生命的意义是由价值还是可理解性构成的?

IF 0.5 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI:10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288

I. Landau

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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要几位作者最近认为，构成生命意义的是可理解性，而不是价值。在本文中，我通过提供可理解性和有意义率不一致的例子来批评可理解性观点。我展示了这一点，既是生命的意义，也是生命的意义；在自然主义和超自然主义的假设下；以及与主观主义者、客体主义者和混合主义者相关的方式。我展示了为什么价值观实际上不容易受到几个假定反例的影响，我解释了为什么如果价值而不是可理解性构成了意义，那么在很多情况下，可理解性和意义率确实一致。最后，我解释了为什么可理解性观点的各种论点都没有表明它有利于价值观。

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Is Meaning in Life Constituted by Value or Intelligibility?

Abstract Several authors have recently argued that intelligibility, rather than value, constitutes life’s meaning. In this paper I criticize the intelligibility view by offering examples of cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do not coincide. I show this for both meaning in life and meaning of life; under both naturalist and supernaturalist assumptions; and in ways relevant to subjectivists, objectivists, and hybridists. I show why the value view is not, in fact, vulnerable to several putative counterexamples to it, and I explain why, if value rather than intelligibility constitutes meaningfulness, there are so many cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do coincide. Finally, I explain why various arguments for the intelligibility view fail to show that it is advantageous to the value view.

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来源期刊

Philosophical Papers PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.