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Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism? 亚里士多德的“存在不是属”论是否包含本体论多元主义？
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-08-21 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0062
Maciej Czerkawski
{"title":"Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?","authors":"Maciej Czerkawski","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0062","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"688 - 711"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46034711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Puzzle of the Sophist 诡辩家之谜
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-08-18 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2019-0109
J. Vlasits
{"title":"The Puzzle of the Sophist","authors":"J. Vlasits","doi":"10.1515/agph-2019-0109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-0109","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato’s Sophist have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue’s main speakers: the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially is. It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the traditional view of Plato’s method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent grounds that, although Platonic division in the Sophist must express predication relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43178212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited 《先验美学》中康德的先验唯心主义论证
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2019-0039
Damian Melamedoff-Vosters
{"title":"Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited","authors":"Damian Melamedoff-Vosters","doi":"10.1515/agph-2019-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper provides a novel reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This reconstruction relies on two main contentions: first, that Kant accepts the then-ubiquitous view that all cognition is either from grounds or consequences, a view he props up by drawing a distinction between logical and real grounds; second, that Kant, like most of his contemporaries, holds that our representations are the most immediate grounds of our cognition. By stressing these elements, the most threatening objection to Kant’s argument can be avoided, namely, the claim that Kant ignores the possibility that our representations of space and time are subjective in origin, but objective as regards their applicability. My reconstruction shows that this so-called neglected alternative objection is based on a conceptual confusion about the nature of a priori cognition.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"105 1","pages":"141 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2019-0039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43852869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Augustine on the Existence of the Past and the Future 奥古斯丁论过去与未来的存在
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2018-0110
Davide Anzalone
{"title":"Augustine on the Existence of the Past and the Future","authors":"Davide Anzalone","doi":"10.1515/agph-2018-0110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-0110","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the eleventh book of the Confessiones Augustine puts forward several considerations about the nature of time. The received view is that he held that only the present exists, while the past and the future do not exist. This received view has recently been attacked by Paul Helm and Katherin Rogers, who have offered alternative interpretations according to which Augustine held that the present has no privileged ontological status, and that past, present and future all equally exist. The aim of this paper is to defend the received view vis-à-vis these attacks. I argue that the received view fits best Augustine’s view of God’s eternity and relation to time and should therefore be preferred.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"290 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2018-0110","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45040200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant’s Mereological Account of Greater and Lesser Actual Infinities 康德对实际无限大小的流变描述
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2018-0107
Daniel J. Smyth
{"title":"Kant’s Mereological Account of Greater and Lesser Actual Infinities","authors":"Daniel J. Smyth","doi":"10.1515/agph-2018-0107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-0107","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent work on Kant’s conception of space has largely put to rest the view that Kant is hostile to actual infinity. Far from limiting our cognition to quantities that are finite or merely potentially infinite, Kant characterizes the ground of all spatial representation as an actually infinite magnitude. I advance this reevaluation a step further by arguing that Kant judges some actual infinities to be greater than others: he claims, for instance, that an infinity of miles is strictly smaller than an infinity of earth-diameters. This inequality follows from Kant’s mereological conception of magnitudes (quanta): the part is (analytically) less than the whole, and an infinity of miles is equal to only a part of an infinity of earth-diameters. This inequality does not, however, imply that Kant’s infinities have transfinite and unequal sizes (quantitates). Because Kant’s conception of size (quantitas) is based on the Eudoxian theory of proportions, infinite magnitudes (quanta) cannot be assigned exact sizes. Infinite magnitudes are immeasurable, but some are greater than others.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"105 1","pages":"315 - 348"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2018-0107","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44773909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Role of Animal in Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s Theory of the Perfection of the Soul 动物在阿布·巴克尔al-Rāzī灵魂完美论中的作用
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-07-16 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2019-0070
Mohammad Mehdi Montaseri, Ahad Faramarz-Qaramaleki
{"title":"The Role of Animal in Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s Theory of the Perfection of the Soul","authors":"Mohammad Mehdi Montaseri, Ahad Faramarz-Qaramaleki","doi":"10.1515/agph-2019-0070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-0070","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. ca. 925), a well-known physician and Muslim philosopher, has not yet been widely considered for his philosophical reflections on animals. An inspection of al-Rāzī’s works demonstrates his endeavor, based on his cosmology, to come up with a way of the perfection of the soul and becoming liberated from the terrestrial world. As this paper maintains, his investigation of animals is aimed at developing his theory of the perfection of the soul. After a brief clarification of the theory, which entails a discussion of the interaction of the two theoretical and practical aspects of human reason, this paper will discuss seven cases in which al-Rāzī uses the discussion of animals to develop his theory of the perfection of the soul.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"712 - 734"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48110976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig? 不正确:动议是正式的吗?
