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Enseigner les structures de marché et stratégies de concurrence avec les jeux pédagogiques 通过教育游戏教授市场结构和竞争策略
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.281.0001
Yannick Gabuthy, E. Lambert
{"title":"Enseigner les structures de marché et stratégies de concurrence avec les jeux pédagogiques","authors":"Yannick Gabuthy, E. Lambert","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Partant du constat d’un enseignement de l’economie a l’universite fonde sur des methodes principalement passives, cet article plaide en faveur d’une pedagogie active fondee sur les jeux pedagogiques experimentaux avec une application a la thematique des structures de marche. Il fournit les cles pour l’utilisation de tels jeux en exposant les bases de l’economie experimentale et les elements pratiques de la mise en œuvre d’un jeu pedagogique. L’enseignement des trois principales structures de marche (concurrence pure et parfaite, monopole et oligopole) est propose a travers la presentation d’un jeu detaille par structure, complete par une revue de la litterature liee aux experiences pedagogiques existant sur chacune d’entre elles.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"26 1","pages":"1-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84150928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aides publiques à l’efficacité énergétique. Mérites respectifs des subventions ad valorem et spécifiques 对能源效率的公共援助。从价补贴和特定补贴的各自优点
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/redp.286.1089
Philippe Quirion, L. Giraudet
{"title":"Aides publiques à l’efficacité énergétique. Mérites respectifs des subventions ad valorem et spécifiques","authors":"Philippe Quirion, L. Giraudet","doi":"10.3917/redp.286.1089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.286.1089","url":null,"abstract":"In France, subsidies in favour of energy efficiency are numerous and diverse. Most of them are ad valorem – proportional to the price of the targeted good or service – as the income credit for energy transition, the reduced rate VAT for building thermal retrofitting, the zero-rate loan or the ANAH subsidies. Others are specific i.e. independent from the price: automobile bonus and energy efficiency certificates. We review the arguments for each subsidy type. Compared to specific subsidies, ad valorem ones suffer from four drawbacks: they cause more public spending for a given impact, they distort goods’ quality, they benefit more to wealthier households and they encourage more fraud. However, specific subsidy are not without drawbacks either: the fiscal basis must be defined for every type of good and in case of an unexpected drop in the production cost of the subsidised good, the price of the latter risks becoming virtually zero.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"24 1","pages":"1089-1100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83252083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Piketty à Pékin. Les lois du Capital au XXIe siècle à l’épreuve de la Chine 皮凯蒂在北京。21世纪的资本法则在中国的考验
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.281.0059
Zhiming Long, R. Herrera
{"title":"Piketty à Pékin. Les lois du Capital au XXIe siècle à l’épreuve de la Chine","authors":"Zhiming Long, R. Herrera","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0059","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we propose a method to build a stock of global capital ? la Piketty for China on a long period from?1952?to?2012?(part?1). The elasticities associated to such a capital are econometrically estimed though specifications integrating, along with it, human capital, research-and-development and a variable of institutional change, within the framework of modern macrodynamic neo-classical models???a framework which is that of this author, even if not exlusively. On this basis, we calculate a rate of implicit rentability of this global capital in order to test the validity of what Piketty presents as a ?fundamental unbalance?, comparing in the long term the rate of return of capital and the growth rate of income. Piketty?s ?economic law?, linking the coefficient of capital to the ratio savings rate?-?growth rate, is then examined (part?2). The results previously obtanined are confronted to new estimations on the subperiod?1978-2012, corresponding to what many authors call a ?capitalism ? la Chinese? (part?3). Finally, we briefly discuss the issue of inequality in China.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"57 1","pages":"59-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85221550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Évaluation du consentement à payer des riverains pour la restauration du lac Tchad 评估向居民支付恢复乍得湖费用的同意
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/redp.286.1175
Patrick Arnold Ombiono Kitoto
