China Journal of Accounting Research最新文献_第2页

Fiscal expenditure responsibilities of public–private partnerships and corporate innovation investment—evidence from prefecture-level cities in China 公私合作与企业创新投资的财政支出责任——来自中国地级市的证据

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100416

Fang Wang , Xinci Chen , Guochao Yang

{"title":"Fiscal expenditure responsibilities of public–private partnerships and corporate innovation investment—evidence from prefecture-level cities in China","authors":"Fang Wang , Xinci Chen , Guochao Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100416","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100416","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Many public–private partnership (PPP) projects in China are facing increased fiscal expenditure responsibilities and weakened fiscal capacity, which may hinder investment in corporate innovation. Using data from Chinese prefecture-level cities and listed firms from 2014 to 2020, we find that PPP fiscal expenditure responsibilities negatively affect firms’ current and future innovation investment by reducing government subsidies and increasing corporate taxes. This negative effect is more pronounced when PPP fiscal expenditure responsibilities exceed a certain threshold. It is also stronger when local governments have higher levels of debt and lower central transfer payments. The effect is also stronger if the PPP project’s return mechanism increases the government’s future fiscal expenditure responsibilities, but weaker if the project’s operating model revitalizes government assets. The effect on private firms, small firms, high-debt firms, and firms facing strong financing constraints is more pronounced. From the perspective of fiscal capacity, this paper explains the underlying reasons why the effectiveness of government support policies for corporate innovation varies. Additionally, it examines the negative impacts of the financing-oriented PPP model on corporate innovation investment, providing empirical evidence to support options for optimal PPP strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":45688,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"18 2","pages":"Article 100416"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143937783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can independent directors effectively monitor controlling shareholders after reappointment? 独立董事连任后能否有效监督控股股东？

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100415

Rongjiang Bao , Yi Quan , Yuan Sun , Jingwen Zhang

{"title":"Can independent directors effectively monitor controlling shareholders after reappointment?","authors":"Rongjiang Bao , Yi Quan , Yuan Sun , Jingwen Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100415","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100415","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China, aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision. However, whether reappointing these directors after a “cooling-off period” following mandatory rotation undermines the effectiveness of supervision remains an open question. We investigate whether independent directors can effectively monitor tunneling activities after their reappointment. We find that their monitoring is less effective during their reappointment term than in their first term, reflected in a significant increase in related-party transactions with controlling shareholders. A mechanism test reveals that independent directors’ monitoring behavior is more passive during the reappointment term, as evidenced by less dissent and a lower likelihood of challenging proposals related to controlling shareholders. These effects are more pronounced when reappointed independent directors are less willing or able to supervise, or when the company’s internal and external governance environment is poor. Supervision also appears to be more effective if they are reappointed after a cooling-off period of more than three years. This paper extends research on the governance impact of reappointed independent directors and provides empirical evidence that can help to improve their post-term management practices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":45688,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"18 2","pages":"Article 100415"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143937787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Innovative or conservative? How clan culture shapes bank digital transformation in China 创新还是保守？家族文化如何影响中国银行数字化转型

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100406

Jinxuan Zhao , Meixu Ren

引用次数: 0

Does ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information really backfire? 事先披露监管信息真的会适得其反吗？

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100408

Huiyang Zhou, Jian Chu

{"title":"Does ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information really backfire?","authors":"Huiyang Zhou, Jian Chu","doi":"10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100408","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100408","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Regulatory information disclosure is an important measure to enhance government transparency and law enforcement credibility. Studies mainly focus on ex-post disclosure and affirm its positive effects. However, ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information, as a representative regulatory policy, not only receives little attention in research but also is highly controversial in practice. This paper leverages the differential timing of disclosure of on-site inspections by the China Securities Regulatory Commission as the research setting to examine the impact of ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information on the governance of regulated listed companies. We find that ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information does not weaken the regulatory effect as expected, but rather enhances the governance of listed companies, as evidenced by the improvement of internal control quality. Mechanism analysis shows that ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information can stimulate shareholder activism and motivate investors to participate in corporate governance activities by exercising their rights and voicing their opinions, which in turn improves corporate governance. In addition, the heterogeneity test finds that regulatory capture induced by political connections weakens the governance effect of ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information. The economic consequence test shows that ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information reduces corporate violations and improves firm performance. Our findings suggest that ex-ante disclosure of regulatory information can mobilize investors, especially minority shareholders, to participate in corporate governance and promote the high-quality development of listed companies in a market-oriented way. Meanwhile, the institutional cost of regulatory capture stemming from ex-ante disclosure must be watchfully monitored.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":45688,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"18 2","pages":"Article 100408"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143937784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100404

