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Dealbreakers and the Work of Immoral Artists 破坏者与不朽艺术家的作品
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.54
Ian Stoner
{"title":"Dealbreakers and the Work of Immoral Artists","authors":"Ian Stoner","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.54","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A dealbreaker, in the sense developed in this essay, is a relationship between a person's psychology and an aspect of an artwork to which they are exposed. When a person has a dealbreaking aversion to an aspect of a work, they are blocked from embracing the work's aesthetically positive features. I characterize dealbreakers, distinguish this response from other negative responses to an artwork, and argue that the presence or absence of a dealbreaker is in some cases an appropriate target of moral evaluation. I then use the concept of dealbreakers to develop a new approach to the question of our moral obligations with respect to the work of immoral artists, arguing that there is no general obligation binding us to cultivate or eliminate a dealbreaking aversion to their work. I conclude by suggesting several other philosophical debates that could benefit from a focus on dealbreakers.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44522584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse 道德哗众取宠与道德话语规范
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-11 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.8
{"title":"Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.8","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others’ stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49032150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two Dimensions of Responsibility: Quality and Competence of Will 责任的两个维度：素质与意志能力
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-04-03 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.2
Taylor Madigan
{"title":"Two Dimensions of Responsibility: Quality and Competence of Will","authors":"Taylor Madigan","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.2","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Pure quality of will theories claim that ‘the ultimate object’ of our responsibility responses (i.e., praise and blame) is the quality of our will. Any such theory is false—or so I argue. There is a second dimension of (moral) responsibility, independent of quality of will, that our responsibility responses track and take as their object—namely, how adroitly we are able to translate our will into action; I call this competence of will. I offer a conjectural explanation of the two dimensions of (moral) responsibility: it matters to us that people actually perform adequately well because of how much it matters to us that we are able to live and work together successfully.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49303247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
No Harm, Still Foul: On the Effect-Independent Wrongness of Slurring 没有伤害，仍然犯规:论诽谤的效果无关性错误
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-03-22 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.18
R. DiFranco, A. Morgan
{"title":"No Harm, Still Foul: On the Effect-Independent Wrongness of Slurring","authors":"R. DiFranco, A. Morgan","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.18","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Intuitively, a speaker who uses slurs to refer to people is doing something morally objectionable even if no one is measurably affected by their speech. Perhaps they are only talking to themselves, or they are speaking with bigots who are already as vicious as they can be. This paper distinguishes between slurring as an expressive act and slurring as the act of causing a psychological effect. It then develops an expression-focused ethical account in order to explain the intuition that slurring involves an effect-independent moral wrong. The core idea is that the act of expressing a morally defective attitude is itself pro tanto morally objectionable. Unlike theories that focus only on problematic effects, this view is able to shift the moral burden of proof away from victims of slurring acts and onto speakers. It also offers moral guidance with respect to metalinguistic and pedagogical utterances of slurs.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47175879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Skepticism, the Virtue of Preemptive Distrust 怀疑论，先发制人的不信任的美德
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-03-20 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2023.1
John A. Brennan
{"title":"Skepticism, the Virtue of Preemptive Distrust","authors":"John A. Brennan","doi":"10.1017/apa.2023.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.1","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does trust operate under conditions of oppression? Little attention has been paid to how distrust may be both necessary and costly to its bearer. Distrust is clearly warranted under certain conditions, but do those conditions contribute to a reduction in one's overall well-being? More importantly, is there something about distrust itself (rather than the conditions that warrant it) that contributes to this reduction in well-being? In this essay, I explore these questions in depth. I explain what the costs of distrust are and how they impede our well-being. I argue that the weakened development of trust through oppression has some important downstream consequences: namely, it requires the cultivation of skepticism as a virtue of distrust, which I argue should be included as one of Lisa Tessman's burdened virtues—those that are required for survival but that do not necessarily lead to the agent's flourishing.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49482551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Desert and Dissociation 沙漠与分离
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-03-08 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.42
C. Bennett
