不同所有权类型和强制法律环境下独立董事的履职风险应对策略

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yu Xin , Ying Xin , Xinyi Huang , Liping Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

所有制类型、法律制度演变及其相互作用会显著影响独立董事的激励和行为。我们利用 2019 年《证券法》修订作为外生冲击,考察国有企业(SOE)与非国有企业(Non-SOE)及其独立董事如何应对监管合规风险的变化。修订后,国有企业更有可能购买董事和高管责任保险,为独立董事提供工作保障。非国有企业更倾向于通过提高薪酬来补偿独立董事的履职风险,而其独立董事则更倾向于辞职以规避诉讼风险。在不同的合规风险阶段,国有企业、非国有企业和独立董事的应对策略是动态的,并受到企业层面和董事层面特征的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Coping strategy of independent directors for job-fulfillment risk under different ownership types and enforced legal environments
Ownership type, legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors. We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk. Following the revision, SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors. Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’ fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk. The coping strategies for SOEs, non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
295
审稿时长
15 weeks
期刊介绍: The focus of the China Journal of Accounting Research is to publish theoretical and empirical research papers that use contemporary research methodologies to investigate issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance in the Greater China region, countries related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and other emerging and developed markets. The Journal encourages the applications of economic and sociological theories to analyze and explain accounting issues within the legal and institutional framework, and to explore accounting issues under different capital markets accurately and succinctly. The published research articles of the Journal will enable scholars to extract relevant issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance related to the capital markets and institutional environment.
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