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Doing Moral Philosophy Without ‘Normativity’ 没有“规范性”的道德哲学
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.16
Jorah Dannenberg
{"title":"Doing Moral Philosophy Without ‘Normativity’","authors":"Jorah Dannenberg","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.16","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay challenges widespread talk about morality's ‘normativity’. My principal target is not any specific claim or thesis in the burgeoning literature on ‘normativity’, however. Rather, I aim to discourage the use of the word among moral philosophers altogether and to reject a claim to intradisciplinary authority that is both reflected in and reinforced by the role the word has come to play in the discipline. My hope is to persuade other philosophers who, like me, persist in being interested in long-standing questions about our morals to be considerably more suspicious about the word's actual value for us and to see those studying ‘normativity’ itself as having little to offer us when it comes to posing our questions about morals and debating the answers to them.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46281142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Explanation and the Right to Explanation 解释与解释权
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-08-29 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.7
Elanor Taylor
{"title":"Explanation and the Right to Explanation","authors":"Elanor Taylor","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.7","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In response to widespread use of automated decision-making technology, some have considered a right to explanation. In this article, I draw on insights from philosophical work on explanation to present a series of challenges to this idea, showing that the normative motivations for access to such explanations ask for something difficult, if not impossible, to extract from automated systems. I consider an alternative, outcomes-focused approach to the normative evaluation of automated decision making and recommend it as a way to pursue the goods originally associated with explainability.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46835772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Disrupt a Social Script 如何破坏社交脚本
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.10
Samia Hesni
{"title":"How to Disrupt a Social Script","authors":"Samia Hesni","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Social scripts, like A gives a compliment, B says ‘thank you’, pervade and shape natural language discourse and social interactions. Scripts usually promote cooperation between conversational participants, but not always. For example, if A pays B a ‘compliment’ like ‘nice legs’, A puts B in a double bind of either abiding by the compliment script by saying ‘thank you’ and being humiliated, or breaking the script and risking escalation. In this paper, I take a philosophical lens to the notion of a social script. I give a theoretical overview of what it would mean to disrupt a social script and explain why and when it is prudential to do so. Then I give several examples of disruptions of social scripts. This essay makes four key contributions to the philosophical literature on social scripts: (1) it introduces a new distinction between interpersonal and structural scripts; (2) it illuminates how interpersonal social scripts can be pernicious by creating a double bind; (3) it analyzes what it is to disrupt a social script; and (4) in doing so, it challenges the orthodoxy about the relationship between cooperation and disruption in political action.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48952073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emotions and the Action Analogy: Prospects for an Agential Theory of Emotions 情绪与行动类比:情绪代理理论的展望
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.11
H. Naar
{"title":"Emotions and the Action Analogy: Prospects for an Agential Theory of Emotions","authors":"H. Naar","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.11","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to the action analogy, emotions and actions have certain structural and normative similarities that no theory of emotions should ignore. The action analogy has recently been used in an objection against the so-called perceptual theory of emotions, often defended by means of an analogy between emotion and perception. Beyond the dialectical significance of the action analogy, one might wonder whether it can support a picture of emotions as fundamentally action-like—what I call an agential theory. This article is a first step in answering this question. After discussing various ways to formulate the agential theory, I sketch a version of it.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46217780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
C. I. Lewis's Theory of Ideas: Royce's Problem and Lewis's Solution C.I.刘易斯的思想理论：罗伊斯的问题与刘易斯的解决方案
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-07-31 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.15
R. Atkins
{"title":"C. I. Lewis's Theory of Ideas: Royce's Problem and Lewis's Solution","authors":"R. Atkins","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.15","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Implicit in C. I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is an account of how our ideas undergo a process of social development. Lewis's account of that process resolves a problem with Josiah Royce's theory of ideas. Royce holds that there are both sensuous and symbolic ideas. It is, however, possible for someone to have only a sensuous idea of how middle C sounds and for another person to have only the symbolic idea that middle C is 261.63 Hz. In what sense, if at all, can these two persons have the same idea, namely, the idea of middle C? On Lewis's account, while ideas in individual minds are typically constituted of both sensory correlates and pure concepts, ideas are also social products that individuals inherit through education and language acquisition. For two people to have the same idea is for them both to be heirs to the social development of the idea.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45733939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Sooner the Better: An Argument for Bias Toward the Earlier 越快越好:对越早的偏见的争论
