Strategic Product Line Choice under Asymmetric Demand Structure

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Levent Kutlu, Alper Nakkas
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine strategic product line choices of manufacturers in a stylised duopoly model where products have asymmetric and interdependent market conditions. We characterise the optimal product line decisions and show that manufacturers always prefer to have head-to-head competition (and never segment markets) when product line setup cost is small relative to profitability of the products. When setup costs are high, symmetric manufacturers may prefer to have asymmetric product lines or market segmentation. We show that high setup costs lead to the market segmentation outcome only if there is no significant market size difference and the level of product substitutability is moderate.

非对称需求结构下的战略产品线选择
我们在一个程式化的双寡头垄断模型中考察制造商的战略产品线选择,其中产品具有不对称和相互依赖的市场条件。我们描述了最优产品线决策的特征,并表明当产品线设置成本相对于产品的盈利能力较小时,制造商总是倾向于进行正面竞争(而不是细分市场)。当设置成本较高时,对称制造商可能倾向于采用不对称的产品线或市场细分。我们发现,只有在市场规模差异不显著且产品可替代性水平适中的情况下,高设置成本才会导致市场细分结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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