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The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey 后果主义的定义：综述
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-08-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000164
Oscar Horta, Gary David O’Brien, Dayrón Terán
{"title":"The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey","authors":"Oscar Horta, Gary David O’Brien, Dayrón Terán","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000164","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There are different meanings associated with consequentialism and teleology. This causes confusion, and sometimes results in discussions based on misunderstandings rather than on substantial disagreements. To clarify this, we created a survey on the definitions of ‘consequentialism’ and ‘teleology’, which we sent to specialists in consequentialism. We broke down the different meanings of consequentialism and teleology into four component parts: Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality. Combining these components in different ways we distinguished six definitions, all of which are represented in the philosophical literature. We asked the respondents which definition is best for consequentialism and for teleology. The most popular definition of consequentialism was the one which accepted value-dependence, but not maximization and agent-neutrality. We therefore recommend the use of this meaning to avoid misunderstandings. The results for teleology were more problematic, with several respondents claiming they never use the term, or indicating that it is confusing.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46746469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Letter from the New Editor 新编辑的来信
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-08-03 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000310
Ben Eggleston
{"title":"A Letter from the New Editor","authors":"Ben Eggleston","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000310","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43898056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reply to Jay on Subjective Consequentialism and Deontic Variance 论周的主观后果主义与道德变异
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/S095382082200019X
Scott Forschler
{"title":"Reply to Jay on Subjective Consequentialism and Deontic Variance","authors":"Scott Forschler","doi":"10.1017/S095382082200019X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382082200019X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Christopher Jay has recently argued that one version of subjective consequentialism is objectionable because it entails ‘arbitrary deontic variance’ in which the permissibility of some action can depend upon an arbitrary, non-moral choice of which possible results of the action to investigate or even reflect upon. This author argues that this deontic variance is actually entirely innocuous, and results from what may be the best subjective strategy for such investigation and reflection in cases involving uncertainty and cognitive limitations.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48763507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects? 如果我们包含多个道德相关的主体呢？
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000115
Dustin Crummett
{"title":"What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?","authors":"Dustin Crummett","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000115","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49531789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Christopher Woodard, Taking Utilitarianism Seriously (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 217. Christopher Woodard，《认真对待功利主义》（牛津，牛津大学出版社，2019），第xii+217页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-07-25 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000206
Lizzy Ventham
{"title":"Christopher Woodard, Taking Utilitarianism Seriously (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 217.","authors":"Lizzy Ventham","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000206","url":null,"abstract":"Approach in Practice); and deliberative democracy (e.g. David Crocker’s Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy). And of course, the most recent scholarly literature can be found in The Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, which publishes on all aspects of the capability approach. To sum up, although the Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach satisfies the need for a dedicated handbook and offers several new insights that contribute to the understanding of the capability approach, it is difficult to pinpoint the gap in the capability literature that it fills. That said, both new and established capability scholars might find value in some of the individual chapters of the Handbook depending on their research interests. In the end, the Handbook is a bit like those supermarket-bought mozzarella balls that come wrapped in plastic: safe, inoffensive, and likely to have a broad appeal. However, for those bothering to look, there are alternatives out there with more depth and flavour.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46027582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, Siddiqur Osmani, and Mozaffar Qizilbash (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. xxii + 718.
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000231
M. F. Byskov
{"title":"Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, Siddiqur Osmani, and Mozaffar Qizilbash (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. xxii + 718.","authors":"M. F. Byskov","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000231","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43482785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Decline of Egoism 利己主义的衰落
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000152
R. Shaver
{"title":"The Decline of Egoism","authors":"R. Shaver","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, what makes an action right is a fact other than its maximizing my self-interest. I briefly explain and criticize many of the arguments given against egoism in the period, then explain and defend the grounds objection.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42879621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Prospects for ‘Prospect Utilitarianism’ “前景功利主义”的前景
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000176
Ben Davies
{"title":"The Prospects for ‘Prospect Utilitarianism’","authors":"Ben Davies","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000176","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hun Chung argues for a theory of distributive justice – ‘prospect utilitarianism’ – that overcomes two central problems purportedly faced by sufficientarianism: giving implausible answers in ‘lifeboat cases’, where we can save the lives of some but not all of a group, and failing to respect the axiom of continuity. Chung claims that prospect utilitarianism overcomes these problems, and receives empirical support from work in economics on prospect theory. This article responds to Chung's criticisms of sufficientarianism, showing that they are misplaced. It then shows that prospect utilitarianism faces independent problems, since it too requires a threshold, which Chung bases on the idea of ‘adequate functioning’. The article shows that there are problems with this as a threshold, and that it is not empirically supported by prospect theory.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45161001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Clifford's Consequentialism Clifford的结果论
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000139
Brian Zamulinski
{"title":"Clifford's Consequentialism","authors":"Brian Zamulinski","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000139","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is morally negligent or reckless to believe without sufficient evidence. The foregoing proposition follows from a rule that is a modified expression of W. K. Clifford's ethics of belief. Clifford attempted to prove that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence by advancing a doxastic counterpart to an act utilitarian argument. Contrary to various commentators, his argument is neither purely nor primarily epistemic, he is not a non-consequentialist, and he does not use stoicism to make his case. Clifford's conclusion is a universal generalisation that is in a precarious position because of potential counterexamples. But the counterexamples do not preclude a rule against going beyond the available evidence and it is worthwhile making a moral case for such a rule.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43702525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Jonathan Pugh, Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 287. Jonathan Pugh，《自主性、理性与当代生物伦理学》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2020），第287页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Utilitas Pub Date : 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000127
Andréa Daventry
{"title":"Jonathan Pugh, Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 287.","authors":"Andréa Daventry","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000127","url":null,"abstract":"tional cooperative scheme. There seems to be no reason why the elderly should be bound less by the principles of fairness. In conclusion, Heath has aimed to offer philosophical foundations for the kind of climate change policy proposed within mainstream economics. While this may result in recommendations that are readily digestible by policymakers, the philosophical foundations Heath offers are radical within the discourse of environmental philosophy. In combination with Heath’s polemical style, it remains to be seen whether he succeeds in ‘promoting greater dialogue’ (p. 23) between philosophers and economists.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46497051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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