Information Economics and Policy最新文献_第4页

Pay-for-delay settlements and patent expansion practices 延迟付款和解和专利扩展实践

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101044

Anton-Giulio Manganelli

引用次数: 0

Incentivising ‘pirates’ to pay – An experiment with comic book readers 激励“盗版者”付费——对漫画读者的实验

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101045

Satia Rożynek , Wojciech Hardy

引用次数: 0

Can data openness unlock competition when an incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing? 当在位者对个性化定价拥有独家数据访问权时，数据开放能否释放竞争?

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101046

Rosa-Branca Esteves , Francisco Carballo-Cruz

{"title":"Can data openness unlock competition when an incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing?","authors":"Rosa-Branca Esteves , Francisco Carballo-Cruz","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how an incumbent firm's data investment decisions can impact market structure and competition. In markets with sufficiently low entry costs, using exclusive data for personalized pricing (PP) does not raise any barrier to entry. However, in markets with intermediate entry costs, the risk of competition and consumer harm is significant. Policy intervention is needed to foster competition. The effectiveness of an information-sharing policy depends on whether the incumbent anticipates it. Mandatory information sharing can only promote entry in markets with intermediate to high entry costs if the incumbent does not foresee its imposition. If the incumbent foresees this policy, it will strategically reduce its data acquisition to deter entry, by serving fewer consumers in the early period. This will cause significant harm to consumers and overall welfare. In markets with sufficiently low intermediate entry costs, information-sharing obligations can effectively foster competition and benefit consumers, regardless of the incumbent's anticipation. A ban on price personalization practices could be a better policy option to promote competition, especially in markets with high entry costs or where mandatory information sharing is not effective due to the incumbent strategic behavior.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"64 ","pages":"Article 101046"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41532985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

A model of endogenous targeting in duopoly 双寡头市场的内生目标模型

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101047

Christian Siemering

引用次数: 0

Determinants of fixed and mobile broadband demand in Mexico using discrete choice exercises and logit and conditional logit models 墨西哥固定和移动宽带需求的决定因素——使用离散选择练习和logit和条件logit模型

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101048

Agustin J. Ros

引用次数: 0

Platform Competition and Incumbency Advantage under Heterogeneous Lock-in effects 异质性锁定效应下的平台竞争与在位优势

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101031

Emanuele Giovannetti , Paolo Siciliani

{"title":"Platform Competition and Incumbency Advantage under Heterogeneous Lock-in effects","authors":"Emanuele Giovannetti , Paolo Siciliani","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101031","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101031","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Digital platform markets perform a myriad of daily transactions, providing internet-mediated exchange possibilities: between consumers, for peer-to-peer exchanges; between businesses, for digital value chains; and between businesses and consumers, in digital marketplaces. It is essential for competition that new entrants are able to join platform markets. However, these markets are often characterised by proprietary innovations, especially in data analytics applied to existing user data. The algorithmic analysis of user data and information might increase incumbency advantages, creating lock-in effects among users and making them more reluctant to join an entrant platform. The individual costs of these lock-in effects may differ between the sides of a platform, e.g., between sellers and buyers, and across users within each side, e.g., between sellers with different costs and/or propensities to join an entrant platform. Moreover, these costs will interact with cross-group network effects, another well-studied source of incumbency advantage. This paper develops a model exploring how different levels of lock-in effects may favour an incumbent platform. The conditions for platforms’ coexistence, to avoid market tipping, require lock-in effects to be \"stronger\" than cross-group effects. However, this condition also provides a market advantage to the incumbent platform compared to the entrant's. Therefore, policies aimed at reducing lock-in effects, such as mandating data portability, may counterintuitively impair entry conditions as the incumbent sets its prices more aggressively with lower lock-in effects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101031"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41705454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Social R&D: Does academic freedom contribute to improved societal outcomes? 社会研发：学术自由有助于改善社会成果吗？

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101030

Alberto Posso , Quanda Zhang

{"title":"Social R&D: Does academic freedom contribute to improved societal outcomes?","authors":"Alberto Posso , Quanda Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101030","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101030","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The economics literature views R&D as an important conduit for growth because it generates new ideas that can be translated into technological innovations. Some of this R&D occurs in universities, making academic freedom an important part of this process. This literature ignores the potential role that academic research in the social sciences plays toward achieving non-commercial societal outcomes. We bridge this gap by proposing that academia generates social R&D. We posit that greater degrees of academic freedom allow for social R&D to flourish and be transformed into policies that improve societal conditions. We test our hypothesis by studying the relationship between academic freedom and inequality using panel data of 132 countries over the 1967–2018 period. We measure academic freedom using an index developed by the V-Dem Institute. Our econometric analysis suggests that an increase in the index is associated with a decrease in inequality. We employ instrumental variable and interactive fixed effects techniques to try to lend support to the causal relationship between academic freedom and inequality. We argue that this negative relationship can be explained by academia, predominantly the social sciences, exerting pressure on governments to enact policies that redistribute wealth. We find evidence in support of this mechanism using data from other sources.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101030"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42313216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do telecommunications prices depend on consumer engagement? 电信价格取决于消费者参与度吗？

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101018

Joan Calzada , Begoña García-Mariñoso , David Suárez

{"title":"Do telecommunications prices depend on consumer engagement?","authors":"Joan Calzada , Begoña García-Mariñoso , David Suárez","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes how customers’ heterogeneous search and switching habits affect the prices paid for telecommunication services in a context in which operators use price discrimination strategies to retain their customers and attract those of their rivals. Drawing on a representative sample of Spanish households (N=3,113), we show that engaged consumers pay 9.4% less than completely unengaged consumers for their telecommunication services, after controlling for the characteristics of the bundle of services contracted. We also find that highly engaged consumers (i.e. those that have called their operator to obtain a better deal and who have switched to a different operator at least once) pay 13.6% less for their services than unengaged consumers, that consumers who have switched operator at least once pay 8.4% less, and that consumers who call their operator to request better conditions for their contracts pay 5.8% less. Finally, we show that the excess price paid by unengaged consumers increases as they contract more sophisticated services, such as premium television content and additional mobile lines.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101018"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49189296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impact of taxation in the telecommunications industry 税收对电信业的影响

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101016

Raúl Katz , Juan Jung

{"title":"The impact of taxation in the telecommunications industry","authors":"Raúl Katz , Juan Jung","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article we study the impact of taxation in the performance of the telecommunications sector. To do so, we develop a model that considers the taxes and fees imposed directly or indirectly along the telecommunications value chain. Overall, we find strong evidence of a negative impact on investment from an increase in regulatory fees, profit taxes, and excise taxes. In addition, telecommunication service prices are affected by the fiscal regime, both directly -through taxation over services- and indirectly, through obligations imposed on operators that can ultimately have an impact on service prices. We also find some evidence of the effect of custom duties for equipment and smartphones on the decrease of investment on broadband network deployment and service adoption, respectively. On this basis, we simulate a fiscal-reform scenario, consisting in removing sector-specific contributions to eliminate inter-sectoral asymmetries, with results suggesting significant gains in investment, coverage, and adoption. Considering these findings, and the potential socioeconomic gains from increasing broadband adoption, we believe that governments pursuing the development of digital agendas should consider potential fiscal reforms to accelerate the development of the digital economy. That being said, considering the potential loses in tax collection, a careful trade-off analysis should be performed before determining the nature and the scope of the fiscal reforms to be introduced.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101016"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49767449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Prioritization between asymmetric content providers 非对称内容提供者之间的优先级

IF 2.8 3区经济学

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101019

Jeong-Yoo Kim

引用次数: 1