误导高阶证据与理性:我们不能总是理性地相信我们有证据相信的东西

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Wade Munroe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

证据主义作为一种理论合理性的解释是一种普遍的、有充分辩护的立场。然而,最近有人认为,误导性的高阶证据(HOE)——即关于一个人的证据或关于一个人的认知功能的证据——给证据主义带来了一个问题。粗略地说,问题在于,在某些误导HOE的情况下,证据主义似乎意味着,相信一个akratic合词是理性的——一个形式为“p,但我的证据不支持p”的命题——尽管在这种情况下,相信一个akratic合词显然是非理性的。在本文中,我用命题理性和对立理性的区别来扩散证据主义的问题。我认为,尽管相信一个阿克拉底结合(根据证据主义)可以是命题理性的,但一个人不能在自己的证据中推断出一个阿克拉底信仰,因此,一个人不能完全理性地拥有一个阿克拉底信仰。此外,我还提出了一个担忧,即我对这个难题的解决方案使证据主义者认为,在认识环境中,一个命题p在命题上是可以理性相信的(即,一个akratic合词),但在原则上,人们不能(荒谬地)理性地相信p。正如我所展示的,误导的HOE案例并不是迫使证据主义者接受命题理性不包含悖论理性可能性的唯一案例类型。在涉及纯一阶证据的案件中,误导的HOE并没有引起新的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe
Abstract Evidentialism as an account of theoretical rationality is a popular and well-defended position. However, recently, it's been argued that misleading higher-order evidence (HOE) – that is, evidence about one's evidence or about one's cognitive functioning – poses a problem for evidentialism. Roughly, the problem is that, in certain cases of misleading HOE, it appears evidentialism entails that it is rational to adopt a belief in an akratic conjunction – a proposition of the form “ p , but my evidence doesn't support p ” – despite it being the case that believing an akratic conjunction appears to be clearly irrational. In this paper, I diffuse the problem for evidentialism using the distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality. I argue that, although it can be propositionally rational to believe an akratic conjunction (according to evidentialism), one cannot inferentially base an akratic belief in one's evidence, and, thus, one cannot doxastically rationally possess an akratic belief. In addition, I address the worry that my solution to the puzzle commits evidentialists to the possibility of epistemic circumstances in which a proposition, p , is propositionally rational to believe (namely, an akratic conjunction), yet one cannot, in principle, (doxastically) rationally believe p . As I demonstrate, cases of misleading HOE are not the only types of cases that force evidentialists to accept that propositional rationality does not entail the possibility of doxastic rationality. There are no new problems raised by misleading HOE that weren't already present in cases involving purely first-order evidence.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
11.80%
发文量
48
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