多阶段博弈中的信息设计

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.3982/te4769

Miltiadis Makris, Ludovic Renou

引用次数: 20

摘要

本文将贝叶斯相关均衡Bergemann和Morris(2016)的概念推广到多阶段博弈。我们将我们的表征结果应用到一些说明性的例子和应用中。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Information design in multistage games

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

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来源期刊

Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

5.90%

发文量

审稿时长

52 weeks

期刊介绍： Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index