{"title":"Évaluation du consentement à payer des riverains pour la restauration du lac Tchad","authors":"Patrick Arnold Ombiono Kitoto","doi":"10.3917/redp.286.1175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.286.1175","url":null,"abstract":"La disparition de 90 % de la superficie du lac Tchad a conduit les Etats riverains a elaborer un projet de restauration de cet actif naturel. Nous proposons ici de mesurer le consentement a payer des beneficiaires de ce projet. La demarche methodologique a fait recourt aux donnees d’une enquete d’evaluation contingente menee en 2011 dans la partie camerounaise du lac Tchad et aux procedures statistiques et econometriques adequates. Tout d’abord, nous revelons que 70 % au moins des enquetes sont favorables a la realisation du projet. Ensuite, nous estimons le consentement a payer a 55 240 FCFA par menage, soit un benefice social de 3 606 572 049 FCFA. Ces resultats sont ainsi la preuve que, du point de vue de la population riveraine, il y a un benefice reel a preserver le lac Tchad.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"7 1","pages":"1175-1198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85365588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning 论进化博弈论与团队推理
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.283.0423
D. Lempert
{"title":"On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning","authors":"D. Lempert","doi":"10.3917/REDP.283.0423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.283.0423","url":null,"abstract":"Evolutionary game theory has a lengthy history of modeling human interactions, and has been recently used to analyze the emergence and long-term viability of team reasoning. I review some basic elements of evolutionary analysis, and discuss a few issues attending evolutionary game theory?s importation from biology (where it was originally used to study genetic evolution of animal behavior) to the human sciences; in particular, I emphasize important differences between genetic and cultural evolution. After sketching a few fundamental results, I describe recent evolutionary analyses of team reasoning. Finally, I suggest some open lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"24 1","pages":"423-446"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84678989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Non-paternalistic Benevolence, Consumption Externalities and the Liberal Social Contract 非家长式仁爱、消费外部性与自由主义社会契约
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/redp.282.0267
J. Ythier
{"title":"Non-paternalistic Benevolence, Consumption Externalities and the Liberal Social Contract","authors":"J. Ythier","doi":"10.3917/redp.282.0267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.282.0267","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the regulation of general consumption externalities by the liberal social contract. First-best liberal social contracts redistribute individual wealth and determine the level of provision of public commodities to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources that is unanimously preferred to the allocation of a hypothetical initial situation of perfect communication. We show that the social welfare functionals that aggregate individual social preferences by means of the generalized bargaining solution of Nash support the liberal social contract if they verify non-paternalistic benevolence, that is, if the associate social welfare functions are strictly increasing in the private welfare of all individuals. The existence of a liberal social contract follows as a corollary of this property of supportability. We characterize the liberal social contract as a case of application of Habermas?s norms of communicative action to the allocation of scarce resources by public finance and the market.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"166 1","pages":"267-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76180806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
L’efficience technique des institutions de microfinance en zone UEMOA waemu地区小额信贷机构的技术效率
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.284.0667
F. Fall
{"title":"L’efficience technique des institutions de microfinance en zone UEMOA","authors":"F. Fall","doi":"10.3917/REDP.284.0667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.284.0667","url":null,"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous proposons une analyse de l’efficience des institutions de microfinance (IMF) dans la zone UEMOA. L’analyse est faite a partir d’une approche DEA en deux etapes. Dans la premiere etape, l’efficience des IMF est estimee de facon non parametrique, en executant un modele VRS (de rendements d’echelle variables) a orientation input. Au total six modeles d’efficience sont estimes dont trois concernent l’efficience financiere et trois autres, l’efficience sociale. Les scores d’efficience obtenus dans cette premiere etape sont regresses, dans la seconde etape, sur un ensemble de variables environnementales en suivant la procedure bootstrap truncated de Simar et Wilson [2007], plus robuste que les approches classiques basees sur la regression tobit ou les moindres carrees ordinaires. Les resultats de la premiere etape mettent en evidence une faible efficience des IMF de la zone UEMOA. L’inefficience est a la fois technique et d’echelle, mais s’explique davantage par une mauvaise combinaison technique des ressources. Elle est plus palpable sur le plan social que financier. Les resultats de l’estimation post-dea montrent que la rentabilite economique est un determinant essentiel de l’efficience financiere et sociale. Les IMF les plus rentables economiquement sont les plus efficientes tant au plan social que financier. Les IMF les plus grandes et les plus anciennes sont egalement les moins efficientes au plan social. De meme les IMF a profil non commercial sont les plus efficientes du point de vue social. Toutefois, les resultats montrent que les variables environnementales ont souvent un impact qui varie selon le type de modele specifie.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"76 1","pages":"667-689"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74146362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Bond between Positive and Normative Economics 实证经济学与规范经济学之间的联系
