Economics of Transportation最新文献

{"title":"Pricing shared vehicles","authors":"Roman Zakharenko","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100296","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes profit-maximizing pricing in a model of shared vehicle (SV) market, with particular emphasis on spatial inequality of demand. I show that the best policy assigns a score to every location, and rewards (penalizes) customers for relocating the vehicle to a place with higher (lower) score. Such spatially explicit pricing enables providers to expand the vehicle dropoff “home” area into otherwise unprofitable low-density suburban areas and into for-fee parking zones. A greater geographic coverage has positive spillovers on operations within the initial home area. The empirical part of the paper uses novel microdata on SV trips to develop a strategy to estimate demand parameters, extrapolate them into larger counterfactual home area, evaluate optimal location scores, and predict profit gains from the expansion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"33 ","pages":"Article 100296"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49708156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How should ports share risk of natural and climate change disasters? Analytical modelling and implications for adaptation investments","authors":"Ryo Itoh ,&nbsp;Anming Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2023.100301","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2023.100301","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study theoretically examines disaster adaptation investments under risk of natural disasters. Given two neighboring, competitive ports, the disasters may cause independent damages to either port, or to both ports simultaneously; consequently, some shippers avoid loss by using the unaffected port if an independent disaster occurs in their local port. Since such inter-port risk sharing benefit increases with the share of independent disasters in all disasters, the socially optimal investment decreases with the disaster independence. However, the risk sharing benefit only attributes to the shippers' surplus and does not attribute to profits from the port management, so it does not affect investment of private port authorities that maximize the profits. Such an ignorance of the risk sharing benefit by the private port authorities is likely to lead to underinvestment in disaster adaptation facilities under a lower disaster independence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"33 ","pages":"Article 100301"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45969045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Airport concession revenue sharing and entry deterrence","authors":"Yushi Tsunoda","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100300","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100300","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates how concession revenue sharing between an airport and an incumbent airline affects the strategic flight frequency choice of that airline for entry deterrence and thus, profits and welfare. Specifically, we construct a model in which the incumbent airline confronts the entry threat of an entrant airline and strategically decides whether to deter or accommodate the entrant airline by choosing its flight frequency. We show that concession revenue sharing between the airport and the incumbent airline may enhance the market power of the incumbent airline, which improves or harms welfare. In addition, concession revenue sharing also diminishes the incentive for the incumbent airline to deter entry, which improves welfare. Our novel results provide important policy implications by determining that the effects of concession revenue sharing depend on the revenue share rate and the airport capacity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"33 ","pages":"Article 100300"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49589553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Urban commuting time and sick-leave medical license use: An empirical study of Santiago, Chile","authors":"Andrés Gómez-Lobo,&nbsp;Alejandro Micco","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100287","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use a large dataset from the Chilean unemployment insurance program covering 20% of all formal sector workers to study the impact of commuting time on the likelihood of sick-leave in Santiago, Chile. Our empirical results indicate that longer commuting times are associated with an increase in the probability of sick-leave work absence. A 20% decrease in commuting times would generate close to 36 million dollars per year in productivity benefits. Our results also suggest that commuting travel time improvements targeted to women, lower paid workers and relatively older workers would provide the highest benefits in terms of lowering sick-leave behavior. We also find evidence that mobility infrastructure investments, such as metro and commuter rail expansions, reduce the probability of sick-leave. The results of this paper have implications for measuring the social costs of congestion and for the estimation of the wider economic benefits of transport projects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"33 ","pages":"Article 100287"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49708153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Single-till regulation, dual-till regulation, and regulatory capture: When does a regulatory authority favor single-till regulation over dual-till regulation?","authors":"Yukihiro Kidokoro ,&nbsp;Anming Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100299","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100299","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes