{"title":"Big data at the crossroads of antitrust and consumer protection","authors":"Ginger Zhe Jin , Liad Wagman","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100865","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100865","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The rise of big data in the global economy has led to concerns about antitrust and consumer protection, but policy makers often treat the two areas separately. The separate treatment is justified in classical markets because antitrust tends to focus on firm-to-firm interactions, while consumer protection deals with firm-to-consumer interfaces. The two areas may also be subject to different laws, and any crossovers between the two have tended to be small. However, big data blurs the distinction between the two, causing them to intertwine, complement or even conflict with each other. This paper uses examples to illustrate why that is the case and identifies areas that would benefit from more economic research.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100865"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100865","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125974163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Big tech mergers","authors":"Massimo Motta , Martin Peitz","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100868","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100868","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Big tech mergers are frequently occurring events. What are the competitive effects of these mergers? With the help of a simple model we identify the acquisition of potential competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries. We also sketch a few recent theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers that are potentially relevant in digital industries. Finally, we draw some policy recommendations on how to deal with mergers in such industries.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100868"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100868","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132935143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reduced demand uncertainty and the sustainability of collusion: How AI could affect competition","authors":"Jason O’Connor , Nathan E. Wilson","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100882","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We model how a technology that perfectly predicts one of two stochastic demand shocks alters the character and sustainability of collusion. Our results show that mechanisms that reduce firms’ uncertainty about the true level of demand have ambiguous welfare implications for consumers and firms alike. An exogenous improvement in firms’ ability to predict demand may make collusion possible where it was previously unsustainable or more profitable where it previously existed. However, an increase in transparency also may make collusion impracticable where it had been possible. The intuition for this ambiguity is that greater clarity about the true state of demand raises the payoffs both to colluding and to cheating. Our findings on the ambiguous welfare implications of reduced uncertainty contribute to the emerging literature on how algorithms, artificial intelligence (AI), and “big data” in market intelligence applications may affect competition.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100882"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100882","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138393951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Merger policy in digital industries","authors":"Luís Cabral","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100866","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100866","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I present a cautionary note on the proposal to tighten merger policy in the high-tech space. The discouragement effect on innovation could be significant. This is not to say that increased policy enforcement is not called for. On the contrary. My point is that it should primarily take the form of checking for abuses of dominant position, tightening consumer protection, and directly regulating dominant firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100866"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100866","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130573397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Big Tech mergers: Innovation, competition for the market, and the acquisition of emerging competitors","authors":"Michael L. Katz","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100883","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100883","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is broad concern that merger policy toward Big Tech has been too lenient. Big Tech typically operates in markets characterized by innovation-driven “competition for the market.” I show that this fact provides a rationale for heightened scrutiny of incumbents’ acquisitions of emerging or potential competitors. I also address the widespread argument that permissive merger policy promotes innovative entry by facilitating entry for buyout. I show that permissive merger policy can also discourage entrant innovation. One way is by diminishing entrants’ incentives to invest in marginal product improvements when such improvements reduce the gains from merger. A second way is by facilitating i<em>ncumbency for buyout,</em> under which an incumbent makes investments in order to extract rents from an entrant through merger.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100883"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100883","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43264706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Seven deadly sins of tech?","authors":"Hal R. Varian","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100893","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100893","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is currently a great deal of interest in online competition, particularly involving large tech firms such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (a group commonly known as “GAFAM”). In this essay I examine several issues involving these firms that have often come up both in the popular press and academic discussions. The goal of this paper is to examine the facts about the <em>alleged</em><span> seven deadly sins of tech: competition, innovation, acquisitions, entry, switching costs, entry barriers, and size. I argue that when you look at the facts, it is clear that competition among tech firms is working well, and this has yielded many positive outcomes for consumers and the economy as a whole.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100893"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100893","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44559186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Separation: A Cure for Abuse of Platform Dominance?","authors":"Richard J. Gilbert","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100876","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Political candidates, legislators, and academics have made proposals to separate services provided by dominant digital platforms from activities that rely on these services. Although the platforms have different economic and technical characteristics, common themes that motivate these proposals are the incentives of platforms to favor their own products and to suppress investment by imitating rivals. As has been shown in other contexts, this paper demonstrates that structural separation does not eliminate incentives for platforms to discriminate in the provision of service quality. Furthermore, the ability of vertically integrated platforms to imitate rivals does not necessarily harm consumers. Structural or functional separation can address some complaints lodged against activities by dominant platforms, but experience demonstrates that separation requirements are difficult to administer and can harm innovation. Public policy should rely on a mix of antitrust enforcement and regulation to address concerns about privacy, data security, and potential influence of major platforms in politics and the media, as well as the abuse of market power.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100876"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100876","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138393950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy","authors":"Bruno Jullien , Wilfried Sand-Zantman","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyze competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100880"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138393952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets: A survey","authors":"Emilio Calvano , Michele Polo","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100853","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article focuses on the economics of digital markets with particular emphasis on those features that are commonly deemed critical for Antitrust. Digital markets are often concentrated due to network effects and due to the need of large amounts of Data for production. We review papers characterizing the nature of social harms caused by market power and the role of competition FOR the market and IN the market to relief some of that harm. Special emphasis is given to the role of (i) human attention (which is monetized and is a key input in advertising markets), (ii) Data (which is the oil that powers these markets) and (iii) innovation (incentives, entry for buyout and killer acquisitions).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100853"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100853","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138393953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the special issue of information economics and policy on “antitrust in the digital economy”","authors":"Yossi Spiegel , Joel Waldfogel","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100894","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100894","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"54 ","pages":"Article 100894"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100894","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43782847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}