Economics of Transportation最新文献

{"title":"Optimal pricing and design of station-based bike-sharing systems: A microeconomic model","authors":"Sergio Jara-Díaz,&nbsp;André Latournerie,&nbsp;Alejandro Tirachini,&nbsp;Félix Quitral","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100273","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100273","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Carefully collected data of nine station-based Bike Sharing Systems (BSS) observed during several years, feed the theoretical formulation of three (aggregated) strategic models representing BSS operation from which the optimal design and pricing is derived. The models include both the operator's costs (investment and operation) and users' costs (time to walk to-from a station, waiting at a station, and time while cycling). The design variables are station spacing, number and capacity of stations, number of bicycles and bike repositioning. Once optimized, the design variables lead to cost functions and optimal pricing. In the first model, a permanent equilibrium without waiting times is assumed. In the second model, waiting at stations (due to a lack of bicycles or docking sites) is introduced in an aggregate form, which results in an increase in the optimal number of bikes and docking sites, making the optimal money price per trip to increase. The third and final model introduces repositioning of bicycles in order to diminish waiting time, making the optimal price grow even further. We obtain an optimal subsidy per trip that grows with the area covered by the BSS, which has implications for its actual implementation in large cities and their spatial and social equity. The optimal pricing scheme is caused by </span>economies of scale due to the reduction in users' access and egress times as the density of stations increases (positive externality) in addition to a fixed operator cost.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"31 ","pages":"Article 100273"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49279632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Spillover delay effects of damaging wildlife strike events at U.S. airports","authors":"Levi Altringer ,&nbsp;Sammy Zahran ,&nbsp;Stephanie A. Shwiff ,&nbsp;Michael J. Begier ,&nbsp;Aaron Anderson","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100252","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100252","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>In this paper, we investigate the spillover<span> departure delay effects of damaging wildlife strike events that occur to commercial passenger airlines on flights scheduled to depart in the 24 h following a damaging wildlife strike event. Employing multiple empirical approaches, and investigating various differential effects, we identify significant excess departure delays in the 24-hour post-strike period. Our results suggest that the spillover delay effects of wildlife strike events are largely contained within the airline to which the strike occurred. The estimated effects are particularly large—5.4 to 8.3 times higher than expectation—for immediate within-airline, same-leg flights. Further, the behavior of the estimated spillover delay effects also depend on whether a strike flight’s destination airport is an airline hub or not. Our estimated average treatment effects indicate that, during the 24-hour post-strike period, the average damaging wildlife strike event generates a minimum of 570 aircraft minutes and roughly 40,000 passenger minutes of within-airline excess departure delay. From this, we estimate that damaging wildlife strike events generate around $25 million (2020 U.S. $) in spillover delay costs each year—an external cost borne by </span></span><em>airlines</em>, <em>passengers</em>, and the <em>economy at large</em>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"30 ","pages":"Article 100252"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42904426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Assessing consumer valuations of future costs versus purchase prices in Japan's auto market","authors":"Kiyoshi Arakawa","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100260","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100260","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To tax vehicles such that market distortions are minimized and environmental goals are promoted, policymakers must determine whether consumers correctly assess automobile prices versus future costs of ownership. Drawing from data spanning 2006 to 2015 for Japan's new car market, we apply the aggregate random coefficients logit model to estimate consumer demand with rich substitution patterns. We find that Japanese consumers primarily focused on fuel costs and future registration taxes followed by vehicle purchase prices. This finding implies that promoting eco-friendly vehicles requires Japanese policymakers' attention to fuel and vehicle registration taxes. This finding also suggests that salient features of preferential tax treatment in the auto market distort consumer preferences toward future costs. Counterfactual experiments under a fixed amount of tax revenue reveal that raising fuel taxes improves average fuel economy more than registration taxes do at the expense of broader social welfare.