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Probabilism: An Open Future Solution to the Actualism/Possibilism Debate 概率论：现实主义/可能性论争论的开放未来解决方案
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.49
Yishai Cohen, T. Timmerman
{"title":"Probabilism: An Open Future Solution to the Actualism/Possibilism Debate","authors":"Yishai Cohen, T. Timmerman","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.49","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom requires a metaphysically open future. We develop probabilism as a solution to the actualism/possibilism debate, a solution that accommodates an open future requirement for freedom. We argue that probabilism resolves the conflicting intuitions that arise between actualists and possibilists and maintains certain distinct advantages over actualism and possibilism.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41391296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased Evaluative Descriptions 有偏见的评价性描述
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-13 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.5
S. Bernstein
{"title":"Biased Evaluative Descriptions","authors":"S. Bernstein","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.5","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this essay I identify a type of linguistic phenomenon new to feminist philosophy of language: biased evaluative descriptions. Biased evaluative descriptions are descriptions whose well-intended positive surface meanings are inflected with implicitly biased content. Biased evaluative descriptions are characterized by three main features: (1) they have roots in implicit bias or benevolent sexism, (2) their application is counterfactually unstable across dominant and subordinate social groups, and (3) they encode stereotypes. After giving several different kinds of examples of biased evaluative descriptions, I distinguish them from similar linguistic concepts, including backhanded compliments, slurs, insults, epithets, pejoratives, and dog whistles. I suggest that the traditional framework of Gricean implicature cannot account for biased evaluative descriptions. I discuss some challenges to the distinctiveness and evaluability of biased evaluative descriptions, including intersectional social identities. I conclude by discussing their social significance and moral status. Identifying biased evaluative descriptions is important for a variety of social contexts, from the very general and broad (political speeches) to the very particular and small (bias in academic hiring).","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48015162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Principles as Generics 作为泛型的道德原则
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.47
Ravi Thakral
{"title":"Moral Principles as Generics","authors":"Ravi Thakral","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.47","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that moral principles involve the same sort of generalization as ordinary yet elusive generic generalizations in natural language such as ‘Tigers are striped’ or ‘Peppers are spicy’. A notable advantage of the generic view is that it simultaneously allows for pessimism and optimism about the role and status of moral principles in our lives. It provides a new perspective on the nature of moral principles on which principles are not apt for determining the moral status of particular actions while they may be apt, and even fundamental, to our acquisition of moral knowledge. A natural consequence of the view is variation among moral principles, with some regularly warranting exceptions and some appearing arguably exceptionless. I will also argue that this generic conception of moral principles has significant advantages, as a normative model of moral reasoning, over the view of moral principles as defaults advanced in recent years.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45005974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political Legitimacy as Grounded in the Wills of Citizens: A Reply to Peter 基于公民意志的政治合法性——对彼得的回应
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.4
{"title":"Political Legitimacy as Grounded in the Wills of Citizens: A Reply to Peter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.4","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Fabienne Peter (2020) recently proposed a taxonomy of accounts of the meta-normative grounds of political legitimacy. In this article, I argue that there is an important distinction left out of that taxonomy that complicates the picture. This is the distinction between attitude-independent and attitude-dependent conceptions of normative truth. Through an examination of these conceptions of normative truth (and correlate interpretations of what counts as a normative reason) I argue that what Peter calls a fact-based conception of legitimacy may collapse into a will-based conception. Further, the distinction has important implications for what Peter calls the belief-based conception. Finally, I defend the will-based conception against Peter's arbitrariness objection through an examination of ideally coherent eccentrics.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47955671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Master Narratives, Self-Simulation, and the Healing of the Self 大师叙事、自我模拟和自我疗愈
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.44
