{"title":"Complexité des communs et régimes de droits de propriété : le cas des ressources génétiques animales","authors":"G. Allaire, J. Labatut, G. Tesnière","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0109","url":null,"abstract":"Animal breeds are intangible resources created and maintained by selection activities aimed a ?genetic progress?, and they are continuously transformed as a result of these activities and farming practices. Animal breeds (at least for cattle and sheep) have a status of common ownership. The way these common resources are managed, and the genetic progress is generated, controlled and distributed, is based in different national and historical contexts on ?breeding regimes?, made up of rules and political, scientific, informational, technical and organizational devices. Bundles of property rights analytical framework proposed by Schlager and Ostrom [1992] is implemented to distinguish these regimes, considering first the one that is structured in the?1960s in France with the support of the national policy of modernization of agriculture, then the one which today results of recent developments in scientific and technical knowledge, in the context of liberalization of agricultural policies. Each of these regimes got institutionalized in the context of technological breakthroughs: artificial insemination for the first one and genomic selection for the second one. In this article, we analyse the complexity of common resources systems and the evolution of the property rights applied to the case of animal genetic resources and the industry of livestock selection in agriculture. In our analysis of bundle of rights, we add a right of contribution, taking into account the definition of collective breeding objectives aiming at changing the breed?s orientation (leading to an ?alteration? of the breed). While only one breeding organism used to have the monopoly of this right for each breed, it is now threatened by the more competitive emerging regime. The economic stakes are different at each of the two periods.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"109-135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77249012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coordinated Reasoning and Augmented Individualism","authors":"W. Stirling, Luca Tummolini","doi":"10.3917/REDP.283.0469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.283.0469","url":null,"abstract":"An essential component of any theory of team reasoning is a formal definition of group rationality and of the collective interests that motivate the reasoning of team players. Eschewing the need to endow a group with its own preferences, this paper argues that an operational notion of coordination can serve such a role. Coordination is an intrinsically group-level concept that is complementary to, but distinct from, the intrinsically individual notion of performance. Both group rationality as manifest by coordination and individual rationality as manifest by performance are necessary for a full understanding of group behavior in social environments. Conditional game theory provides a flexible mathematical framework within which individuals may modulate their preferences in response to the social influence that others exert on them. As social influence diffuses throughout a social network, a comprehensive social model emerges that provides an operational definition of group rationality as well as an operational concept of augmented individual rationality that together establish a concept of coordinated reasoning.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"136 1","pages":"469-492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86419402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Enseigner les structures de marché et stratégies de concurrence avec les jeux pédagogiques","authors":"Yannick Gabuthy, E. Lambert","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Partant du constat d’un enseignement de l’economie a l’universite fonde sur des methodes principalement passives, cet article plaide en faveur d’une pedagogie active fondee sur les jeux pedagogiques experimentaux avec une application a la thematique des structures de marche. Il fournit les cles pour l’utilisation de tels jeux en exposant les bases de l’economie experimentale et les elements pratiques de la mise en œuvre d’un jeu pedagogique. L’enseignement des trois principales structures de marche (concurrence pure et parfaite, monopole et oligopole) est propose a travers la presentation d’un jeu detaille par structure, complete par une revue de la litterature liee aux experiences pedagogiques existant sur chacune d’entre elles.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"26 1","pages":"1-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84150928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aides publiques à l’efficacité énergétique. Mérites respectifs des subventions ad valorem et spécifiques","authors":"Philippe Quirion, L. Giraudet","doi":"10.3917/redp.286.1089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.286.1089","url":null,"abstract":"In France, subsidies in favour of energy efficiency are numerous and diverse. Most of them are ad valorem – proportional to the price of the targeted good or service – as the income credit for energy transition, the reduced rate VAT for building thermal retrofitting, the zero-rate loan or the ANAH subsidies. Others are specific i.e. independent from the price: automobile bonus and energy efficiency certificates. We review the arguments for each subsidy type. Compared to specific subsidies, ad valorem ones suffer from four drawbacks: they cause more public spending for a given impact, they distort goods’ quality, they benefit more to wealthier households and they encourage more fraud. However, specific subsidy are not without drawbacks either: the fiscal basis must be defined for every type of good and in case of an unexpected drop in the production cost of the subsidised good, the price of the latter risks becoming virtually zero.