{"title":"命题的行为型理论是一种关于所说内容的理论","authors":"Thomas Hodgson","doi":"10.1111/phib.12309","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>I propose a version of the act-type theory of propositions, following Hanks and Soames. According to the theory, propositions are types of act of predication. The content of a sentence is the type of such act performed when that sentence is uttered. A consequence of this theory is that the structure of the content of a sentence will mirror the structure of that sentence. I defend this consequence of the theory from two important objections. I then argue that this theory is well motivated because it can be part of a theory of what is said.</p>","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"66 1","pages":"37-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said\",\"authors\":\"Thomas Hodgson\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phib.12309\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>I propose a version of the act-type theory of propositions, following Hanks and Soames. According to the theory, propositions are types of act of predication. The content of a sentence is the type of such act performed when that sentence is uttered. A consequence of this theory is that the structure of the content of a sentence will mirror the structure of that sentence. I defend this consequence of the theory from two important objections. I then argue that this theory is well motivated because it can be part of a theory of what is said.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45646,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analytic Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"66 1\",\"pages\":\"37-62\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analytic Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phib.12309\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analytic Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phib.12309","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said
I propose a version of the act-type theory of propositions, following Hanks and Soames. According to the theory, propositions are types of act of predication. The content of a sentence is the type of such act performed when that sentence is uttered. A consequence of this theory is that the structure of the content of a sentence will mirror the structure of that sentence. I defend this consequence of the theory from two important objections. I then argue that this theory is well motivated because it can be part of a theory of what is said.
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