欧洲和美国的移动终端率和零售制度:CPP和RPP的统一理论

IF 4.5 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100915

Sjaak Hurkens , Ángel L. López

{"title":"欧洲和美国的移动终端率和零售制度:CPP和RPP的统一理论","authors":"Sjaak Hurkens , Ángel L. López","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100915","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyse an oligopoly model where mobile operators may charge subscribers for placing and receiving calls. We compare the CPP equilibrium (where receiving calls is free) with the RPP equilibrium (where placing and receiving calls are priced equally). Reducing termination rates leads to lower prices and higher penetration under CPP, but has reversed effects under RPP. No termination rate yields efficiency under either retail regime. Comparing EU practice (CPP with termination regulated at cost) and US practice (RPP with Bill and Keep), we find that total surplus is higher in the US when the value of receiving calls is very high, but both producer and consumer surplus are higher in the EU for intermediate values of the call externality. If call externality is higher (resp., lower), consumers (resp., producers) are better off in the US.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":"56 ","pages":"Article 100915"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100915","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mobile termination rates and retail regimes in Europe and the US: A unified theory of CPP and RPP\",\"authors\":\"Sjaak Hurkens , Ángel L. López\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100915\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We analyse an oligopoly model where mobile operators may charge subscribers for placing and receiving calls. We compare the CPP equilibrium (where receiving calls is free) with the RPP equilibrium (where placing and receiving calls are priced equally). Reducing termination rates leads to lower prices and higher penetration under CPP, but has reversed effects under RPP. No termination rate yields efficiency under either retail regime. Comparing EU practice (CPP with termination regulated at cost) and US practice (RPP with Bill and Keep), we find that total surplus is higher in the US when the value of receiving calls is very high, but both producer and consumer surplus are higher in the EU for intermediate values of the call externality. If call externality is higher (resp., lower), consumers (resp., producers) are better off in the US.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47029,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Information Economics and Policy\",\"volume\":\"56 \",\"pages\":\"Article 100915\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2021.100915\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Information Economics and Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624521000032\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information Economics and Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624521000032","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了一个寡头垄断模型，其中移动运营商可能会向用户收取拨打和接听电话的费用。我们将CPP均衡(接听电话是免费的)与RPP均衡(拨打电话和接听电话的价格相同)进行比较。在CPP下，降低终止率会导致价格降低和渗透率提高，但在RPP下会产生相反的效果。在两种零售制度下，没有终止率产生效率。比较欧盟的实践(CPP与按成本管制终止)和美国的实践(RPP与Bill和Keep)，我们发现，当接听电话的价值很高时，美国的总剩余更高，但对于电话外部性的中间值，欧盟的生产者和消费者剩余都更高。如果呼叫外部性较高(响应)。，较低)，消费者(见下文)。(生产商)在美国过得更好。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Mobile termination rates and retail regimes in Europe and the US: A unified theory of CPP and RPP

We analyse an oligopoly model where mobile operators may charge subscribers for placing and receiving calls. We compare the CPP equilibrium (where receiving calls is free) with the RPP equilibrium (where placing and receiving calls are priced equally). Reducing termination rates leads to lower prices and higher penetration under CPP, but has reversed effects under RPP. No termination rate yields efficiency under either retail regime. Comparing EU practice (CPP with termination regulated at cost) and US practice (RPP with Bill and Keep), we find that total surplus is higher in the US when the value of receiving calls is very high, but both producer and consumer surplus are higher in the EU for intermediate values of the call externality. If call externality is higher (resp., lower), consumers (resp., producers) are better off in the US.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Information Economics and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

10.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： IEP is an international journal that aims to publish peer-reviewed policy-oriented research about the production, distribution and use of information, including these subjects: the economics of the telecommunications, mass media, and other information industries, the economics of innovation and intellectual property, the role of information in economic development, and the role of information and information technology in the functioning of markets. The purpose of the journal is to provide an interdisciplinary and international forum for theoretical and empirical research that addresses the needs of other researchers, government, and professionals who are involved in the policy-making process. IEP publishes research papers, short contributions, and surveys.