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Seeing Yourself in Others’ Blindness: Learning from Literature as Epitomized in Proust’s In Search of Lost Time 从别人的盲目中看到自己:从普鲁斯特的《追忆似水年华》中的文学中学习
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1937682
Jonas H. Aaron
{"title":"Seeing Yourself in Others’ Blindness: Learning from Literature as Epitomized in Proust’s In Search of Lost Time","authors":"Jonas H. Aaron","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1937682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1937682","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recognizing yourself in literature can not only help you to get a clearer grasp of what you already think and feel. It can also deeply unsettle your vision of yourself. This article examines a hitherto neglected mechanism to this effect: learning by way of seeing yourself in others’ blindness. I show that In Search of Lost Time epitomizes this phenomenon. Confronting characters oblivious to their old age makes the protagonist realize that he, too, has aged without noticing it, and invites readers to analogous insights. The paper contributes to the discussion on how you can learn from literature and adds a twist to Marcel Proust’s claim that the purpose of literature is that readers recognize themselves in it.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"1 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44767757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology 从规范性论原始情感现象学
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602
Aarón Álvarez-González
{"title":"An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology","authors":"Aarón Álvarez-González","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel’s phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"31 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46167095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What is Desirable About Having a Child with a Romantic Partner? 和一个浪漫的伴侣生一个孩子有什么可取之处?
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1961290
M. Hunt
{"title":"What is Desirable About Having a Child with a Romantic Partner?","authors":"M. Hunt","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1961290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1961290","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most people desire to have a romantic relationship, and most people desire to have a child. The paper suggests one respect in which it is more desirable to have a child with a romantic partner rather than with someone other than a romantic partner, as platonic parents do. The first premise claims that the romantic relationship, and only this relationship, has a certain desire as a constitutive part. This is the desire to be as related to someone as one can be. That this ‘desire for relatedness’ is a constitutive part of the romantic relationship explains why those related by a romantic relationship tend to become related in other ways and explains why romantic partners tend to desire to have relationships with those to whom their romantic partner is otherwise related. The second premise is that by having a child together romantic partners become related in an important and unique way, satisfying their desire for relatedness. Since platonic parents do not have the desire for relatedness toward one another they do not satisfy such a desire in having a child together. A brief review of the sociological literature on platonic parenting is included and eight objections are answered.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"187 - 210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44676235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy 尼采的移情理论
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1938649
V. O. Özen
{"title":"Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy","authors":"V. O. Özen","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1938649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1938649","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"235 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48930447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defending Libertarianism through Rethinking Responsibility for Consequences 通过反思后果责任来捍卫自由意志主义
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601
László Bernáth
{"title":"Defending Libertarianism through Rethinking Responsibility for Consequences","authors":"László Bernáth","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article defends indirect libertarianism against those arguments which attempt to show that blameworthiness cannot be traced back to earlier blameworthy acts in most cases. More precisely, I focus on those arguments according to which responsibility cannot be traced back in most cases because agents are unable to foresee the distant consequences of their acts . Since indirect libertarianism claims that we are responsible for many actions, omissions, beliefs, attitudes because they can be traced back to earlier free acts, the success of the arguments against tracing would be fatal to indirect libertarianism. In the literature, there are some answers to the problem of tracing, but they are either implausible or unacceptable for indirect libertarians who hold that indeterministic free decisions are the ultimate sources of moral responsibility. On the basis of works by Björnsson, Persson, Robichaud, and Wieland, I provide a solution to the problem of tracing that preserves the crucial role of indeterministic decisions. In other words, I provide a libertarian solution to the problem of tracing.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"81 - 108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47646038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction 校正
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-34072-8_29
P. Kielanowski, A. Odzijewicz, E. Previato
{"title":"Correction","authors":"P. Kielanowski, A. Odzijewicz, E. Previato","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-34072-8_29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34072-8_29","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"345 - 345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48895093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Meaning in Life Constituted by Value or Intelligibility? 生命的意义是由价值还是可理解性构成的?
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288
I. Landau
{"title":"Is Meaning in Life Constituted by Value or Intelligibility?","authors":"I. Landau","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several authors have recently argued that intelligibility, rather than value, constitutes life’s meaning. In this paper I criticize the intelligibility view by offering examples of cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do not coincide. I show this for both meaning in life and meaning of life; under both naturalist and supernaturalist assumptions; and in ways relevant to subjectivists, objectivists, and hybridists. I show why the value view is not, in fact, vulnerable to several putative counterexamples to it, and I explain why, if value rather than intelligibility constitutes meaningfulness, there are so many cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do coincide. Finally, I explain why various arguments for the intelligibility view fail to show that it is advantageous to the value view.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"211 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42816958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Truth in Virtue of Meaning Reconsidered 重新思考意义中的真理
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989
K. Büttner
{"title":"Truth in Virtue of Meaning Reconsidered","authors":"K. Büttner","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"109 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44432027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility 安全性和错误可能性的无意识
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1947155
Haicheng Zhao
{"title":"Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility","authors":"Haicheng Zhao","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1947155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1947155","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I first seek a relatively plausible formulation of the safety principle. To this end, I refute a recent form of safety by Duncan Pritchard and then defend another weaker form of safety as a necessary condition for knowledge. Second, and more importantly, I point out that this weaker safety is still insufficient, in that it neglects one’s belief regarding nearby error-possibilities—a factor that is largely omitted in the literature but could determine whether or not one knows. I then develop a safety-based account of knowledge that incorporates this element of belief concerning nearby error-possibilities. It is argued that such an account addresses various problematic cases and delivers useful resources for accommodating the phenomenon of knowledge-defeat, while preserving the important anti-skeptical power behind a safety principle.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"309 - 337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47797388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
This Quintessence of Dust - Consciousness Explained, at Thirty 尘埃意识的精髓在《三十而已》中得到阐释
IF 0.8 3区 哲学
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1905541
Jared Warren
{"title":"This Quintessence of Dust - Consciousness Explained, at Thirty","authors":"Jared Warren","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1905541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1905541","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained is probably the most widely read book about consciousness ever written by a philosopher. Despite this, the book has had a surprisingly small influence on how most philosophers of mind view consciousness. This might be because many philosophers badly misunderstand the book. They claim it does not even attempt to explain consciousness, but instead denies its very existence. Outside of philosophy the book has had more influence, but is saddled by the same misunderstanding. Now, 30 years after publication, Consciousness Explained deserves reconsideration from anyone interested in consciousness. Here I make a case for this. To start, I will clear up the central misunderstanding of the book. With that done, I will explain and update Dennett’s tantalizing approach to consciousness and the mind. The result brings us very, very close to explaining consciousness. Or so I will argue.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"281 - 308"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49160136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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