practice of philosophy and that teaching philosophy in schools, especially through the methods of Philosophy for Children (P4C), is an effective way to cultivate open-mindedness in students. Teaching philosophy therefore has a valuable role to play in the education of responsible believers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"315-326"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Indoctrination Still Matter?","authors":"Michael Hand","doi":"10.1111/edth.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70004","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For at least half a century, there has been a broad consensus that indoctrination is a pernicious form of miseducation and a distinctive vice of teaching. In recent years, a number of educational theorists have sought to cast doubt on this view. They suggest that the attention traditionally given to the threat of indoctrination, and the anxiety induced by it, are significantly misplaced. Here, Michael Hand distinguishes three forms of indoctrination skepticism — the <i>impossibility objection</i>, the <i>unavoidability objection</i>, and the <i>desirability objection</i> — and argues that all three miss their mark. A fourth challenge to the standard view — the <i>third-party objection</i> — does not downplay the threat of indoctrination but does deny that it is a distinctive vice of teaching. Hand contends that this objection too is unpersuasive and concludes that the standard view is the correct one.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"276-291"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personalized Learning with AI Tutors: Assessing and Advancing Epistemic Trustworthiness","authors":"Nicolas J. Tanchuk, Rebecca M. Taylor","doi":"10.1111/edth.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>AI tutors are promised to expand access to personalized learning, improving student achievement and addressing disparities in resources available to students across socioeconomic contexts. The rapid development and introduction of AI tutors raises fundamental questions of epistemic trust in education. What criteria should guide students' critical assessments of the epistemic trustworthiness of these new technologies? And furthermore, how should these technologies and the environments in which they are situated be designed to improve their epistemic trustworthiness? In this article, Nicolas Tanchuk and Rebecca Taylor argue for a shared responsibility model of epistemic trust that includes a duty to collaboratively improve the epistemic environment. Building off prior frameworks, the model they advance identifies five higher-order criteria to assess the epistemic credibility of individuals, tools, and institutions and to guide the co-creation of the epistemic environment: (1) epistemic motivation, (2) epistemic inclusivity, (3) epistemic accountability, (4) epistemic accuracy, and (5) reciprocal epistemic transparency.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"327-353"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do the Unexpected! Why Deweyan Educators Should Be Pluralists about Political Tactics and Strategies†","authors":"Joshua Forstenzer","doi":"10.1111/edth.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.70006","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How should Deweyan educators teach their students about engaging in efforts to bring about social change in a political context marked by polarization, power differentials, and oppression? In this article, Joshua Forstenzer argues that Deweyan educators must encourage their students to engage in pluralistic and creative experiments rather than teach a pre-set model for social change. To this end, he engages with two critiques: one formulated by Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy, and John Puckett according to which Dewey's pedagogic vision failed to be sufficiently practically minded; the other formulated by Aaron Schutz — drawing on Saul Alinsky's theory of community organizing — according to which Deweyan educators fail to be meaningfully politically minded, because their democratic faith blinds them to the role of conflict in real politics. In response, this article argues that the Deweyan outlook is closer to Alinsky's than Schutz assumes and that it demands that we Deweyan educators introduce our students to a rich diversity of voices and traditions that address the concrete conditions of social change to provide our students with a fullness of civic experiences, as well as a depth of political and social ideas to challenge the status quo.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":"75 2","pages":"171-187"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.70006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143770582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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