{"title":"非对称需求结构下的战略产品线选择","authors":"Levent Kutlu, Alper Nakkas","doi":"10.1111/jere.12186","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine strategic product line choices of manufacturers in a stylised duopoly model where products have asymmetric and interdependent market conditions. We characterise the optimal product line decisions and show that manufacturers always prefer to have head-to-head competition (and never segment markets) when product line setup cost is small relative to profitability of the products. When setup costs are high, symmetric manufacturers may prefer to have asymmetric product lines or market segmentation. We show that high setup costs lead to the market segmentation outcome only if there is no significant market size difference and the level of product substitutability is moderate.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":"69 3","pages":"347-359"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12186","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic Product Line Choice under Asymmetric Demand Structure\",\"authors\":\"Levent Kutlu, Alper Nakkas\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jere.12186\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We examine strategic product line choices of manufacturers in a stylised duopoly model where products have asymmetric and interdependent market conditions. We characterise the optimal product line decisions and show that manufacturers always prefer to have head-to-head competition (and never segment markets) when product line setup cost is small relative to profitability of the products. When setup costs are high, symmetric manufacturers may prefer to have asymmetric product lines or market segmentation. We show that high setup costs lead to the market segmentation outcome only if there is no significant market size difference and the level of product substitutability is moderate.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45642,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Japanese Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"69 3\",\"pages\":\"347-359\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-07-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12186\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Japanese Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jere.12186\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Japanese Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jere.12186","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic Product Line Choice under Asymmetric Demand Structure
We examine strategic product line choices of manufacturers in a stylised duopoly model where products have asymmetric and interdependent market conditions. We characterise the optimal product line decisions and show that manufacturers always prefer to have head-to-head competition (and never segment markets) when product line setup cost is small relative to profitability of the products. When setup costs are high, symmetric manufacturers may prefer to have asymmetric product lines or market segmentation. We show that high setup costs lead to the market segmentation outcome only if there is no significant market size difference and the level of product substitutability is moderate.
期刊介绍:
Started in 1950 by a group of leading Japanese economists under the title The Economic Studies Quarterly, the journal became the official publication of the Japanese Economic Association in 1959. As its successor, The Japanese Economic Review has become the Japanese counterpart of The American Economic Review, publishing substantial economic analysis of the highest quality across the whole field of economics from researchers both within and outside Japan. It also welcomes innovative and thought-provoking contributions with strong relevance to real economic issues, whether political, theoretical or policy-oriented.