Theorised to Death: Diagnosing the Social Pseudosciences

Abstract

Philosophers whoopenly reject the very possibility of the academicdisciplines they philosophise about are something of a rarity. It is also not surprising that their arguments tend either to be ignored or all too conveniently sidestepped by the vast majority of dutiful practitioners of the disciplines in question. Excommunication is often an easier fate towhich to condemn the intellectual heretic or arch-sceptic than decisive refutation. To reject the possibility of a discipline is, however, not necessarily to deny the existence of its basic subject matter nor even to disclaim the propriety of an interest in it. The philosopher here is not quite in the same position as the man in the street who thinks palmistry and horoscopes are a load of old cobblers, which is not to say that there may not be people who regard themselves as philosophers of such pursuits. It is more a case of taking issue with the onto-epistemological assumptions––i.e., the theory––which underlie the programmes and methodologies typically formulated and deemed formulable in order to give an account of the subject matter in question. For instance, it is notable that what are seen as some of the most radical––and in some quarters even scandalous––theories to have emerged from those fields of inquiry concerned with humandoings and society are those which reject the possibility of a scientific account of their subjectmatter. It hardly needs saying that this situation is