Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics最新文献

{"title":"Correction to: Experimental philosophy of medicine and the concepts of health and disease.","authors":"Walter Veit","doi":"10.1007/s11017-021-09556-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-021-09556-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"44 1","pages":"99-100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9943991/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10748367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to: Pain priors, polyeidism, and predictive power: a preliminary investigation into individual differences in ordinary thought about pain.","authors":"Emma Borg, Sarah A Fisher, Nat Hansen, Richard Harrison, Deepak Ravindran, Tim V Salomons, Harriet Wilkinson","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09564-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09564-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"44 1","pages":"101-102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9944380/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10817895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to: How many ways can you die? Multiple biological deaths as a consequence of the multiple concepts of an organism.","authors":"Piotr Grzegorz Nowak, Adrian Stencel","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09591-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09591-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"44 1","pages":"105-106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9945035/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10765646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Biographical lives and organ conscription.","authors":"Derrick Pemberton","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09603-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09603-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to 2021 data, the United States' opt-in system of posthumous organ donation results in seventeen Americans dying each day waiting for vital organs, while many good undonated organs go to the grave with the corpse. One of the most aggressive, and compelling, proposals to resolve this tragedy is postmortem organ conscription, also called routine salvaging or organ draft. This proposal entails postmortem retrieval of needed organs, regardless of the prior authorization or refusal of the deceased or his family. The argument of most proponents of conscription relies heavily upon a denial of the possibility of posthumous harms. While I also deny the possibility of posthumous harms, I argue this denial fails to acknowledge other serious wrongs that could be done to the deceased person and his corpse. While the person can no longer be harmed, his life, in a roughly biographical sense, can be damaged. Humans highly value life in this sense, often more than biological life. Respect for this sense of life also informs appropriate treatment of particular human corpses, which already have special value beyond mere resource. I will argue that conscription proponents fail to appropriately value lives and human corpses. This failure can lead to multiple wrongs, among them a wrongful exploitation of the vulnerability of a person's life and corpse and a disrespect of persons. While it is possible that some biographical lives could be made better, or at least less bad, by conscription, the judgments such decisions would require make conscription bad policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"44 1","pages":"75-93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9090051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Misapplying autonomy: why patient wishes cannot settle treatment decisions.","authors":"Colin Goodman,&nbsp;Timothy Houk","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09593-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09593-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The principle of autonomy is widely recognized to be of utmost importance in bioethics; however, we argue that this principle is often misapplied when one fails to distinguish two different contexts in medicine. When a particular patient is offered treatment options, she has the ultimate say in whether to proceed with any of those treatments. However, when deciding whether a particular intervention should be regarded as a form of medical treatment in the first place, it is the medical community who has the ultimate say. Some argue that particular interventions should be allowed by virtue of the fact that they are autonomously requested. But making such an argument fails to distinguish between these two contexts and misapplies the principle of autonomy, ultimately having the potential to instigate problematic changes in the practice of medicine.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"289-305"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40651800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The criticism of medicine at the end of its \"golden age\".","authors":"Somogy Varga","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09598-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09598-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Medicine is increasingly subject to various forms of criticism. This paper focuses on dominant forms of criticism and offers a better account of their normative character. It is argued that together, these forms of criticism are comprehensive, raising questions about both medical science and medical practice. Furthermore, it is shown that these forms of criticism mainly rely on standards of evaluation that are assumed to be internal to medicine and converge on a broader question about the aim of medicine. Further work making medicine's internal norms explicit and determining the aim of medicine would not only help to clarify to what extent the criticism is justified, but also assist an informed deliberation about the future of medicine. To illustrate some of the general difficulties associated with such a task, the paper concludes by critically engaging Edmund Pellegrino's account of the aim of medicine as well as the Hastings Center's consensus report.