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"30 ","pages":"Article 100260"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42893175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public transport frequency and risk-taking behavior","authors":"Harald Høyem","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100259","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100259","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When travellers connect to a transit service from a different mode, they must arrive at the connection in a timely manner. If there is uncertainty about the required time to meet the connection, some users might engage in risky behavior by, e.g., increasing their traveling speed. We examine whether the frequency level at a transfer connection may influence the incentive to engage in such risky behavior. We develop an optimization model in which users select an optimal speed in a two-stage process. A simulation study is performed to study the behavior within a wide range of possible preferences and trip characteristics. Our results suggest that increasing the departure frequency may provide a greater incentive for engaging in risky behavior – increasing social costs by increasing the number of accidents. The result is dependent upon average trip length, the initial frequency and the user's perception of scheduling cost. Policy makers should consider the possibly increased accident costs when altering the service level at a transfer connection.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"30 ","pages":"Article 100259"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41852827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The spatial effects of entry on airfares in the U.S. airline industry","authors":"Brad Shrago","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100251","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100251","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I analyze the spatial relationship between entry and airfares in the U.S. airline industry. I define the spatial relationship between adjacent airports based on catchment overlap, and evaluate the spatial impact of entry on fares. Using a fixed-effects estimator, I find that the impact of LCC entry on prices is not only larger than that of Legacy entry, but also influences prices at more distant airports. Owing to endogeneity concerns in the estimates, I also consider quasi-experimental evidence from the expiry of the Wright Amendment, which resulted in rapid and dramatic entry by Southwest Airlines from Dallas. Echoing the descriptive results, I find a broad spatial impact of entry by Southwest on rivals’ airfares. Overall, evidence suggests that current approaches to market definition in the airline industry may be overly restrictive, and I recommend researchers consider grouping a broader set of airports when defining markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"30 ","pages":"Article 100251"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46417848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Platform competition and consumer foresight: The case of airports","authors":"Giuseppe D’Amico","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100248","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100248","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the effect of competition and consumer foresight on platform profits. The focus is on airports, which provide passengers with aeronautical and commercial services through airlines and retailers. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we unravel the relationship between consumer foresight and the optimal pricing of the two services. When passengers are myopic, they undervalue the surplus they derive from the retail services, so that the airport charges low landing fees and makes profits from the retail business. When passengers are foresighted, they better anticipate the surplus from the retail services, so that the airport changes its strategy by charging higher landing fees and boosting competition in the retail sector. Second, we find that the relationship between profits and consumer foresight strictly depends on the considered market structure. When the airport has no competitors, airport profits are non-decreasing in the degree of consumer foresight. By contrast, under duopoly competition, a weakly-negative correlation between airport profits and consumer foresight is observed. These results allow to derive two main managerial implications. First, airport competition can lead to higher landing fees. Second, under competition, an airport is not necessarily interested in informing passengers about its retail facilities. However, an extension where airports decide whether to set an advertising campaign to inform passengers about their retail facilities reveals that they end up locked in a Prisoner’s Dilemma.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"29 ","pages":"Article 100248"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212012221000514/pdfft?md5=9410e3dfb1a4167abf034b3bb95f2330&pid=1-s2.0-S2212012221000514-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49148835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A freeway to prosperity? Evidence from Calabria, South of Italy","authors":"Emanuele Ciani ,&nbsp;Guido de Blasio ,&nbsp;Samuele Poy","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100250","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the impact of the freeway “Salerno-Reggio Calabria” on long-term local economic development. Built between 1962 and 1974, the freeway connected the southernmost region of the Italian peninsula (Calabria) to the national highway network. According to the original plan, the freeway could have been built along three different routes. The final choice was mostly influenced by powerful politicians who lobbied in favor of the path crossing their constituency (the town of Cosenza). In a differences-in-differences framework, we compare the growth of “inconsequentially” treated municipalities – traversed only because they lie on the route connecting Cosenza – with the one of municipalities on the two discarded paths. Our results suggest that the freeway caused a significant reorganization of both economic activity and population from untreated to treated locations. At the same time, the infrastructure does not seem to have helped the convergence of the overall region.