重新思考意义中的真理

IF 0.5 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI:10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989

K. Büttner

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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要实证主义者仅凭意义将分析性定义为真理，并主张这样定义的分析性概念与先验真理和必要真理的概念都是广泛的。由于许多原因，这种分析性的概念如今被认为是站不住脚的，关于先验真理和必要真理的相关学说几乎被一致拒绝。反对这一共识，我认为，如果正确理解，实证主义者对分析/综合区别的说法是可以辩护的。此外，我将对他们关于先验真理和必要真理的语言学说提出部分和有条件的辩护。

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Truth in Virtue of Meaning Reconsidered

Abstract The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.

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来源期刊

Philosophical Papers PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.