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"401-419"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40702684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The principle of procreative beneficence and its implications for genetic engineering.","authors":"Luvuyo Gantsho","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09585-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09585-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Molecular genetic engineering technologies such as CRISPR/Cas9 have made the accurate and safe genetic engineering of human embryos possible. Further advances in genomics have isolated genes that predict qualities and traits associated with intelligence. Given these advances, prospective parents could use these biotechnologies to genetically engineer future children for genes that enhance their intelligence. While Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB) argues for the moral obligation of prospective parents to use in-vitro fertilization and preimplantation genetic diagnosis to make eugenic selections of embryos for intelligence, the PPB could imply obligations to genetically engineer selected embryos for intelligence as well. I argue that the PPB implies an additional moral obligation for prospective parents to genetically engineer the embryonic germline identity of selected embryos for genes that predict intelligence. Objections to my argument for the PPB's extension are also discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"307-328"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40540656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The patient experience of medically unexplained symptoms: an existentialist analysis.","authors":"Kimberly S Engels","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09587-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09587-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article explores the patient experience of medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) from an existentialist standpoint. Drawing on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, I explore their concepts of existential situation, existential project, authenticity, and praxis. I then analyze the situation of MUS patients in the current cultural and institutional context, elucidating that a lack of explanation for their symptoms puts MUS patients in an existential bind. I illustrate the effects of the experience of MUS on patients' existential projects. Last, I develop an ethical response in the existentialist tradition from the perspective of patients, providers, and society at large. I argue that there is a collective responsibility to foster conditions more conducive to authentic patient well-being and to improve the experience of patients with medically unexplained symptoms.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"355-373"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40584183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Osteoporosis and risk of fracture: reference class problems are real.","authors":"Nicholas Binney","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09590-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09590-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Elselijn Kingma argues that Christopher Boorse's biostatistical theory does not show how the reference classes it uses-namely, age groups of a sex of a species-are objective and naturalistic. Boorse has replied that this objection is of no concern, because there are no examples of clinicians' choosing to use reference classes other than the ones he suggests. Boorse argues that clinicians use the reference classes they do because these reflect the natural classes of organisms to which their patients belong. Drawing on a thorough exploration of how the disease osteoporosis is defined in adults, I argue that clinicians do indeed make choices about which reference classes to use in diagnosis. Clinicians use young adult reference classes to diagnose osteoporosis in elderly patients. They also use young female reference classes to diagnose osteoporosis in elderly males. Clinicians adjust their reference classes so that the diagnosis of osteoporosis reflects a person's risk of sustaining a fragility fracture. The ethical intuition that people with the same risk of fracture should receive the same diagnosis overwhelms the naturalistic intuition that reference classes should reflect natural classes of organisms of uniform functional design. Clinicians construct a variety of reference class types, including pathological reference classes and epidemiological population-specific reference classes, to serve this ethical intuition. I show how clinicians use several reference classes at once so that they can more accurately predict risk of fracture. Ultimately, the reference classes chosen and used in medical practice are quite different from those proposed in naturalistic philosophy of medicine.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"375-400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9700603/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40362538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Death as \"benefit\" in the context of non-voluntary euthanasia.","authors":"Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry","doi":"10.1007/s11017-022-09597-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-022-09597-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I offer a principled objection to arguments in favour of legalizing non-voluntary euthanasia on the basis of the principle of beneficence. The objection is that the status of death as a benefit to people who cannot formulate a desire to die is more problematic than pain management care. I ground this objection on epistemic and political arguments. Namely, I argue that death is relatively more unknowable, and the benefits it confers more subjectively debatable, than pain management. I am not primarily referring to the claim that it is difficult to make comparisons between live and post-mortem states, but rather to the fact that it is epistemically and metaphysically problematic to impute a \"life-worse-than-death\" or a state of \"suffering-calling-for-death\" to people who cannot subjectively wish to die, as though this kind of suffering were a medically observable fact rather than a belief- and value-laden notion. On the contrary, people enduring similar causes of pain may have different experiences of suffering and views on how it affects the worthwhileness of their existence or the desirability of death or of continuing their lives. The projection of a \"suffering-calling-for-death\" onto infants or people with severe intellectual disabilities may not be indefensible, but it is more controversial than judging that pain management will improve their well-being from the perspective of beneficence. My argument also relies on our society's liberal endeavour to avoid endorsing unverifiable beliefs about life and death or controversial conceptions of the good life. My goal is not to suggest we should not attend the suffering of cognitively disabled people. On the contrary, I only cast doubt on too quick an assumption that ending their lives is the best way of caring for them, when robust palliative treatments are available. Moreover, I express the concern that a lack of attention to distinctions between \"pain-calling-for-relief\" and \"suffering-calling-for-death\" may be based on ableist projections and assumptions. I conclude that it is imperative to continue research into the nature of pain and suffering experienced by individuals with mental or cognitive impairments preventing them from expressing autonomous wishes about the kind of treatment that would most benefit them.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"43 5-6","pages":"329-354"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33502888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}