single-till regulation and dual-till regulation of a monopoly infrastructure, and clarifies conditions under which different stakeholders prefer one regulation type to the other. When a regulator maximizes the utility of consumers, the profit of service providers, or the weighted sum of both, it prefers single-till regulation when there is a positive profit from the non-core good. On the contrary, when the regulator maximizes the profit of the (infrastructure) monopoly, dual-till regulation is preferred if the profit from the non-core good is positive. Under a positive profit from the non-core good, consumers and service providers prefer single-till regulation, while the monopoly prefers dual-till regulation. Consumers and service providers thus have an opposite preference to the monopoly. If a regulator implements dual-till regulation under a positive profit from the non-core good, it reveals its preference for the monopoly's profit, suggesting that the regulator may be captured by the monopoly.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"33 ","pages":"Article 100299"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43705840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What role for electric vehicles in the decarbonization of the car transport sector in Europe?","authors":"Christina Littlejohn ,&nbsp;Stef Proost","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100283","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span><span><span><span>The transport sector is the only sector where carbon emissions<span><span> continue to grow. This has led policy makers to propose ambitious policies to reduce emissions in the car sector, in particular carbon emissions standards, portfolio mandates for Electric Vehicles and purchase taxes or subsidies. We use a stylized two-period model for the car </span>manufacturing sector to compare the </span></span>cost efficiency of these policies. The model has gasoline fueled cars (GV) compete with battery electric cars (EV). Both types of cars have endogenous technological progress that is triggered by </span>environmental policies, including tradable carbon emissions standards, portfolio mandates, </span>carbon taxes, purchase taxes and R&amp;D subsidies. Parked EVs can serve as batteries that help grid operators to shift off peak (renewable) electricity to peak hour supply. The model is calibrated to evaluate the </span>EU policy to reduce average carbon emissions of new cars by 37,5% in 2030 compared to 2021. We assess the cost-efficiency of policy instruments evaluating vehicle costs and prices, fuel costs, and externalities. We find that a carbon emissions standard achieves emission reductions at a much lower cost than a portfolio mandate for electric cars.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"32 ","pages":"Article 100283"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136705942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An analysis of labor regulations for transportation network companies","authors":"Akhil Shetty ,&nbsp;Sen Li ,&nbsp;Hamidreza Tavafoghi ,&nbsp;Junjie Qin ,&nbsp;Kameshwar Poolla ,&nbsp;Pravin Varaiya","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100284","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100284","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is a growing movement worldwide to regulate transportation network companies (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft. This is driven by concerns over low driver wages. Two recent labor regulations that were passed in California are Assembly Bill 5 (AB5) and Proposition 22 (Prop 22). AB5 classifies drivers (and other gig-economy workers) as employees as opposed to contractors. The implication is that ride-hailing companies must pay drivers a minimum wage and associated benefits, and that the drivers work full-time. This negatively impacts the TNC business model in two ways: (a) wage effect: higher wages and benefits reduce profit margins significantly, and (b) flexibility effect: having a base of full time drivers reduces the ability of TNCs like Uber and Lyft to match driver supply to customer demand on a fine temporal scale. As an alternative, TNCs lobbied fiercely for Prop 22. This regulation offers drivers 120% of minimum wage, but only for driving hours spent servicing a trip (<em>engaged time</em>).</p><p>This paper studies the impacts of these and other possible regulations using data from the city of San Francisco. We develop a market-equilibrium model that captures passenger demand and driver supply in response to TNC’s pricing decisions. We show that the flexibility effect under AB5 can be largely mitigated by offering staggered driver shifts. The wage effect is substantial and undermines the viability of the TNC business model. We find that the wage effect leads to a 18% decrease in TNC profit, whereas the flexibility effect results in a profit reduction ranging between 1%–10% depending on how shifts are designed. On the other hand, Prop 22 will preserve TNC profitability, but the guaranteed engaged time wage promised by Prop 22 is insufficient to materially increase driver wages. We show that this concern cannot be addressed by further increasing the engaged time wage, as it will increase passenger fares, increase driver cruising time, reduce efficiency, and significantly reduce TNC profit. We then suggest suitable modifications to each of the above regulations that can improve outcomes for drivers and passengers without jeopardizing the TNC business model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"32 ","pages":"Article 100284"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42953025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"I