{"title":"胡塞尔与分离主义:对鲍尔的回答","authors":"S. Overgaard","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902881","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"3 2","pages":"499 - 513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Husserl and Disjunctivism: Reply to Bower\",\"authors\":\"S. Overgaard\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/hph.2023.a902881\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"abstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46448,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":\"3 2\",\"pages\":\"499 - 513\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902881\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902881","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
期刊介绍:
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