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.51
Bradford Saad
{"title":"The Sooner the Better: An Argument for Bias Toward the Earlier","authors":"Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.51","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward earlier events: other things equal, we should prefer for good events to occur earlier and disprefer for bad events to occur earlier. The argument contends that we should accord at least some credence—if only a small one—to a theoretical package featuring the growing block theory of time and that this package generates a presumptive bias toward earlier events. Rival theoretical packages are considered. Under reasonable allocations of credence to them, the presumptive bias escapes defeat. The argument has several corollaries: other things equal, we should be biased toward the past over the future, the further past over the nearer past, and the nearer future over the further future.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41450090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion 询问态度与情色逻辑:限制与拓展的规范
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-06-19 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.13
Dennis Whitcomb, Jared Millson
{"title":"Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion","authors":"Dennis Whitcomb, Jared Millson","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.13","url":null,"abstract":"A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might prohibit having certain inquiring attitudes (“norms of restriction”), while ignoring those that might require having them (“norms of expansion”). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields—some sympathetically, others unsympathetically.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45664491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Contingency, Sociality, and Moral Progress 偶然性、社会性和道德进步
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-05-17 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.3
Olof Leffler
{"title":"Contingency, Sociality, and Moral Progress","authors":"Olof Leffler","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.3","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A debate has recently appeared regarding whether non-naturalism is better than other metaethical views at explaining moral progress. I shall take the occasion of this debate to present a novel debunking dilemma for moral non-naturalists, extending Sharon Street's Darwinian one. I will argue that moral progress indicates that our moral attitudes tend to reflect contingent sociocultural and psychological factors. For non-naturalists, there is then either a relation between these factors and the moral facts, non-naturalistically construed, or there is not. If there is no relation, the contingent factors are unlikely to lead to moral knowledge. If there is a relation, they must be likely to lead to non-naturalist-style moral knowledge, but no theoretically virtuous explanation of moral progress is likely to accommodate non-naturalist commitments. It follows that non-naturalist moral realism cannot explain our moral knowledge. I call this a contingentist challenge to non-naturalism.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43348920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contrastive Intentions 对比意图
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.33
Andrew Peet
{"title":"Contrastive Intentions","authors":"Andrew Peet","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.33","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses about intention, intentional action, and practical reason. And they give rise to a puzzle about rather-than constructions such as ‘I intend to ϕ rather than ψ’: In side effect cases it can seem wrong to claim that the subject intends to ϕ yet acceptable to claim that they intend to ϕ rather than ψ. This cries out for explanation. Contrastivism provides a unified response to all of these problems.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46095245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Indexing Philosophy in a Fair and Inclusive Key 以公平和包容的方式索引哲学
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.52
Simon Fokt, Quentin Pharr, Clotilde Torregrossa
{"title":"Indexing Philosophy in a Fair and Inclusive Key","authors":"Simon Fokt, Quentin Pharr, Clotilde Torregrossa","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.52","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Existing indexing systems used to arrange philosophical works have been shown to misrepresent the discipline in ways that reflect and perpetuate exclusionary attitudes within it. In recent years, there has been a great deal of effort to challenge those attitudes and to revise them. But as the discipline moves toward greater equality and inclusivity, the way it has indexed its work has unfortunately not. To course correct, we identify in this article some of the specific changes that are needed within current indexing systems and propose a new model that could embody them. We use the Diversity Reading List in Philosophy as a case study and PhilPapers as a basis for comparison. The model we propose not only represents the discipline in a more inclusive and fair way, but it is also efficient, easy to use or implement, and adaptable for a variety of contexts.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42126320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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