发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
The Value of Risk in Transformative Experience 变革经验中的风险价值
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.53
Petronella Randell
{"title":"The Value of Risk in Transformative Experience","authors":"Petronella Randell","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.53","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Risk is inherent to many, if not all, transformative decisions. The risk of regret, of turning into a person you presently consider to be morally objectionable, or of value change are all risks of choosing to transform. This aspect of transformative decision-making has thus far been ignored, but carries important consequences to those wishing to defend decision theory from the challenge posed by transformative decision-making. I contend that a problem lies in a common method used to cardinalise utilities – the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) method – which measures an agent's utility function over sure outcomes. I argue that the risks involved in transformative experiences are constitutively valuable, and hence their value cannot be accurately measured by the vNM method. In Section 1, I outline what transformative experiences are and the problem they pose to decision theory. In Section 2, I outline Pettigrew's (2019, Choosing for Changing Selves ) decision-theoretic response, and in Section 3, I present the case for thinking that risks can carry value. In Section 4, I argue for the claim that at least some transformative experiences involve constitutive risk. I argue that this causes a problem for decision-theoretic responses within the vNM framework in Section 5.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136347742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism 认识论分离主义的获取难题
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.51
Paweł Grad
{"title":"The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism","authors":"Paweł Grad","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.51","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p ) just by having E and/or reflecting on E . This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135819750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics 为美学的认识原则辩护
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.50
Andrea Sauchelli
{"title":"In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics","authors":"Andrea Sauchelli","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.50","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are mistaken and that, when properly qualified, the acquaintance principle (in some of its versions) is not threatened by their examples and arguments.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136210968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidentialism, Judgment, and Suspension: Meeting Sosa's Challenges 证据主义、判断与中止:迎接索萨的挑战
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.48
Kevin McCain
{"title":"Evidentialism, Judgment, and Suspension: Meeting Sosa's Challenges","authors":"Kevin McCain","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.48","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ernest Sosa has recently presented three challenges for evidentialism. The challenges concern what is required for epistemically justified judging and suspending of judgment. The aim of this article is to respond to these challenges on behalf of the evidentialist. Importantly, responding to Sosa's challenges requires giving substance to the idea of appreciating what one's evidence supports. This idea has been mentioned by prominent evidentialists but not given adequate development. Hence, this article marks a significant move forward in the understanding of evidentialism as well as a defense of the theory from Sosa's prima facie serious objections.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136296223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Rationality of COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy COVID-19疫苗犹豫的合理性
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.47
Joshua Kelsall
{"title":"The Rationality of COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy","authors":"Joshua Kelsall","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.47","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some vaccine-hesitant people lack epistemic trust in the COVID-19 vaccine recommendation that because vaccines have been shown to be medically safe and effective, one ought to get vaccinated. Citing what I call exception information , they claim that whatever the general safety and efficacy of vaccines, the vaccines may not be safe and effective for them. Examples include parents citing information about their children's health, pregnant women's concerns about the potential adverse effects of treatment on pregnant women, young people citing their relative invulnerability to extreme COVID-19 symptoms, or members of vulnerable racial groups citing epistemic injustice, such as a lack of representation in COVID-19 vaccine trials. This paper examines the extent to which a lack of epistemic trust in vaccine recommendations, based on such exemption information, is rational.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs 武断的辩护和证言信仰
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.49
Emmanuel Smith
{"title":"Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs","authors":"Emmanuel Smith","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.49","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I argue that a general feature of human psychology provides strong reason to modify or reject anti-reductionism about the epistemology of testimony. Because of the work of what I call “the background” (which is a collection of all of an individual's synthetizations, summarizations, memories of experiences, beliefs, etc.) we cannot help but form testimonial beliefs on the basis of a testifier's say so along with additional evidence, concepts, beliefs, and so on. Given that we arrive at testimonial beliefs through the work of the background, to be justified in holding a testimonial belief, we must not only have a rational speaker's say so, but we must also form such beliefs in a right way. If this is right, then, contrary to typical anti-reductionism, justified testimonial beliefs require more than just a trustworthy testifier's say so – another requirement is that they are formed in a right way.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134976015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partisan Epistemology and Misplaced Trust 党派认识论和错误的信任
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.46
Boyd Millar