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.282.0191
D. Hausman
{"title":"The Bond between Positive and Normative Economics","authors":"D. Hausman","doi":"10.3917/REDP.282.0191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.282.0191","url":null,"abstract":"This essay clarifies the relations between positive economics and mainstream normative economics. If rationality can be characterized by conditions on preferences and choices and, in addition, people are, to a reasonable degree of approximation rational, then economists can invoke the theory of rationality to explain choices. If people are also, as in positive economics, largely self-interested and reasonably well-informed, then their preferences will also indicate their level of well-being. Modeling both choice and welfare in terms of rational preferences thus unites positive and normative economics. In explaining market outcomes in terms of individual choices, explaining choices by preferences, and taking preferences to indicate well-being, economists who are concerned with welfare defend a normative theory that piggybacks on their positive theory. This traditional mainstream normative theory is problematic, but because of its unity and its connection to positive economics, it is also very powerful.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"11 1","pages":"191-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81465201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners 契约理论的焦点:奥利弗·哈特和本特Holmström, 2016年诺贝尔奖获得者
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.284.0493
Pierre Fleckinger, D. Martimort
{"title":"Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners","authors":"Pierre Fleckinger, D. Martimort","doi":"10.3917/REDP.284.0493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.284.0493","url":null,"abstract":"Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom were awarded the 2016 Swedish National Bank's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their contributions to the Theory of Contracts. Their works build a theory of firms and organizations that is based on two pillars: (1) Parties exert efforts or incur investments that increase the value of their relationships, but these actions are sometimes hidden, not directly observed, and thus cannot be contractually enforced by courts, and (2) contracts and ownership structures are (imperfect) responses to such informational frictions. Together, the contributions of these authors have paved the way for a complete renewal of the Theory of the Firm and Organizations Theory.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"7 1","pages":"493-533"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88668981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Time for Waste, Waste of Time? Assessing Heterogeneous Values of Saving Time from Recycling 浪费时间，浪费时间?评估从回收中节省时间的异质价值
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.3917/REDP.285.0915
Olivier Beaumais, D. Prunetti
{"title":"Time for Waste, Waste of Time? Assessing Heterogeneous Values of Saving Time from Recycling","authors":"Olivier Beaumais, D. Prunetti","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0915","url":null,"abstract":"EnglishAlthough the opportunity cost of time spent recycling has long been recognized as a key determinant of household recycling participation, very few empirical studies have attempted to provide estimates of it. In this paper, we propose a model of household recycling that, while including pecuniary and non pecuniary motives for decisions, such as social or moral norms, reveals heterogeneous values of saving time from recycling (VSTR). The predictions of our model are tested using data from a discrete choice experiment on waste management conducted in 2008 in Corsica and estimating a latent-class rank-ordered logit model. We find VSTR clearly heterogeneous across individuals, ranging from 8 % to 76 % of one’s income. francaisBien qu’il soit clairement etabli que le cout d’opportunite du temps consacre au recyclage constitue un determinant essentiel des decisions des menages en matiere de tri des dechets, tres peu de travaux empiriques ont tente d’en fournir une estimation. Dans ce travail, nous proposons un modele de prise de decision des menages en termes de tri des dechets incluant des motivations pecuniaires et non-pecuniaires, telles que celles liees a des normes sociales ou morales, qui permet de mettre en evidence l’heterogeneite des valeurs du gain de temps consacre au recyclage. Les resultats de notre modele sont testes en utilisant des donnees issues d’une etude basee sur la methode des choix experimentaux discrets conduite en 2008 en Corse et estimees en utilisant un modele logit de classement ordonne a classes latentes. Les resultats permettent d’etablir que les valeurs du gain de temps consacre au recyclage sont fortement heterogenes entre les individus puisqu’elles sont comprises entre 8 % et 76 % de leur revenu.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"85 1","pages":"915-934"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81223612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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