专利私有化对相继进入市场情况下的和解与研发的影响

IF 4.5 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101080

Felix B. Klapper, Christian Siemering

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在一个市场中，两家公司为获得专利和生产产品而开发技术，我们对专利诉讼、和解和研发激励机制进行了研究。企业可以将知识产权出售给作为专利货币化中介的专利主张实体（PAE）。我们发现，与同时进入市场相比，如果企业依次进入市场，这种所谓专利私有化的影响就会减轻。此外，我们还发现，即使 PAE 没有抽取租金，专利私有化也会因研发激励机制的扭曲而降低行业利润。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Effects of patent privateering on settlements and R&D under sequential market entry

We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.

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来源期刊

Information Economics and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

10.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： IEP is an international journal that aims to publish peer-reviewed policy-oriented research about the production, distribution and use of information, including these subjects: the economics of the telecommunications, mass media, and other information industries, the economics of innovation and intellectual property, the role of information in economic development, and the role of information and information technology in the functioning of markets. The purpose of the journal is to provide an interdisciplinary and international forum for theoretical and empirical research that addresses the needs of other researchers, government, and professionals who are involved in the policy-making process. IEP publishes research papers, short contributions, and surveys.