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Analytic Philosophy最新文献

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Grounding and boundaries 接地和界限
2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12319
Giulio Sciacca
{"title":"Grounding and boundaries","authors":"Giulio Sciacca","doi":"10.1111/phib.12319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12319","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper discusses a recent puzzle concerning the notions of boundary parthood and dependence, and offers a new solution. The puzzle was originally presented by Jeroen Smid and successively elaborated upon by Claudio Calosi. I first reformulate some of the troublesome premises. Particularly, whereas Smid and Calosi discuss the puzzle in terms of an underspecified notion of dependence, I propose to construe it in terms of the notion of grounding. In this manner, the dependence relation inherently carries an asymmetry, and we can effectively utilize its four places. The solution I advance precisely takes advantage of this feature of dependence. My proposal avoids the contradiction while still respecting the intuitions driving the original premises. It is also fully compatible with boundaries being only generically dependent on their wholes.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135202525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advice as a model for reasons 忠告作为理由的典范
2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-16 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12320
Andrew Sneddon
{"title":"Advice as a model for reasons","authors":"Andrew Sneddon","doi":"10.1111/phib.12320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12320","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Smith ( Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 55 , 1995, 109) and Manne ( Philosophical Studies , 167 , 2014, 89), both following Williams ( Making sense of humanity , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), have developed advice‐based models of practical reasons. However, advice is not an apt model for reasons. The case for such pessimism is made by examining the positions of Smith and Manne first as attempts to explain the nature of reasons, then as suggestions for reforming our conception of reasons for action. The explanatory projects fail: both views either omit or distort ordinary reasons. The reforming project fails because insufficient reason is provided for thinking that the significant extent of revision offered by these models is worth it. Overall, the advice‐based approach to understanding reasons fails because advising is a social practice to aid with decisions, whereas reasons are considerations that favour action regardless of whether these considerations are inputs to or outputs from such a practice.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135307305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from Grundgesetze 论逻辑公理和非证据的认识论保证:摘自《哲学概论》的一段
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-07 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12315
Junyeol Kim
{"title":"Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from Grundgesetze","authors":"Junyeol Kim","doi":"10.1111/phib.12315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12315","url":null,"abstract":"Criticizing psychologism about logic in the Foreword of Grundgesetze, Frege examines an answer to the question of how we can justify our acknowledgment of logical axioms as true—the logical laws that cannot be proved from other laws. The answer he entertains states that we cannot reject logical axioms if we do not want to give up our judgment altogether. Suspending his judgment about this answer, Frege points out that it is still compatible with his anti‐psychologist conception of logic. There are two issues with this paragraph. First, it is difficult to read this paragraph consistently. Second, it is not clear why Frege brings up this particular view regarding the justification for logical axioms in the middle of his criticism of psychologism. This paper develops a consistent interpretation of this paragraph. The view on the justification for logical axioms, which Frege is dealing with, is neo‐Kantian. In the paragraph, Frege is criticizing a psychologistic misunderstanding of the neo‐Kantian justification for logical axioms. The way Frege explains away this misunderstanding shows that he takes the neo‐Kantian justification for logical axioms to be a non‐evidential epistemic warrant if it is an epistemic warrant. It is this notion of non‐evidential epistemic warrant that Frege suspends his judgment about. Thus, the paragraph shows that Frege has a reason to have reservations about neo‐Kantianism. Furthermore, it turns out that the sole issue between Frege and psychological logicians is whether truth is objective, which provides a different way to explain away a much‐discussed tension between Begriffsschrift and Frege's anti‐psychologism.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42057818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment 原因、削弱因素和美德：对语用侵犯的新阐释
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-04 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12314
Eva Schmidt
{"title":"Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment","authors":"Eva Schmidt","doi":"10.1111/phib.12314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12314","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I explicate pragmatic encroachment by appealing to pragmatic considerations attenuating, or weakening, epistemic reasons to believe. I call this the ‘Attenuators View’. I will show that this proposal is better than spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’. While both views do equally well when it comes to providing a plausible mechanism of how pragmatic encroachment works, the Attenuators View does a better job distinguishing practical and epistemic reasons to believe. First, this view does not appeal to the costs of believing falsely as reasons against believing; second, because of this, it does not run the risk of tearing down the wall between practical and epistemic reasons bearing on belief. I underpin the Attenuators View with a virtue‐theoretic account of how pragmatic encroachment attenuates epistemic reasons and close my discussion by considering some objections against such a view.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42469431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
No double-halfer embarrassment: A reply to Titelbaum 没有双半尴尬:对Titelbaum的回复
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12257
Joel Pust
{"title":"No double-halfer embarrassment: A reply to Titelbaum","authors":"Joel Pust","doi":"10.1111/phib.12257","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12257","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"64 3","pages":"346-354"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48758336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can we combine practical and epistemic reason? 我们能把实践理性和认识论理性结合起来吗?
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12312
Darren Bradley
{"title":"Can we combine practical and epistemic reason?","authors":"Darren Bradley","doi":"10.1111/phib.12312","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12312","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers a theory of how epistemic and practical reasons for belief can be combined into all-things-considered reason. Unlike alternative theories, it does not involve any sharp cut-offs or lexical priorities among types of reason. The theory allows that the relative strengths of the practical and epistemic reasons matter, as does the distance between the epistemically rational credence and the practically rational credence. Although there are important differences between the structure of epistemic and practical reason, they can still be combined in a satisfactory way. The central idea is that epistemic reason determines an epistemically rational doxastic state, and practical reason can push it around.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 1","pages":"53-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12312","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48151308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Giving up gratitude 放弃感恩
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12311
Daniel Coren
{"title":"Giving up gratitude","authors":"Daniel Coren","doi":"10.1111/phib.12311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12311","url":null,"abstract":"Resentment is a negative reaction to expressions of bad will. Gratitude is a positive reaction to expressions of good will. To give up resentment, when someone has wronged you, is to forgive them. We might expect an analog for giving up gratitude. The practice features in some ordinary and extraordinary moments in our lives. But it is unnamed and unstudied. I clarify what giving up gratitude is. I identify three types of ordinary and important cases. I then attend to implications; in particular, my account sheds light on restorations of gratitude analogous to un‐forgiving. Restoring gratitude may help to repair relationships, and restoring your once‐lost gratitude may be morally required in some contexts. More generally, by taking account of gratitude as a dynamic attitude that may be given up and restored as fits the situation and one's judgment, we may better understand the power and flexibility of gratitude's everyday function.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45530803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platonic qua predication 柏拉图式夸预测
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-08 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12306
Rachel Barney
{"title":"Platonic qua predication","authors":"Rachel Barney","doi":"10.1111/phib.12306","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Platonic arguments often have premises of a particular form which is misunderstood. These sentences look like universal generalizations, but in fact involve an implicit qua phrase which makes them a fundamentally different kind of predication. Such general implicit redoubled qua predications (girqps) are not an expression of Plato's proprietary views; they are also very common in everyday discourse. Seeing how they work in Plato can help us to understand them.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 4","pages":"453-472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42010752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The act‐type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said 命题的行为型理论是一种关于所说内容的理论
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-07 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12309
Thomas Hodgson
{"title":"The act‐type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said","authors":"Thomas Hodgson","doi":"10.1111/phib.12309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12309","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48713686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities 克里普克可设想性和认识论模态
IF 0.6 2区 哲学
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12310
Vittorio Morato
{"title":"Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities","authors":"Vittorio Morato","doi":"10.1111/phib.12310","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phib.12310","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti-Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and theoretical costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibility (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility), and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"65 4","pages":"585-602"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/phib.12310","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135642598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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