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0104
C. Hoffmann
{"title":"Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig?","authors":"C. Hoffmann","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0104","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the Infini-Rien fragment of his Pensées, Blaise Pascal develops an argument for the rationality of faith in God, which posthumously became known as Pascal’s Wager and at the same time represents a cornerstone of modern probability theory. While this betting argument has been the subject of much philosophical investigation, the contribution of this paper lies in the following: On the one hand, the bet is reconstructed in its basic features as well as its structure with the help of modern decision and probability theory tools. Thus, it is shown that Pascal’s betting argument, in distinction to Hacking 1972 for instance, has the form of an a fortiori argument. On the other hand, as far as objections to Pascal’s argument are concerned, it is true that the premises have often been called into doubt, more or less convincingly. On the other hand, this article is dedicated to the question, often emphatically – especially in Hacking 1972 – and perhaps carelessly affirmed in Pascal research, whether Pascal’s premises imply his conclusion at all.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"759 - 782"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2020-0104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44533554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heidegger and Gadamer on Hegel’s Greek Conception of Being and Time in an Unpublished 1925/26 Seminar 海德格尔和伽达默尔在1925/26年未出版的研讨会上论黑格尔的希腊存在和时间概念
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0154
F. González
{"title":"Heidegger and Gadamer on Hegel’s Greek Conception of Being and Time in an Unpublished 1925/26 Seminar","authors":"F. González","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0154","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the Winter semester of 1925/26 Heidegger gave what appears to have been his first seminar on Hegel. Still unpublished in any form, this neglected seminar is of extraordinary importance, and not only for the in-depth and critical reading it pursues of Hegel’s Logic I, a critique that charges Hegel with not knowing how or where to begin. The seminar is also important for its attempt to demonstrate that Hegel’s philosophy was thoroughly Greek. In the class of 25 November 1925, Heidegger is reported to have said: “Therefore am I in the habit of saying that Hegel is the most radical Greek there ever was. With the means that were pre-formed in Greek ontology as if in a seed, the means that lay at the roots of Greek ontology, Hegel mastered something (roughly speaking: spirit, history) that in this form was never experienced by the Greeks. This is only asserted here. Proof of this thesis is naturally very difficult.” Heidegger therefore turns towards the end of the seminar to Aristotle’s account of time in the Physics to show that both this understanding of time and the conception of being it presupposes are also Hegel’s. Yet Heidegger entrusts the initial presentation of Aristotle’s conception of time to a student whose reading is at odds with his own, so much so that Heidegger accuses the student of turning everything on its head. The student’s name is H.-G. Gadamer.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"735 - 758"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2020-0154","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49105482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works 亚里士多德论因果关系的有效性
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0078
Tyler Huismann
{"title":"Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works","authors":"Tyler Huismann","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0078","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article I argue that, in light of his critique of rival theories of efficient causation, there is a puzzle latent in Aristotle’s own account. According to that critique, efficient causes must explain why their effects come about when they do rather than at some other time, a feature I call temporal contrastiveness. But it is not clear how the various elements of one of Aristotle’s preferred examples of such causation, the activity of experts, can enjoy this feature. Solving the puzzle yields a novel reading of Aristotle, one according to which experts, but not their characteristic arts or skills, are efficient causes.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"633 - 687"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2020-0078","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44351990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Frede, Dorothea: Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzung mit Einleitung und Kommentar. (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bde 6.1 und 6.2). Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter 2020, xvii + 1016 pp. 亚里士多德，尼古丁伦理学翻译和评论(亚里士多德.德国翻译:Bde和6.2)。柏林/波士顿:沃特·德格鲁耶特2020,xvii + 1016。
IF 0.4 2区 哲学
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2021-2022
Jörn P. Müller
{"title":"Frede, Dorothea: Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzung mit Einleitung und Kommentar. (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bde 6.1 und 6.2). Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter 2020, xvii + 1016 pp.","authors":"Jörn P. Müller","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-2022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-2022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"192 - 198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2021-2022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43801216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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