Yong Huang , Kam C. Chan , Chunxiang Zhao

{"title":"Tax-related human capital: Evidence from financial reporting aggressiveness of boards with tax officer directors in China","authors":"Yong Huang , Kam C. Chan , Chunxiang Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100404","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100404","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the impact of tax-related human capital (THC) on corporate financial reporting aggressiveness. Using the presence of former or current tax officers from tax authorities on a firm’s board of directors as a proxy for THC, we find that firms with tax officer directors report their earnings more aggressively than those without such directors. This relationship remains robust across alternative measures of aggressiveness, model specifications and various methods of addressing endogeneity concerns. Moreover, the level of aggressiveness is more pronounced when tax officer directors have previously served in local tax authorities, have experience in offices overseeing the firm’s income tax affairs or have held a senior position in tax authorities, particularly when firms are subject to lenient tax enforcement policies or higher statutory tax rates. These findings support that tax officer directors contribute to firms’ aggressive reporting practices through THC. Additional analyses suggest that firms with tax officer directors exhibit lower effective tax rates and a weaker association between effective tax rates and operating cash flows. Our findings collectively demonstrate that firms with tax officer directors possess significant THC and employ aggressive strategies in both financial and tax reporting practices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":45688,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"18 1","pages":"Article 100404"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143593319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Differentiated governance of executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises 中国国有企业高管薪酬的差异化治理

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100394

Yuanyuan Liu, Guojian Zheng, Guilong Cai

{"title":"Differentiated governance of executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises","authors":"Yuanyuan Liu, Guojian Zheng, Guilong Cai","doi":"10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100394","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100394","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the context of differentiated governance and the deepening market-oriented reform of compensation in China, we divide state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into four categories according to their equity structure, namely absolute holding firms, relative holding firms, major impact firms and equity participation firms, to examine the current situation and effectiveness of differentiated governance for executive compensation. We report four main findings. First, executive compensation levels, compensation gaps and equity incentives increase as government control decreases, indicating the emergence of differentiated governance of executive compensation in SOEs. Second, the driving force behind differentiated compensation is the government’s willingness to intervene in SOEs. The government’s ability to intervene in SOEs is not diminished by reduced equity control, and the government may even compensate for such a reduction by appointing excess executives. Third, differentiated governance of compensation is more prominent in local and competitive SOEs, while equity incentives lag significantly behind salary levels and salary gap incentives. Fourth, differentiated governance of compensation levels and gaps are effective in reducing agency problems and enhancing innovation in SOEs; however, the impact of equity incentives is limited. These findings enrich the literature on the differentiated governance of SOEs and facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of executive incentive and compensation contracts in Chinese SOEs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":45688,"journal":{"name":"China Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"18 1","pages":"Article 100394"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143593325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The aggregate release of third-party online sales data and audit quality improvement 第三方线上销售数据汇总发布及审核质量提升

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100376

Ning Chen , Junxiong Fang

引用次数: 0

Is corporate digital transformation counter-cyclical? 企业数字化转型是逆周期的吗？

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100401

Shuai Wang , Xi Chen , Qinggang Wang

引用次数: 0

How do managers use MD&A disclosures to respond to negative news? 管理者如何利用管理层收购与收购的披露来应对负面新闻？

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2025.100405

Lingbing Liu, Huixin Geng, Yutong Wang

引用次数: 0

Returnee CEO and audit fees 海归CEO和审计费用

IF 1.9

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100403

Vincent Tawiah , Hela Borgi , Muhammad Usman , Francis Osei-Tutu

引用次数: 0