Philosophical Papers最新文献_第10页

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-11-29 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1462667

A. Schinkel

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引用次数: 17

Interpreting Ecofeminist Environmentalism in African Communitarian Philosophy and Ubuntu: An Alternative to Anthropocentrism 解读非洲社群主义哲学中的生态女性主义环境主义与乌班图:人类中心主义的替代

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-19 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1450643

Munamato Chemhuru

引用次数: 13

The Productive Body 生产主体

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1512893

C. Morales

引用次数: 0

The Monogamous Conception of Romantic Love and Western Critiques of Polygamy in African Traditions 浪漫爱情的一夫一妻制观念与西方对非洲传统一夫多妻制的批判

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1450642

P. Ikuenobe

引用次数: 0

Conversations about Taste, Contextualism, and Non-Doxastic Attitudes 关于品味、语境主义和非武断态度的对话

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1450159

M. Zouhar

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引用次数: 12

A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives 对第一人称和第三人称视角的新理解

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1450160

Alla Choifer

引用次数: 14

The Principle of Non-Contradiction in Plato’s Republic: An Argument for Form 柏拉图《理想国》中的不矛盾原则:一种形式论证

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1512374

D. Futter

引用次数: 0

Life Meaning and Sign Meaning 生命意义和符号意义

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-09-02 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1424027

Charles A. Repp

引用次数: 8

Theorised to Death: Diagnosing the Social Pseudosciences 理论化至死:诊断社会伪科学

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1446761

Jon Orman

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引用次数: 0

Learning, Acquired Dispositions and the Humean Theory of Motivation 学习、后天倾向与休谟动机理论

IF 0.8 3区哲学

Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2018-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2017.1422989

C. Douskos

{"title":"Learning, Acquired Dispositions and the Humean Theory of Motivation","authors":"C. Douskos","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2017.1422989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2017.1422989","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A central point of contention in the ongoing debate between Humean and anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation concerns the theoretical credentials of the idea of mental states that are cognitive and motivational at the same time. Humeans claim that this idea is incoherent and thereby unintelligible (M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Blackwell 1994). I start by developing a linguistic argument against this claim. The semantics of certain ‘learning to’ and ‘knowing to’ ascriptions points to a dispositional state that has both motivational and cognitive properties: habitual knowledge, as we may call it. But there is nothing unintelligible or incoherent about such ascriptions as they figure in the explanation and assessment of action. This suggests that the idea of a state that has both cognitive and motivational properties is not an artefact of philosophical speculation. Moreover, I suggest that action explanations that appeal to habitual knowledge, which are a variety of habit explanation, present distinctive problems for Humean accounts. The discussion bears on the relationship between habitual knowledge and knowing-how, and its possible significance for anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"47 1","pages":"199 - 233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2017.1422989","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47943600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1