{"title":"Master Narratives, Self-Simulation, and the Healing of the Self","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.44","url":null,"abstract":"Infiltrated consciousness occurs when a subject's sense of self comes to be strongly and negatively shaped by victimizing master narratives. Consider the stay-at-home dad who has internalized a harmful narrative of traditional masculinity and so feels ashamed because he is not the family's bread winner. One way master narratives infiltrate consciousness is through conditioning self-simulation by assigning a hierarchy of values to different social roles. Further, master narratives confine self-simulation by prescribing certain social roles to an individual and prohibiting others. One common suggestion for counteracting infiltrated consciousness is to transform it through membership in new communities with new master narratives. But how does such healing happen? This essay offers a response. Recent psychological research on constructivist theories of memory outlines a naturalistically plausible mechanism for self-simulation. I argue that this mechanism is implicated in transforming infiltrated consciousness. This clarifies features of our psychological architecture that make the alteration of self-concepts possible.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44255327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dealbreakers and the Work of Immoral Artists 破坏者与不朽艺术家的作品
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.54
Ian Stoner
{"title":"Dealbreakers and the Work of Immoral Artists","authors":"Ian Stoner","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.54","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A dealbreaker, in the sense developed in this essay, is a relationship between a person's psychology and an aspect of an artwork to which they are exposed. When a person has a dealbreaking aversion to an aspect of a work, they are blocked from embracing the work's aesthetically positive features. I characterize dealbreakers, distinguish this response from other negative responses to an artwork, and argue that the presence or absence of a dealbreaker is in some cases an appropriate target of moral evaluation. I then use the concept of dealbreakers to develop a new approach to the question of our moral obligations with respect to the work of immoral artists, arguing that there is no general obligation binding us to cultivate or eliminate a dealbreaking aversion to their work. I conclude by suggesting several other philosophical debates that could benefit from a focus on dealbreakers.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44522584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Universalism and the Problem of Aesthetic Diversity 普遍主义与审美多样性问题
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.53
A. King
{"title":"Universalism and the Problem of Aesthetic Diversity","authors":"A. King","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.53","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay examines a recent line of thought in aesthetics that challenges realist-leaning aesthetic theories. According to this line of thought, aesthetic diversity and disagreement are good, and our aesthetic judgments, responses, and attachments are deeply personal and even identity-constituting. These facts are further used to support anti-realist theories of aesthetic normativity. I aim to achieve two goals: (1) to disentangle arguments concerning diversity, disagreement, and personality; and (2) to offer realist-friendly replies to all three.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48107144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse 道德哗众取宠与道德话语规范
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-11 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.8
{"title":"Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.8","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others’ stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49032150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two Dimensions of Responsibility: Quality and Competence of Will 责任的两个维度：素质与意志能力
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-03 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.2
Taylor Madigan
{"title":"Two Dimensions of Responsibility: Quality and Competence of Will","authors":"Taylor Madigan","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.2","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Pure quality of will theories claim that ‘the ultimate object’ of our responsibility responses (i.e., praise and blame) is the quality of our will. Any such theory is false—or so I argue. There is a second dimension of (moral) responsibility, independent of quality of will, that our responsibility responses track and take as their object—namely, how adroitly we are able to translate our will into action; I call this competence of will. I offer a conjectural explanation of the two dimensions of (moral) responsibility: it matters to us that people actually perform adequately well because of how much it matters to us that we are able to live and work together successfully.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49303247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
No Harm, Still Foul: On the Effect-Independent Wrongness of Slurring 没有伤害，仍然犯规:论诽谤的效果无关性错误
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-03-22 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.18
R. DiFranco, A. Morgan
{"title":"No Harm, Still Foul: On the Effect-Independent Wrongness of Slurring","authors":"R. DiFranco, A. Morgan","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.18","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Intuitively, a speaker who uses slurs to refer to people is doing something morally objectionable even if no one is measurably affected by their speech. Perhaps they are only talking to themselves, or they are speaking with bigots who are already as vicious as they can be. This paper distinguishes between slurring as an expressive act and slurring as the act of causing a psychological effect. It then develops an expression-focused ethical account in order to explain the intuition that slurring involves an effect-independent moral wrong. The core idea is that the act of expressing a morally defective attitude is itself pro tanto morally objectionable. Unlike theories that focus only on problematic effects, this view is able to shift the moral burden of proof away from victims of slurring acts and onto speakers. It also offers moral guidance with respect to metalinguistic and pedagogical utterances of slurs.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47175879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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