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NOT BY MAX WEBER ALONE: HISTORICAL TYPES OF STATE BUREAUCRACY (THE ADVANTAGES AND SHORTCOMINGS) 不只是马克斯·韦伯:历史上国家官僚主义的类型(优点与缺点)
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_7_20
A. Obolonsky
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引用次数: 0
STUDENT YOUTH’ SOCIAL ACTIVITY MASS PRACTICES 学生青年社会活动群众性实践
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2023_1_100_113
D. Loginov, M. Yankovskaya
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引用次数: 0
Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents 匹配市场中的激励:计算和比较操纵主体
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te5105
Somouaoga Bonkoungou, Alexander Nesterov
{"title":"Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents","authors":"Somouaoga Bonkoungou, Alexander Nesterov","doi":"10.3982/te5105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te5105","url":null,"abstract":"Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms to select the best among them. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical design decisions such as the design of the entry‐level medical labor market in the United States, and school admissions systems in New York, Chicago, Denver, and many cities in Ghana and the United Kingdom.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade 创新、企业规模分布和贸易收益
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4152
Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, S. Peng
{"title":"Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade","authors":"Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, S. Peng","doi":"10.3982/te4152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4152","url":null,"abstract":"Power laws in productivity and firm size are well documented empirical regularities. As they are upper right‐tail phenomena, this paper shows that assuming asymptotic power functions for various model primitives (such as demand and firm heterogeneity) are sufficient for matching these regularities. This greatly relaxes the functional‐form restrictions in economic modeling and can be beneficial in certain contexts. We demonstrate this in a modified Melitz (2003) model, which embeds an innovation mechanism so as to endogenize the productivity distribution and generate both of the above‐mentioned power laws. We also investigate the model's welfare implications with regard to innovation by conducting a quantitative analysis of the welfare gains from trade.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"111 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76697905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Unrestricted information acquisition 无限制信息获取
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4541
Tommaso Denti
{"title":"Unrestricted information acquisition","authors":"Tommaso Denti","doi":"10.3982/te4541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4541","url":null,"abstract":"In many strategic environments, information acquisition is a central component of the game that is played. Being uncertain about a payoff‐relevant state, a player in a game has a twofold incentive to acquire information: learning the state and learning what others know. We develop a model of information acquisition in games that accounts for players' incentive to learn what others know. In applications to rational inattention and global games, we prove the power of this incentive. When information acquisition is “independent,” that is, players can acquire information only about the state, severe coordination problems emerge among rationally inattentive players. When information acquisition is “unrestricted,” that is, players can acquire information about the state and each other's information in a flexible way, we show that rational inattention admits a sharp logit characterization and we provide a new rationale for selecting risk dominant equilibria in coordination games.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91075503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization 满足货币时间价值原则的收益流的加性估值:表征和鲁棒优化
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4784
A. Neyman
{"title":"Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization","authors":"A. Neyman","doi":"10.3982/te4784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4784","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes those preferences over bounded infinite utility streams that satisfy the time value of money principle and an additivity property, and the subset of these preferences that, in addition, are either impatient or patient. Based on this characterization, the paper introduces a concept of optimization that is robust to a small imprecision in the specification of the preference, and proves that the set of feasible streams of payoffs of a finite Markov decision process admits such a robust optimization.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89263828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy 影子经济下的最优再分配
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4569
Paweł Doligalski, L. E. Rojas
{"title":"Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy","authors":"Paweł Doligalski, L. E. Rojas","doi":"10.3982/te4569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4569","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the theory of optimal redistributive taxation to economies with an informal sector. In particular, in our model, workers can supply labor simultaneously to the formal and the informal sectors, which we call moonlighting. The optimal tax formula contains two novel terms capturing informality responses on an intensive and an extensive margin. Both terms decrease the optimal tax rates. We estimate the model with Colombian data and find that informality strongly reduces tax rates at all income levels. The possibility to migrate to entirely informal employment restricts tax rates at low and medium income levels, while the possibility of moonlighting is relevant at higher earnings.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86747138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game “calibeat”:在预测者自己的游戏中击败他们
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te5330
Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart
{"title":"“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game","authors":"Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart","doi":"10.3982/te5330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te5330","url":null,"abstract":"To identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to “expertise.” This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as “calibeating.” We provide an easy way to calibeat any forecast, by a deterministic online procedure. We moreover show that calibeating can be achieved by a stochastic procedure that is itself calibrated, and then extend the results to simultaneously calibeating multiple procedures, and to deterministic procedures that are continuously calibrated.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135562490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information design in multistage games 多阶段博弈中的信息设计
3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4769
Miltiadis Makris, Ludovic Renou
{"title":"Information design in multistage games","authors":"Miltiadis Makris, Ludovic Renou","doi":"10.3982/te4769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4769","url":null,"abstract":"This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136008743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Loss aversion in sequential auctions 序贯拍卖中的损失厌恶
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4096
A. Rosato
{"title":"Loss aversion in sequential auctions","authors":"A. Rosato","doi":"10.3982/te4096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4096","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze sequential auctions with expectations‐based loss‐averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a “discouragement effect”: the higher is the winning bid in the current round, the less aggressive are the bids of the remaining bidders in the next round. Moreover, because they experience a loss in each round in which they fail to obtain an object, bidders are willing to pay a premium to win sooner rather than later. This desire to win earlier leads prices to decline in equilibrium. I also show how various disclosure policies regarding the outcome of earlier auctions affect equilibrium bids, and that sequential and simultaneous auctions are neither bidder‐payoff equivalent nor revenue equivalent.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76290536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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