Schopenhauer and the Nature of Philosophy by Jonathan Head (review)

IF 0.7 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
J. Norman
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Subjective Logic “as his own version of a ‘critique of judgment’” (18). She demonstrates that this part of the Logic offers a positive account of the concept of life that Hegel develops in his critical interaction with Kant. The most illustrative in this respect is the “Subjectivity” section of the Logic, in which the form of life is presented as the ground and presupposition of Hegel’s theory of concepts and judgments. According to Ng, such a reading makes evident that “life opens up the space of reasons” (234, 281). Chapter 4 takes up Hegel’s immanent deduction of the Concept argument, revealing that the key to understanding it is the concept of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) (127), most fully recognizable as an internal purposiveness of the Concept itself. Ng traces the purposiveness theme through the entirety of the Subjective Logic, establishing its significance for understanding the deduction of the Concept and for the transition to the Idea. In her analysis, she closely follows Hegel’s division of the Subjective Logic and addresses Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Idea in chapters 5–8, respectively. With chapter 5, Ng moves to a discussion of how Hegel finds judgment to arise from the “original judgement of life,” the initial unity and division of subject and object within life (172). Chapter 6 extends this discussion by elucidating the tension Hegel finds between the objective ground of purposive activity in genera-concepts and its subjective expression in the workings of self-consciousness. Ng devotes chapter 7 to exploring how life constitutes the immediate Idea—the subjectobject (244)—and the doubling thereof in both immediate life and self-consciousness as each is both subject and object. This chapter also furthers her discussion of the tension between the two. Ng concludes in chapter 8 by exploring Hegel’s absolute method, in which the immediate concerns of life are transmuted into the realm of self-consciousness, manifesting “the ongoing dialectic between life and cognition” (293). Freedom arises from self-consciousness’s ability to pursue its own end; this pursuit is limited without the initial impulse provided by life. Ng’s book is an exciting, new, captivating interpretation of Hegel that is at once an original, comprehensive reinterpretation of his philosophy with the potential to fundamentally alter how it is understood. While this study is very dense and requires solid prior knowledge of Hegel and his immediate predecessors, it is highly recommended for all serious students of Hegel. M a r i n a F . B y k o v a North Carolina State University
乔纳森·海德的《叔本华与哲学的本质》(综述)
主观逻辑“作为他自己版本的‘判断批判’”(18)。她证明,《逻辑学》的这一部分对黑格尔在与康德的批判性互动中发展起来的生命概念提供了积极的描述。在这方面最具说明性的是《逻辑学》的“主体性”部分,在这一部分中,生命的形式被作为黑格尔概念和判断理论的基础和前提。吴认为,这样的解读表明“生活打开了理性的空间”(234281)。第四章论述了黑格尔对概念论证的内在演绎,揭示了理解概念论证的关键是互惠概念(Wechselwirkung)(127),最充分地认识到这是概念本身的内在目的性。吴将目的性主题贯穿于主体逻辑的整体,确立了其理解概念演绎和向概念过渡的意义。在她的分析中,她密切关注黑格尔对主体逻辑的划分,并分别在第5-8章中论述了主体性、客观性和理念。在第五章中,吴讨论了黑格尔如何从“生命的最初判断”中找到判断,即生命中主体和客体的最初统一和划分(172)。第六章通过阐释黑格尔在一般概念中的目的性活动的客观基础与其在自我意识运作中的主观表达之间所发现的张力来扩展这一讨论。吴在第七章中探讨了生命是如何构成直接观念的——主客体(244)——以及它在直接生活和自我意识中的双重性,因为它们既是主体又是客体。本章还进一步探讨了二者之间的紧张关系。吴在第八章中总结了黑格尔的绝对方法,在这种方法中,生命的直接关注转化为自我意识的领域,体现了“生命与认知之间正在进行的辩证法”(293)。自由源于自我意识追求自身目的的能力;如果没有生活提供的最初冲动,这种追求是有限的。吴的书是对黑格尔的一种激动人心的、新的、迷人的解读,同时也是对他的哲学的一种独创的、全面的重新解释,有可能从根本上改变人们对哲学的理解。虽然这项研究非常密集,需要对黑格尔及其前任有扎实的先验知识,但强烈建议所有认真学习黑格尔的学生使用。M a r i n a F。北卡罗来纳州立大学
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Since January 2002, the Journal of the History of Philosophy has been published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. For subscriptions, change of address, and back issues, please contact Subscription Services. In addition to photocopying allowed by the "fair use" doctrine, JHP authorizes personal or educational multiple-copying by instructors for use within a course. This policy does not cover photocopying for commercial use either by individuals or publishers. All such uses must be authorized by JHP.
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