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THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL DETERMINATION OF VARIOUS SPHERES OF SOCIAL LIFE: LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN A UNIVERSAL CONTEXT (INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION) 社会生活各个领域的文化决定问题:普遍背景下的拉丁美洲经验(制度层面)
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_92_111
Yakov Shemyakin
{"title":"THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL DETERMINATION OF VARIOUS SPHERES OF SOCIAL LIFE: LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN A UNIVERSAL CONTEXT (INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION)","authors":"Yakov Shemyakin","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_92_111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_92_111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91261938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
THE MAN, THE SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN YEARS OF POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION (ABOUT THE BOOK «DISMANTLING COMMUNISM. THIRTY YEARS LATER») 后社会主义转型时期的人、社会和国家(关于《拆除共产主义》一书)。三十年后的今天?
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_155_171
N. Pliskevich
{"title":"THE MAN, THE SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN YEARS OF POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION (ABOUT THE BOOK «DISMANTLING COMMUNISM. THIRTY YEARS LATER»)","authors":"N. Pliskevich","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_155_171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_155_171","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74667834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations 均衡契约和有限理性预期
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4231
Heiner Schumacher, Heidi C. Thysen
{"title":"Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations","authors":"Heiner Schumacher, Heidi C. Thysen","doi":"10.3982/te4231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4231","url":null,"abstract":"We study a principal‐agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is nonexploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of the informativeness principle: The optimal contract conditions on an additional variable only if it is informative about the action according to the agent's subjective model. We further characterize when misspecifications affect the optimal contract. One implication of this characterization is that the scope for belief biases depends on the agent's job, for example, her position in the hierarchy.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"351 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76394988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
ARCHAIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN JUDICIARY: A RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 俄罗斯司法的古典化:一个研究假设
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_112_127
Vladimir Rimskiy
{"title":"ARCHAIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN JUDICIARY: A RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS","authors":"Vladimir Rimskiy","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_112_127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_2_112_127","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"74 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72369949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Games with switching costs and endogenous references 具有转换成本和内生参考的游戏
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4169
Begum Guney, Michael Richter
{"title":"Games with switching costs and endogenous references","authors":"Begum Guney, Michael Richter","doi":"10.3982/te4169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4169","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a game‐theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one‐player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε‐equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79345326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
DEMOCRATIC AND OLIGARCHIC TRENDS IN THE BOLSHEVIST REVOLUTION: THE GENESIS OF THE SOVIET LABOR OFFICE 布尔什维克革命中的民主和寡头趋势:苏联劳动局的起源
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_102_125
A. Medushevsky
{"title":"DEMOCRATIC AND OLIGARCHIC TRENDS IN THE BOLSHEVIST REVOLUTION: THE GENESIS OF THE SOVIET LABOR OFFICE","authors":"A. Medushevsky","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_102_125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_102_125","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"51 5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91015516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
IN SEARCH OF «SHACKLES FOR LEVIATHAN» (ABOUT THE BOOK BY DARON ACEMOGLU AND JAMES ROBINSON «NARROW CORRIDOR») 寻找“利维坦的枷锁”(关于daron acemoglu和James Robinson的书《狭窄的走廊》)
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_186_193
A. Zaostrovtsev
{"title":"IN SEARCH OF «SHACKLES FOR LEVIATHAN» (ABOUT THE BOOK BY DARON ACEMOGLU AND JAMES ROBINSON «NARROW CORRIDOR»)","authors":"A. Zaostrovtsev","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_186_193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_1_186_193","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"11967 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88966274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
PRIME MINISTER V.S. PAVLOV AND THE MONETARY REFORM OF 1991: ASSESSMENTS AND JUDGMENTS 总理与巴甫洛夫与1991年的货币改革:评价与判断
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_164_176
V. Stepanov
{"title":"PRIME MINISTER V.S. PAVLOV AND THE MONETARY REFORM OF 1991: ASSESSMENTS AND JUDGMENTS","authors":"V. Stepanov","doi":"10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_164_176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666vte_2022_4_164_176","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89685148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets 统一市场中的最优排序分配
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te4171
Afshin Nikzad
{"title":"Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets","authors":"Afshin Nikzad","doi":"10.3982/te4171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te4171","url":null,"abstract":"We prove that in a market where agents rank objects independently and uniformly at random, there exists an assignment of objects to agents with a constant average rank (i.e., an average rank independent of the market size). The proof builds on techniques from random graph theory and the FKG inequality (Fortuin et al. (1971)). When the agents' rankings are their private information, no Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible mechanism can implement the assignment with the smallest average rank; however, we show that there exists a Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism that does so. Together with the fact that the average rank under the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism grows infinitely large with the market size, our findings indicate that the average rank under RSD can take a heavy toll compared to the first‐best, and highlight the possibility of using other assignment methods in scenarios where average rank is a relevant objective.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89387348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule 基于献血者优先原则的血型障碍下最优器官分配策略
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.3982/te3969
Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li
{"title":"Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule","authors":"Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li","doi":"10.3982/te3969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/te3969","url":null,"abstract":"Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor‐priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory and practice. This study investigates the implications of the donor‐priority rule for optimal deceased organ allocation policy design under a general formulation of blood‐type barriers. We find that for any blood typing and organ matching technology, reserving type X organs for only type X patients maximizes the aggregate donation rate under regular distributions, which also ensures equity in organ sharing. Moreover, this is the unique optimal allocation policy if and only if the directed compatibility graph that corresponds to a given organ matching technology is acyclic.","PeriodicalId":46923,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89561758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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