{"title":"Partisan Epistemology and Misplaced Trust","authors":"Boyd Millar","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.46","url":null,"abstract":"The fact that each of us has significantly greater confidence in the claims of co-partisans – those belonging to groups with which we identify – explains, in large part, why so many people believe a significant amount of the misinformation they encounter. It's natural to assume that such misinformed partisan beliefs typically involve a rational failure of some kind, and philosophers and psychologists have defended various accounts of the nature of the rational failure purportedly involved. I argue that none of the standard diagnoses of the irrationality of misinformed partisan beliefs is convincing, but I also argue that we ought to reject attempts to characterize these beliefs as rational or consistent with epistemic virtue. Accordingly, I defend an alternative diagnosis of the relevant epistemic error. Specifically, I maintain that such beliefs typically result when an individual evaluating testimony assigns more weight to co-partisanship than he ought to under the circumstances, and consequently believes the testimony of co-partisans when better alternatives are available.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135835899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Normative Inference Tickets 规范推理票据
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.43
Jen Foster, Jonathan Ichikawa
{"title":"Normative Inference Tickets","authors":"Jen Foster, Jonathan Ichikawa","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.43","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We argue that stereotypes associated with concepts like he-said–she-said , conspiracy theory , sexual harassment , and those expressed by paradigmatic slurs provide “normative inference tickets”: conceptual permissions to automatic, largely unreflective normative conclusions. These “mental shortcuts” are underwritten by associated stereotypes. Because stereotypes admit of exceptions, normative inference tickets are highly flexible and productive, but also liable to create serious epistemic and moral harms. Epistemically, many are unreliable, yielding false beliefs which resist counterexample; morally, many perpetuate bigotry and oppression. Still, some normative inference tickets, like some activated by sexual harassment , constitute genuine moral and hermeneutical advances. For example, our framework helps explain Miranda Fricker's notion of “hermeneutical lacunae”: what early victims of “sexual harassment” – as well as their harassers – lacked before the term was coined was a communal normative inference ticket – one that could take us, collectively, from “this is happening” to “this is wrong.”","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136061015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Solution to the General Epistemic Problem for Anti-Intellectualism 反智主义一般认知问题的解答
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.44
M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj
{"title":"A Solution to the General Epistemic Problem for Anti-Intellectualism","authors":"M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.44","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some authors maintain that anti-intellectualism faces a general epistemic problem of explaining the cognitive aspect of know-how, and answering the question of why know-how as a kind of disposition is to be considered a distinct kind of knowledge. In the present paper, I argue for a solution to this problem, the central idea of which is that there is a broader sense of knowledge to which both knowledge-that and knowledge-how belong. I present two versions of this solution. According to the first version, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is a general analyzable category of knowledge under which both know-how and know-that fall. This general category is analyzed into three components: a success component, an externalist anti-luck component, and an internalist anti-luck component. According to the second version of the solution, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is an unanalyzable analogical conception of knowledge that comes first in both the theoretical realm (as propositional knowledge) and the practical realm (as know-how). Both versions of the solution are plausible since they distinguish between know-how and knacks in an anti-intellectualist manner by positing that there is an internal relation between know-how and non-propositional intentionality.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135437028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe 误导高阶证据与理性:我们不能总是理性地相信我们有证据相信的东西
2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.45
Wade Munroe
{"title":"Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe","authors":"Wade Munroe","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.45","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Evidentialism as an account of theoretical rationality is a popular and well-defended position. However, recently, it's been argued that misleading higher-order evidence (HOE) – that is, evidence about one's evidence or about one's cognitive functioning – poses a problem for evidentialism. Roughly, the problem is that, in certain cases of misleading HOE, it appears evidentialism entails that it is rational to adopt a belief in an akratic conjunction – a proposition of the form “ p , but my evidence doesn't support p ” – despite it being the case that believing an akratic conjunction appears to be clearly irrational. In this paper, I diffuse the problem for evidentialism using the distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality. I argue that, although it can be propositionally rational to believe an akratic conjunction (according to evidentialism), one cannot inferentially base an akratic belief in one's evidence, and, thus, one cannot doxastically rationally possess an akratic belief. In addition, I address the worry that my solution to the puzzle commits evidentialists to the possibility of epistemic circumstances in which a proposition, p , is propositionally rational to believe (namely, an akratic conjunction), yet one cannot, in principle, (doxastically) rationally believe p . As I demonstrate, cases of misleading HOE are not the only types of cases that force evidentialists to accept that propositional rationality does not entail the possibility of doxastic rationality. There are no new problems raised by misleading HOE that weren't already present in cases involving purely first-order evidence.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135436678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信