{"title":"Desert and Dissociation","authors":"C. Bennett","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.42","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue against the idea of basic desert. I claim that the supposed normative force of desert considerations is better understood in terms of dissociation. The starting point is to note that an important strategy in spelling out the apparent normative force of desert considerations appeals to the idea of complicity. I argue that the idea of basic desert cannot give a good explanation of this connection. I propose that it is rather dissociation that is explanatorily basic. I further argue that dissociation is an expressive action. Dissociation from wrongdoing—expressed as distancing from the wrongdoer—is an expressive attempt to do justice to the significance of wrongdoing in a way analogous to the expressive attempt to thank someone adequately for doing you a favor. I draw on the idea of dissociation as an expressive action to explain why it should be that a failure to dissociate is a source of complicity.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42211384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anne Conway's Ontology of Creation: A Pluralist Interpretation 安妮·康威的创造本体论:一个多元主义的解释
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-03-02 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.48
J. Grey
{"title":"Anne Conway's Ontology of Creation: A Pluralist Interpretation","authors":"J. Grey","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.48","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Does Anne Conway (1631–79) hold that the created world consists of a single underlying substance? Some have argued that she does; others have argued that she is a priority monist and so holds that there are many created substances, but the whole created world is ontologically prior to each particular creature. Against both of these proposals, this article makes the case for a substance pluralist interpretation of Conway: individual creatures are distinct substances, and the whole created world is not ontologically prior to the individual creatures that compose it. The basic argument for such a view draws on Conway's claims about the freedom and moral responsibility of individual creatures. The pluralist reading is straightforwardly compatible with these claims, while the monistic readings are not.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42409643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Defensiveness and Identity 防御和身份
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-02-28 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.43
Audrey Yap, J. Ichikawa
{"title":"Defensiveness and Identity","authors":"Audrey Yap, J. Ichikawa","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.43","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Criticism can sometimes provoke defensive reactions, particularly when it implicates identities people hold dear. For instance, feminists told they are upholding rape culture might become angry or upset because the criticism conflicts with an identity that is important to them. These kinds of defensive reactions are a primary focus of this paper. What is it to be defensive in this way, and why do some kinds of criticism or implied criticism tend to provoke this kind of response? What are the connections between defensiveness, identity, and active ignorance? What are the social, political, and epistemic consequences of the tendency to defensiveness? Are there ways to improve the situation?","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41405735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Despair and Hopelessness 绝望与绝望
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.50
Jack M. C. Kwong
{"title":"Despair and Hopelessness","authors":"Jack M. C. Kwong","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.50","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It has recently been argued that hope is polysemous in that it sometimes refers to hoping and other times to being hopeful. That it has these two distinct senses is reflected in the observation that a person can hope for an outcome without being hopeful that it will occur. Below, I offer a new argument for this distinction. My strategy is to show that accepting this distinction yields a rich account of two distinct ways in which hope can be lost, ways that map onto the two senses of hope: A person can lose hope either by ceasing to hope for an outcome (hopelessness) or by ceasing to be hopeful that it will obtain (despair). Thinking about these negative attitudes in these two ways, I contend, is explanatorily rich and fruitfully reveals how they differ in phenomenology, behavioral differences, and the ways in which a person can escape them.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47725578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ta-Nehisi Coates's Between the World and Me: A Phenomenology of Racialized Conflict 塔-内希斯·科茨的《在世界与我之间:种族化冲突的现象学》
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.41
Niclas Rautenberg
{"title":"Ta-Nehisi Coates's Between the World and Me: A Phenomenology of Racialized Conflict","authors":"Niclas Rautenberg","doi":"10.1017/apa.2022.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2022.41","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article investigates the structure of racialized conflict experience. Embarking from a conflict event in Ta-Nehisi Coates's autobiography Between the World and Me and contrasting the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz with insights from Black phenomenology, I argue that Coates's experience discloses conflictual, but intertwined, modes of being-in-the-world. Further, it presents an instantiation of a particular kind of conflict, i.e., corporeal conflict. Corporeal conflict applies whenever the body is politicized, i.e., when it becomes the marker for traits representative of a rival political group. Understood this way, racialized conflict is always political. I conclude the article with some remarks on the shortcomings of two dominant conflict theories in political philosophy and the potential for an alternative, phenomenological approach that enables new ways of engaging the other in conflict. The analysis is preceded by a meditation on the role of the White researcher in critical philosophy of race.","PeriodicalId":44879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the American Philosophical Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47148040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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