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"24 1","pages":"1089-1100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83252083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Piketty à Pékin. Les lois du Capital au XXIe siècle à l’épreuve de la Chine","authors":"Zhiming Long, R. Herrera","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0059","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we propose a method to build a stock of global capital ? la Piketty for China on a long period from?1952?to?2012?(part?1). The elasticities associated to such a capital are econometrically estimed though specifications integrating, along with it, human capital, research-and-development and a variable of institutional change, within the framework of modern macrodynamic neo-classical models???a framework which is that of this author, even if not exlusively. On this basis, we calculate a rate of implicit rentability of this global capital in order to test the validity of what Piketty presents as a ?fundamental unbalance?, comparing in the long term the rate of return of capital and the growth rate of income. Piketty?s ?economic law?, linking the coefficient of capital to the ratio savings rate?-?growth rate, is then examined (part?2). The results previously obtanined are confronted to new estimations on the subperiod?1978-2012, corresponding to what many authors call a ?capitalism ? la Chinese? (part?3). Finally, we briefly discuss the issue of inequality in China.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"57 1","pages":"59-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85221550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Évaluation du consentement à payer des riverains pour la restauration du lac Tchad","authors":"Patrick Arnold Ombiono Kitoto","doi":"10.3917/redp.286.1175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.286.1175","url":null,"abstract":"La disparition de 90 % de la superficie du lac Tchad a conduit les Etats riverains a elaborer un projet de restauration de cet actif naturel. Nous proposons ici de mesurer le consentement a payer des beneficiaires de ce projet. La demarche methodologique a fait recourt aux donnees d’une enquete d’evaluation contingente menee en 2011 dans la partie camerounaise du lac Tchad et aux procedures statistiques et econometriques adequates. Tout d’abord, nous revelons que 70 % au moins des enquetes sont favorables a la realisation du projet. Ensuite, nous estimons le consentement a payer a 55 240 FCFA par menage, soit un benefice social de 3 606 572 049 FCFA. Ces resultats sont ainsi la preuve que, du point de vue de la population riveraine, il y a un benefice reel a preserver le lac Tchad.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"7 1","pages":"1175-1198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85365588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning","authors":"D. Lempert","doi":"10.3917/REDP.283.0423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.283.0423","url":null,"abstract":"Evolutionary game theory has a lengthy history of modeling human interactions, and has been recently used to analyze the emergence and long-term viability of team reasoning. I review some basic elements of evolutionary analysis, and discuss a few issues attending evolutionary game theory?s importation from biology (where it was originally used to study genetic evolution of animal behavior) to the human sciences; in particular, I emphasize important differences between genetic and cultural evolution. After sketching a few fundamental results, I describe recent evolutionary analyses of team reasoning. Finally, I suggest some open lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"24 1","pages":"423-446"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84678989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philosophy and Economics: Recent Issues and Perspectives. Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Cyril Hédoin","doi":"10.3917/redp.282.0177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.282.0177","url":null,"abstract":"From its beginning, economic thinking has been deeply intertwined with philosophical considerations. The most important early economic thinkers, from Aristotle to Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, were of course also and (for some of them) foremost philosophers. Though the Marginalist revolution and the rise of neoclassical economics at the end of the 19th century have contributed to the constitution...","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"34 1","pages":"177-189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78070955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance","authors":"B. Deffains, S. Rouillon","doi":"10.3917/redp.281.0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.281.0041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the behaviour of an agent under strict liability and negligence when he can influence both the probability of the accident and the probability of being found liable in case of accident. We aim to compare the normative properties of strict liability versus fault-based liability under such circumstances. The model demonstrates that only a negligence rule is efficient and that the optimal damages under strict liability is less than what is usually admitted in the literature, i.e. the expected fine, given the probability to escape the liability, should be less than the level of harm. Finally, the paper highlights the role played by the technologies of precaution and evasion in the results.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"17 1","pages":"41-58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77526631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue “66ème congrès de l’AFSE”","authors":"Flora Bellone, P. Aghion","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0691","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"335 1","pages":"691-692"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80611390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}