{"title":"The Potential Compensation Principle and Constant Marginal Utility of Income","authors":"Stephen Martin","doi":"10.1111/jere.12240","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jere.12240","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In policy applications, industrial economists are wont to invoke the Kaldor–Hicks potential compensation principle to justify the use of deadweight loss as a measure of the welfare cost of market power. This usage rests on two assumptions. One of these assumptions, that changes in consumer and producer surplus are weighted equally, is well understood. The other assumption, that the marginal utility of income is constant, receives less attention. In a simple model, I show that if there is decreasing marginal utility of income, the use of deadweight loss as an index of market performance rests on shaky ground.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12240","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88713606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Relational Contracting in Developed Economies: Lessons From Slot Exchanges in the US Airline Industry","authors":"Ricard Gil, Myongjin Kim, Giorgio Zanarone","doi":"10.1111/jere.12243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12243","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper highlights the widespread use of relational contracting in developed economies. While the number of empirical studies on relational practices in developing countries is increasing rapidly, evidence from industries and countries characterised by strong institutions is lagging behind due to data constraints. We argue that technological progress and strong institutions do not diminish the use of relational contracting, and use the US airline industry as a case in point. In particular, we discuss a number of factors (including transaction complexity, existence of collaborative relationships and data availability) that make this industry an ideal setting to study relational contracting in a developed economy. Moreover, we argue that other industries in developed countries share the properties of the US airline industry and, hence, can be used as a basis to investigate relational contracting in future work.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12243","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92297766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Forensic Econometrics: Demand Estimation When Data are Missing","authors":"Julian Hidalgo, Michelle Sovinsky","doi":"10.1111/jere.12242","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jere.12242","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Often empirical researchers face many data constraints when estimating models of demand. These constraints can sometimes prevent adequate evaluation of policies. In this article, we discuss two such missing data problems that arise frequently: missing data on prices and missing information on the size of the potential market. We present some ways to overcome these limitations in the context of two recent research projects. Jacobi and Sovinsky (2018), which addresses how to incorporate unobserved price heterogeneity, and Hidalgo and Sovinsky (2018), which focuses on how to use modelling techniques to estimate missing market size. Our aim is to provide a starting point for thinking about ways to overcome common data issues.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12242","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75135812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective","authors":"Daniel F. Garrett","doi":"10.1111/jere.12239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12239","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some sellers display high “regular” prices, but mark down these prices the vast majority of the time, advertising the good as “on sale” or “discounted”. This note suggests a framework for understanding the practice, emphasising the role of buyer uncertainty about their future valuations for the good. We argue that so-called “regular” prices set buyers’ expectations regarding future prices, expectations that need not be tethered to the prices actually set. By manipulating upwards buyers’ expectations of future prices, the seller can increase demand for the good at the current “sale” price, increasing profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12239","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92297271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collusion and Information Exchange","authors":"Yu Awaya","doi":"10.1111/jere.12241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12241","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Antitrust authorities view that exchange of individual firms’ sales data is more anti-competitive than that of aggregate sales data. In this paper, I survey antitrust implications of such inter-firm information exchange. I argue that both types of information exchange are anti-competitive under some circumstances. More precisely, I compare profits when each type of information exchange is allowed to that when firms can only observe their own sales (Stigler’s secret price-cutting model), and the former is bigger than the latter. I also provide a general method to bound the equilibrium profits without such information exchange.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12241","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92320743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some economics of the movie industry†","authors":"Luís Cabral","doi":"10.1111/jere.12233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12233","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A progress report is provided on a long-term research project, joint with Gabriel Natividad, on the economics and strategy of the movie industry. Specifically, a series of empirical papers dealing with demand estimation, pricing and movie-release strategies is surveyed.</p><p>JEL Classification Numbers: L82.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92334375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using the Tools of Industrial Organisation to Illuminate the Credit Rating Industry","authors":"Lawrence J. White","doi":"10.1111/jere.12238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12238","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Until slightly more than a decade ago, the credit rating industry was largely a little-recognised and little-understood part of the financial system “plumbing”. This obscurity changed with the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. After a few years of intensive attention, however, the CRAs have retreated back to semi-obscurity and attract little media or political attention. The tools of industrial organisation can help us understand this industry: its structure; its behaviour; and its outcomes; and the public policies that are likely to improve its functioning.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12238","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92195119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction to Special Issue on Industrial Organization","authors":"Reiko Aoki, Luis Cabral","doi":"10.1111/jere.12231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12231","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12231","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92369795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}