would if I could: Passing through VAT reductions in the german rail industry","authors":"Gernot Sieg,&nbsp;Jan Wessel","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100286","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100286","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Germany’s state-owned train operator Deutsche Bahn made a credible pledge to completely pass through a VAT<span> reduction to passengers. Using a price observation dataset, we find that pass-through rates for fixed-price tickets are indeed 100%, whereas pass-through rates for tickets with revenue-management-based prices can differ significantly from 100%. They vary over purchase-timing periods, departure weekdays, departure timeframes, and price levels<span>, thereby indicating that revenue management<span><span> systems can cause unequal pass-through to different customer groups. We also provide theoretical insights into the price-setting considerations of offering these two ticket types, and derive the monopoly pass-through rate for ad valorem </span>taxes.</span></span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"32 ","pages":"Article 100286"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46153152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An integral interval timetable for long-distance passenger rail services: Time to reconsider targeting on-track competition","authors":"Christina Brand,&nbsp;Gernot Sieg","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100285","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100285","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the course of introducing an integral interval timetable (IIT), it is possible to induce on-track competition. Regarding punctuality as an essential prerequisite for an IIT, we would not recommend doing so. Regarding overall welfare, the situation is less clear. We model both a route duopoly<span> and a monopoly, and find that in the latter, trains are more punctual and fares are higher. This is because a monopolist is not exposed to intramodal price competition, which may be at the expense of quality in the form of punctuality. Furthermore, a monopolist has a fixed cost advantage when investing in punctuality. If the market is regulated in such a way that rail traffic is maximized, welfare is higher in a monopoly. If such regulation is not binding anyway, this result does not change without it. Otherwise, without regulation, welfare is higher in a monopoly if the lower delay costs overcompensate for the higher fare, so that more passengers travel by train, compared to a duopoly, or if the fact that in the monopoly, there are fewer passengers is overcompensated for by the higher monopoly profit.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"32 ","pages":"Article 100285"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46652992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring the nonlinear impact of air pollution on housing prices: A machine learning approach","authors":"Guojian Zou ,&nbsp;Ziliang Lai ,&nbsp;Ye Li ,&nbsp;Xinghua Liu ,&nbsp;Wenxiang Li","doi":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100272","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100272","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span><span>Air pollution has profoundly impacted residents’ lifestyles as well as their willingness to pay for real estate. Exploring the relationship between air pollution and housing prices has become increasingly prominent. Current research on housing prices mainly uses the </span>hedonic pricing<span> model and the spatial econometric model, which are both linear methods. However, it is difficult to use these methods to model the nonlinear relationship between housing price and its determinants. In addition, most of the existing studies neglect the effects of multiple pollutants on housing prices. To fill these gaps, this study uses a machine learning approach, the gradient boosting decision tree (GBDT) model to analyze the nonlinear impacts of air pollution and the built environment on housing prices in Shanghai. The experimental results show that the GBDT can better fit the nonlinear relationship between housing prices and various explanatory variables compared with traditional linear models. Furthermore, the relative importance rankings of the built environment and air pollution variables are analyzed based on the GBDT model. It indicates that built environment variables contribute 97.21% of the influences on housing prices, whereas the contribution of air pollution variables is 2.79%. Although the impact of air pollution is relatively small, the marginal willingness of residents to pay for clean air is significant. With an improvement of 1 </span></span><span><math><mi>μ</mi></math></span>g/m<span><math><msup><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>3</mn></mrow></msup></math></span> in the average concentrations of PM_2.5 and NO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msub></math></span>, the average housing price increases by 155.93 Yuan/m<span><math><msup><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup></math></span> and 278.03 Yuan/m<span><math><msup><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup></math></span>, respectively. Therefore, this study can improve our understanding of the nonlinear impact of air pollution on housing prices and provide a basis for formulating and revising policies related to housing prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45761,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Transportation","volume":"31 ","pages":"Article 100272"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48776440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}