海归CEO和审计费用

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

China Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.cjar.2024.100403

Vincent Tawiah , Hela Borgi , Muhammad Usman , Francis Osei-Tutu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用2008年至2020年间25630家公司的观察数据，采用稳健的计量经济模型研究了海归首席执行官与中国审计费用之间的关系。海归CEO是指曾在中国大陆以外工作或学习的中国CEO。与供应方认为海归能改善治理、降低审计风险的观点一致，聘请海归CEO与审计费用呈负相关。这种关系对外国经验的来源并不敏感。有海归ceo的公司（与没有海归ceo的公司相比）支付的审计费用更低。这种影响在国有企业中尤为明显。管理不善、高度复杂和高风险的公司从海归首席执行官那里获益最多，因为他们的审计费用较低。我们的发现在各种测试中都是可靠的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Returnee CEO and audit fees

We examine the relationship between returnee chief executive officers (CEOs) and audit fees in China using robust econometric modeling with 25,630 firm-year observations between 2008 and 2020. A returnee CEO is a Chinese CEO who has previously worked or studied outside mainland China. Consistent with the supply-side argument that returnees improve governance and reduce audit risk, having a returnee CEO is negatively associated with audit fees. This relationship is not sensitive to the source of foreign experience. Firms with (vs. without) returnee CEOs pay lower audit fees. This effect is particularly pronounced for state-owned enterprises. Poorly governed, highly complex and risky firms benefit most from returnee CEOs in terms of lower audit fees. Our findings are robust across various tests.

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来源期刊

China Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

295

审稿时长

15 weeks

期刊介绍： The focus of the China Journal of Accounting Research is to publish theoretical and empirical research papers that use contemporary research methodologies to investigate issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance in the Greater China region, countries related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and other emerging and developed markets. The Journal encourages the applications of economic and sociological theories to analyze and explain accounting issues within the legal and institutional framework, and to explore accounting issues under different capital markets accurately and succinctly. The published research articles of the Journal will enable scholars to extract relevant issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance related to the capital markets and institutional environment.