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"29 ","pages":"Article 100250"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136459596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Airport pricing versus (grandfathered) slots: A generalization","authors":"Hao Lang,&nbsp;Achim I. Czerny","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100249","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Many passengers can choose among various destinations for their flight trips (for instance, a leisure trip from Asia to Europe or the US). This study tests the sensitivity of the outcomes of equilibrium congestion policies with respect to changes in airport network and demand structures. A major feature is to incorporate substitute destination choices for origin–destination passengers into the analysis of equilibrium airport congestion policies involving slot or pricing policies. The analysis shows that the presence of substitute destination choices is a necessary condition for equilibrium slot quantities to reach the first-best outcome that maximizes the welfare of all airport regions whereas equilibrium pricing levels will always be too high relative to the first-best prices independent of the presence or absence of substitute destination choices. Examples based on specific functional forms and numerical simulations are used to illustrate the main results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"29 ","pages":"Article 100249"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136459595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Research on travelers’ transportation mode choice between carsharing and private cars based on the logit dynamic evolutionary game model","authors":"Yu Zhang,&nbsp;Leiming Li","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100246","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100246","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The rapid increase in private cars has exacerbated urban traffic and environmental problems. As an alternative to private cars, carsharing is more economical and environmentally friendly than private cars and is becoming internationally recognized as sustainable transportation. However, the benefits of carsharing in alleviating traffic and environmental problems would only be significant when many travelers switch from private cars to carsharing. Thus, understanding travelers' dynamic selection processes when choosing between carsharing and private cars is important in promoting carsharing. Assuming that travelers' behavior regarding travel mode choice conforms to the principle of maximizing random utility, a logit evolutionary game model based on logit dynamics and evolutionary game theory<span> was constructed to explain and analyze the dynamic selection processes and mechanisms by which travelers choose between carsharing and private cars. In addition to the traditional time and monetary cost, the psychological benefit of the driving experience was also considered in the travelers’ payment functions. The unique global stable equilibrium point of the logit dynamic evolution model was derived through mathematical analysis. Data computed from a simple interview survey in Qingdao City were then used to perform an experimental numerical analysis on the evolutionary model of this study to further explain the dynamic evolution. Moreover, the relationships between the evolutionarily stable points and the time cost, monetary cost, and driving experience benefit differences between carsharing and private cars are discussed. The relationships between the benefits of the negative externalities of carsharing and private cars and the evolutionarily stable points are also examined. Furthermore, four scenarios are established, and their corresponding evolutionarily stable points are discussed to explain the influence of adjusting the external circumstances on the evolutionarily stable point. Finally, based on practical application, suggestions for encouraging travelers to use carsharing rather than private cars are provided to help carsharing organizations, government departments, and other related institutions.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"29 ","pages":"Article 100246"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45453415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An auction mechanism for platoon leader determination in single-brand cooperative vehicle platooning","authors":"Xiaotong Sun ,&nbsp;Yafeng Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100233","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Cooperative vehicle platooning enabled by connected automated vehicle (CAV) technology has been identified to bring energy savings and driving-effort reduction. However, the intrinsic difference of gained benefits between the leading vehicle and the following vehicles hampers the spontaneous platooning via peer-to-peer coordination. This study proposes an auction mechanism that determines the leader–follower positioning together with the associated benefits, for facilitating the formation and maintaining the behavioral stability of vehicle platoons in a distributed way. We theoretically prove that there is no mechanism to achieve an efficient outcome in an ex post equilibrium, requiring individual rationality and budget balance. In this regard, we provide a truthful </span><span><math><mi>ε</mi></math></span>-approximate auction mechanism that deploys a linear transfer function, which guarantees that the implemented outcome is an efficient approximate dominant strategy equilibrium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"28 ","pages":"Article 100233"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137371916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}