道德哗众取宠与道德话语规范

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
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引用次数: 0

摘要

道德哗众取宠是利用道德言论进行自我宣传。最近的哲学著作认为,人们通常可以准确地识别哗众取宠的例子。相比之下,我们认为,人们通常无法可靠地识别哗众取宠的情况,而我们通常认为其他人因此而哗众取乐是不合理的。从那以后,我们认为,在大多数情况下,将他人视为哗众取宠的人,就是没有以应有的智慧谦逊行事。然后,我们考察这些结论对道德话语的意义。更具体地说,我们建议道德话语应该关注他人陈述的理由以及他们的行为是否表现出尊重。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse
Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others’ stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
10.00%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: Appearing quarterly in print and online, the Journal of the American Philosophical Association provides a platform for original work in all areas of philosophy. The Journal aims to publish compelling papers written in a way that can be appreciated by philosophers of every persuasion and to review papers quickly (typically within 30 days of submission) and fairly (using a triple anonymous review system), encouraging succinct, constructive reports. Papers are published online early via FirstView (typically within 8 weeks of acceptance).
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