Vincent Tawiah , Hela Borgi , Muhammad Usman , Francis Osei-Tutu
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
We examine the relationship between returnee chief executive officers (CEOs) and audit fees in China using robust econometric modeling with 25,630 firm-year observations between 2008 and 2020. A returnee CEO is a Chinese CEO who has previously worked or studied outside mainland China. Consistent with the supply-side argument that returnees improve governance and reduce audit risk, having a returnee CEO is negatively associated with audit fees. This relationship is not sensitive to the source of foreign experience. Firms with (vs. without) returnee CEOs pay lower audit fees. This effect is particularly pronounced for state-owned enterprises. Poorly governed, highly complex and risky firms benefit most from returnee CEOs in terms of lower audit fees. Our findings are robust across various tests.
期刊介绍:
The focus of the China Journal of Accounting Research is to publish theoretical and empirical research papers that use contemporary research methodologies to investigate issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance in the Greater China region, countries related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and other emerging and developed markets. The Journal encourages the applications of economic and sociological theories to analyze and explain accounting issues within the legal and institutional framework, and to explore accounting issues under different capital markets accurately and succinctly. The published research articles of the Journal will enable scholars to extract relevant issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance related to the capital markets and institutional environment.