Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology最新文献

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Scientific Networks on Data Landscapes: Question Difficulty, Epistemic Success, and Convergence. 数据景观上的科学网络:问题难度、认知成功和融合。
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2013.36
Patrick Grim, Daniel J Singer, Steven Fisher, Aaron Bramson, William J Berger, Christopher Reade, Carissa Flocken, Adam Sales
{"title":"Scientific Networks on Data Landscapes: Question Difficulty, Epistemic Success, and Convergence.","authors":"Patrick Grim,&nbsp;Daniel J Singer,&nbsp;Steven Fisher,&nbsp;Aaron Bramson,&nbsp;William J Berger,&nbsp;Christopher Reade,&nbsp;Carissa Flocken,&nbsp;Adam Sales","doi":"10.1017/epi.2013.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.36","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A scientific community can be modeled as a collection of epistemic agents attempting to answer questions, in part by communicating about their hypotheses and results. We can treat the pathways of scientific communication as a network. When we do, it becomes clear that the interaction between the structure of the network and the nature of the question under investigation affects epistemic desiderata, including accuracy and speed to community consensus. Here we build on previous work, both our own and others', in order to get a firmer grasp on precisely which features of scientific communities interact with which features of scientific questions in order to influence epistemic outcomes. Here we introduce a measure on the landscape meant to capture some aspects of the difficulty of answering an empirical question. We then investigate both how different communication networks affect whether the community finds the best answer and the time it takes for the community to reach consensus on an answer. We measure these two epistemic desiderata on a continuum of networks sampled from the Watts-Strogatz spectrum. It turns out that finding the best answer and reaching consensus exhibit radically different patterns. The time it takes for a community to reach a consensus in these models roughly tracks mean path length in the network. Whether a scientific community finds the best answer, on the other hand, tracks neither mean path length nor clustering coefficient.</p>","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/epi.2013.36","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32220516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 44
Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding 法律事实认定中的正当性、连贯性和认知责任
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2008-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2489867
Amalia Amaya
{"title":"Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding","authors":"Amalia Amaya","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2489867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2489867","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of the coherence bias. The paper then develops an aretaic approach to the standards of epistemic responsibility which govern legal factfinding. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed account of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law for the epistemology of legal proof.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86527395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Conspiracy Theories 阴谋论
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2007-12-20 DOI: 10.1353/epi.2007.0019
D. Coady
{"title":"Conspiracy Theories","authors":"D. Coady","doi":"10.1353/epi.2007.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/epi.2007.0019","url":null,"abstract":"Current thinking about conspiracy theories is dominated by epistemological and psychological approaches. The former see the study of conspiracy theories as a branch of epistemology and insist that each theory should be judged on its evidential merits. On this account, a conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event which cites a conspiracy as a salient cause. Psychological approaches explain belief in conspiracy theories by reference to individual personality traits and generic cognitive biases. Despite their popularity, both epistemological and psychological approaches are flawed. After identifying their flaws, a case is made for a different perspective which focuses on the political function of conspiracy theories. A conspiracy theory is not just an explanation of an event which cites a conspiracy as a salient cause. Conspiracy theories have a range of additional features which distinguish them from ordinary theories about conspiracies and make them unlikely to be true. The political approach sees many conspiracy theories as forms of political propaganda and is especially mindful of the role of conspiracy theories in promoting extremist ideologies.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2007-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74682727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
The Benefits of Multiple Biased Observers 多重偏见观察者的好处
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2007-05-26 DOI: 10.1353/EPI.2007.0002
R. Goodin
{"title":"The Benefits of Multiple Biased Observers","authors":"R. Goodin","doi":"10.1353/EPI.2007.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/EPI.2007.0002","url":null,"abstract":"We know that we can learn much from the reports of multiple competent, independent, unbiased observers. There are also things we can learn from the reports of competent but biased observers. Specifically, when reports go against the grain of an agent's known biases, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of those reports. Triangulating on the truth via that mechanism requires a multiplicity of observers with distinct biases, each of whose reports might be one-way decisive in that fashion. It also presupposes that all observers share the same fundamental epistemic standards.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2007-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77982364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge 经验知识中的客观性与视角
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2007-01-30 DOI: 10.1353/epi.0.0005
R. Kukla
{"title":"Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge","authors":"R. Kukla","doi":"10.1353/epi.0.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/epi.0.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemologists generally think that genuine warrant that is available to anyone must be available to everyone who is exposed to the relevant causal inputs and is able and willing to properly exercise her rationality. The motivating idea behind this requirement is roughly that an objective view is one that is not bound to a particular perspective. In this paper I ask whether the aperspectivality of our warrants is a precondition for securing the objectivity of our claims. I draw upon a Sellarsian account of perception in order to argue that it is not; rather, inquirers can have contingent properties and perspectives that give them access to forms of rational warrant and objective knowledge that others do not have. The universal accessibility of reasons, on my account, is not a precondition for the legitimacy of any actual warrant, but rather a regulative ideal governing inquiry and communication.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2007-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76810357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Masking Disagreement among Experts 掩盖专家之间的分歧
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2006-06-01 DOI: 10.1353/EPI.0.0001
J. Beatty
{"title":"Masking Disagreement among Experts","authors":"J. Beatty","doi":"10.1353/EPI.0.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/EPI.0.0001","url":null,"abstract":"There are many reasons why scientific experts may mask disagreement and endorse a position publicly as \"jointly accepted.\" In this paper I consider the inner workings of a group of scientists charged with deciding not only a technically difficult issue, but also a matter of social and political importance: the maximum acceptable dose of radiation. I focus on how, in this real world situation, concerns with credibility, authority, and expertise shaped the process by which this group negotiated the competing virtues of reaching consensus versus reporting accurately the nature and degree of disagreement among them.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74271884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 58
Openness versus Secrecy in Scientific Research Abstract. 科学研究中的公开与保密 摘要。
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2006-02-01 DOI: 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.135
David B Resnik
{"title":"Openness versus Secrecy in Scientific Research Abstract.","authors":"David B Resnik","doi":"10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.135","DOIUrl":"10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.135","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Openness is one of the most important principles in scientific inquiry, but there are many good reasons for maintaining secrecy in research, ranging from the desire to protect priority, credit, and intellectual property, to the need to safeguard the privacy of research participants or minimize threats to national or international security. This article examines the clash between openness and secrecy in science in light of some recent developments in information technology, business, and politics, and makes some practical suggestions for resolving conflicts between openness and secrecy.\"By academic freedom I understand the right to search for the truth and to publish and teach what one holds to be true. This right also implies a duty; one must not conceal any part of what one has recognized to be true. It is evident that any restriction of academic freedom serves to restrain the dissemination of knowledge, thereby impeding rational judgment and action.\"Albert Einstein, quotation inscribed on his statute in front of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.</p>","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2006-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2991133/pdf/nihms33449.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29497350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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