JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Husserl and Disjunctivism: Reply to Bower","authors":"S. Overgaard","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902881","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"3 2","pages":"499 - 513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41243448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic by Ian Proops (review)","authors":"S. Howard","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902887","url":null,"abstract":"need not be true but merely believable (15). Here, I think we need to pay more attention to the exact relationship of imagination and reason and consider Spinoza’s acquaintance with Al-Farabi’s political philosophy via Maimonides and with Averroes’s ideas via Elijah Delmedigo. Even if dogmata and narratives are to be characterized as efficacious or useful rather than, strictly speaking, true, can they be divorced from the truth? To my mind, we need more clarity about the character of practical and political reason in Spinoza’s philosophy. Chapter 11, “The Right Concerning Sacred Matters,” draws the theological and political together in a comprehensive and subtle study of Spinoza’s view of church-state relations. Chapter 12, “Conclusion: The Dutch Public Sphere,” moves beyond the early modern contextualization of Spinoza’s thought to compare it to contemporary models, particularly Habermas’s influential account of the bourgeois public sphere and the development of consensus through public debate. Compared to Habermas, Spinoza is a robust defender of the freedom to disagree about crucial issues, and his political theory provides a model for managing disagreements among people who must cohabit. Amid contemporary crises about the meanings of liberty, the relations of religious and state institutions, crises of legitimacy and fraud, and the challenge of collective survival in a time of deep disagreement, Spinoza’s political philosophy merits our attention as a resource for and challenge to our reigning ways of thinking. Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing is a learned, philosophically sharp, and carefully argued guide to its intricacies, offerings, and limitations. Elegantly constructed and written, Lærke’s study is well worth reading and rereading as a major contribution to the lively area of Spinoza scholarship. J u l i e R . K l e i n Villanova University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"525 - 527"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44299662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Émilie du Châtelet's Theory of Happiness: Passions and Character","authors":"Marcy P. Lascano","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902879","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:The Discourse on Happiness is Émilie du Châtelet's most translated work, but there is no systematic interpretation of her account of the nature and means to happiness in the secondary literature. I argue that the key to understanding her account lies in interpreting the various roles of the \"great machines of happiness.\" I show that Du Châtelet provides a sophisticated hedonistic account of the nature of happiness, in which passions and tastes are the means to self-perpetuating, increasing, and long-lasting sources of pleasure. In addition, I argue that the remaining \"great machines of happiness\" are not logically necessary conditions for happiness, but rather character traits that support our tastes and passions.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"451 - 472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41699701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic by Karen Ng (review)","authors":"M. Bykova","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902888","url":null,"abstract":"(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1966–71), but with a closer focus on Kant’s arguments. On the other hand, Proops presents the book as driven by a thesis, outlined in the introduction and conclusion, that certain doctrines of previous metaphysics survive the “fiery test” of critique. It is often unclear how the commentaries in the book’s three main parts should contribute to the book’s overall thesis. Here, I found myself wishing that Proops had engaged in more detail with the most important recent book on his topic, Marcus Willaschek’s Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Proops only refers to Willaschek in three footnotes on relatively marginal topics. It would have been helpful to see comparisons with Willaschek’s position when Proops discusses the sources of transcendental illusion (42–58, 130–34). More generally, though, an engagement with Willaschek’s highly systematic interpretation could have clarified how the two implicit tasks of Proops’s book fit together. After his careful attention to Kant’s various arguments, readers would like to know whether Proops considers Kant to definitively possess his philosophical “nuggets”: whether, for Proops, Kant has convincingly defended the positive doctrines said to result from the critical test. S t e p h e n H o w a r d KU Leuven","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"527 - 528"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45119529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam by Larry Benjamin Miller (review)","authors":"K. El-Rouayheb","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902883","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"518 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49579730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Plato on False Judgment in the Theaetetus","authors":"A. Barceló-Aspeitia, Edgar González-Varela","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902875","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of Theaetetus 187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"349 - 372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42350514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy by Alex G. Long, and: Immortality in Ancient Philosophy ed. by Alex G. Long (review)","authors":"C. Cohoe","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902882","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"515 - 518"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43960132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hegel's End of Art and the Artwork as an Internally Purposive Whole","authors":"Gerad Gentry","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902880","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Hegel's end-of-art thesis is arguably the most notorious assertion in aesthetics. I outline traditional interpretive strategies before offering an original alternative to these. I develop a conception of art that facilitates a reading of Hegel on which he is able to embrace three seemingly contradictory theses about art, namely, (i) the end-of-art thesis, (ii) the continued significance of art for its own sake (autonomy thesis), and (iii) the necessity of art for robust knowledge (epistemicnecessity thesis). I argue that Hegel is able to embrace all three theses at once through a conception of the work of art as an internally purposive whole (what I call the \"IP View\" of art). On the IP View, because of the kind of wholes that artworks are, they (i.a) are valuable for their own sake as ends-in-themselves, (i.b) yield valuable experiences because they are valuable for their own sake, and thereby (i.c) are necessary for robust knowledge. Finally, I suggest that not only does Hegel appear to hold the IP View of art, but also that on such a view, there is a very sensible reason for affirming (one reading of) Hegel's end-of-art thesis as an important means to establishing art's actual significance for robust knowledge against soaring, but unsubstantiable, claims about art's potency with respect to robust knowledge.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"473 - 498"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43602847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Schopenhauer and the Nature of Philosophy by Jonathan Head (review)","authors":"J. Norman","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902889","url":null,"abstract":"Subjective Logic “as his own version of a ‘critique of judgment’” (18). She demonstrates that this part of the Logic offers a positive account of the concept of life that Hegel develops in his critical interaction with Kant. The most illustrative in this respect is the “Subjectivity” section of the Logic, in which the form of life is presented as the ground and presupposition of Hegel’s theory of concepts and judgments. According to Ng, such a reading makes evident that “life opens up the space of reasons” (234, 281). Chapter 4 takes up Hegel’s immanent deduction of the Concept argument, revealing that the key to understanding it is the concept of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) (127), most fully recognizable as an internal purposiveness of the Concept itself. Ng traces the purposiveness theme through the entirety of the Subjective Logic, establishing its significance for understanding the deduction of the Concept and for the transition to the Idea. In her analysis, she closely follows Hegel’s division of the Subjective Logic and addresses Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Idea in chapters 5–8, respectively. With chapter 5, Ng moves to a discussion of how Hegel finds judgment to arise from the “original judgement of life,” the initial unity and division of subject and object within life (172). Chapter 6 extends this discussion by elucidating the tension Hegel finds between the objective ground of purposive activity in genera-concepts and its subjective expression in the workings of self-consciousness. Ng devotes chapter 7 to exploring how life constitutes the immediate Idea—the subjectobject (244)—and the doubling thereof in both immediate life and self-consciousness as each is both subject and object. This chapter also furthers her discussion of the tension between the two. Ng concludes in chapter 8 by exploring Hegel’s absolute method, in which the immediate concerns of life are transmuted into the realm of self-consciousness, manifesting “the ongoing dialectic between life and cognition” (293). Freedom arises from self-consciousness’s ability to pursue its own end; this pursuit is limited without the initial impulse provided by life. Ng’s book is an exciting, new, captivating interpretation of Hegel that is at once an original, comprehensive reinterpretation of his philosophy with the potential to fundamentally alter how it is understood. While this study is very dense and requires solid prior knowledge of Hegel and his immediate predecessors, it is highly recommended for all serious students of Hegel. M a r i n a F . B y k o v a North Carolina State University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"528 - 530"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46772198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"La substance comme \"point métaphysique\" et le corps étendu. Éclairage de la géométrie sur un problème de métaphysique dans la doctrine leibnizienne du milieu des années 1690","authors":"Valérie Debuiche","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902877","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:La question de la relation entre le point et l'étendue en géométrie résonne, dans la pensée de Leibniz, avec celle du lien entre la substance simple avec le corps matériel dont elle est l'élément constitutif d'un point de vue métaphysique. En effet, comment ce qui est indivisible et sans dimension pourrait-il être le principe de ce qui se présente, au contraire, comme toujours divisé et étendu? Si la philosophie tardive de l'auteur, une fois devenue monadologie après 1700, rencontre en cela un problème presque insurmontable, il ne semble pas en être de même dans les années 1690. Cet article propose de montrer comment, vers 1695, une solution originale en est fournie qui renvoie aux innovations mathématiques de cette période, au sujet du point, de l'étendue et, de façon centrale, de la continuité, étoffant ainsi la toile qui unit les mathématiques de Leibniz avec sa philosophie.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"397 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47780098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}