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Locke, Simplicity, and Extension 洛克、简单性和可拓性

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0180

Bridger Ehli

引用次数: 0

The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’sTheaetetus (188c10–189b9) 柏拉图关于存在与不存在的错误判断分析（188c10–189b9）

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-10-08 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0186

P. Crivelli

{"title":"The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’sTheaetetus (188c10–189b9)","authors":"P. Crivelli","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0186","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41636937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Life, Lawfulness, and Contingency: Kant and Schelling on Organic Nature 生命、合法性与偶然性：康德与谢林的有机性

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-10-05 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0108

N. Fisher

{"title":"Life, Lawfulness, and Contingency: Kant and Schelling on Organic Nature","authors":"N. Fisher","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0108","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant calls purposiveness the “lawfulness of the contingent”. I argue that this should be interpreted not as lawfulness assumed in order to remove unacceptable mechanical indeterminacy, but rather as an additional kind of lawfulness which, in the case of organisms, inexplicably coincides with mechanical determination. Schelling adapts Kant’s notion of natural purposiveness in his own conception of the relation between mechanism and organism. He states in his 1798 work, On the World Soul, that nature is “lawless in its lawfulness, and lawful in its lawlessness”. This should be interpreted similarly: there is a coincidence of two orders of lawfulness in nature. However, while Kant maintains that the coincidence or unity of these two orders is inexplicable for beings like us, Schelling explains the unity by assigning these laws to distinct levels of operation in nature. Organic organization is generated by a second-order operation of an organic principle on the first-order mechanical forces that are characteristic of matter. Schelling thereby builds on Kant’s third Critique framework in a creative way in order to offer a more fully unified account of nature. In this account, mechanism and organism maintain distinct roles but are both grounded in a further, higher principle.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"105 1","pages":"163 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47925003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Expert Impressions in Stoicism 斯多葛主义的专家印象

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-18 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2021-0038

Máté Veres, David Machek

{"title":"Expert Impressions in Stoicism","authors":"Máté Veres, David Machek","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We focus on the question of how expertise as conceived by the Stoics interacts with the content of impressions. In Section 1, we situate the evidence concerning expert perception within the Stoic account of cognitive development. In Section 2, we argue that the content of rational impressions, and notably of expert impressions, is not exhausted by the relevant propositions. In Section 3, we argue that expert impressions are a subtype of kataleptic impressions which achieve their level of clarity and distinctness due to the contribution of expertise. In Section 4, we argue that the expertise in living well not only allows the wise person to assent correctly but also affects the content of her impressions. We suggest that these two models – one’s attitude toward an impression being informed by expertise, and one’s impressions being affected by expertise – might characterize distinct stages of cognitive development. Stoic wisdom is not only a matter of the way one assents to one’s impressions but also a matter of the condition of one’s soul and, consequently, of the kinds of impressions one even entertains. Expertise offers a model of how cognitive and discriminatory improvement through practice and effort can transform the non-wise into the wise. A reading on which the content of impressions is not exclusively propositional illuminates a further aspect of this transformation. If the same propositions are accessible through impressions with different non-propositional content, we can account for cases in which the novice and the expert entertain the same proposition.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"105 1","pages":"241 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43257275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Spinoza’s Monism II: A Proposal 斯宾诺莎的一元论II：一个建议

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2021-0057

Kristin Primus

{"title":"Spinoza’s Monism II: A Proposal","authors":"Kristin Primus","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0057","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal (E1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,”“Spinoza’s Monism I,” in the previous issue of this journal. I pointed out that most commentators answer this question by invoking entities that are indefinite and sempiternal, but argued that perhaps we should not be so quick to assume that in Spinoza’s system, an infinite and eternal substance could cause such indefinite, sempiternal entities. But if such eternal-durational causation is denied, then it seems harder to see how Spinoza’s system could be coherent: if Spinoza holds that the infinite, eternal substance cannot cause anything that is not infinite and not eternal, then how can he also hold that all things are modes immanently caused by substance (E1p15, E1p18, E1p25)? In this essay, I explain how Spinoza’s system could be understood in light of a denial of eternal-durational causation. On the interpretation I offer, God is the cause of all things and all things are modes because the essences of all things follow from the divine nature and all essences enjoy infinite, eternal reality as modes immanently caused by the infinite, eternal substance. The same non-substantial essences can also be conceived as enjoying non-infinite, non-eternal reality, but so conceived, they are enduring, finite (or sempiternal, indefinite) entities that cannot be conceived as modes caused by and inhering in the one infinite, eternal substance. I conclude by pointing out that if we take this interpretive route, we do have to understand Spinoza as committed to acosmism, or a denial of the reality of the world – at least the world of enduring, finite things.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44533045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Mind your Prayers. Aristotle’s Notion of euchê 小心你的祷告。亚里士多德的真理观

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0094

P. Kontos

引用次数: 0

Spinoza’s Monism I: Ruling Out Eternal-Durational Causation 斯宾诺莎的一元论一：排除永恒的时间因果关系

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2021-0056

Kristin Primus

引用次数: 2

Aesthetics Naturalised: Schlick on the Evolution of Beauty and Art 美学自然化：施利克谈美与艺术的演变

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-16 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0129

Andreas Vrahimis

{"title":"Aesthetics Naturalised: Schlick on the Evolution of Beauty and Art","authors":"Andreas Vrahimis","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0129","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his earliest philosophical work, Moritz Schlick developed a proposal for rendering aesthetics into a field of empirical science. His 1908 book Lebensweisheit developed an evolutionary account of the emergence of both scientific knowledge and aesthetic feelings from play. This constitutes the framework of Schlick’s evolutionary psychological methodology for examining the origins of the aesthetic feeling of the beautiful he proposed in 1909. He defends his methodology by objecting to both experimental psychological and Darwinian reductionist accounts of aesthetics. Having countered these approaches, Schlick applies Külpe’s psychological distinction between stimulus-feelings and idea-feelings to collapse the traditional philosophical opposition between the agreeable and the beautiful. Both types of feeling, Schlick argues, result from humans’ adaptation to their environment. Because of this adaptation, feelings that were once only stimuli for action can come to be enjoyed for their own sake. This thesis underlies Schlick’s 1908 argument that art, qua mimesis, is necessarily inferior to aesthetic feelings directed towards the environment. Part of Schlick’s justification for this view is that humans are, through a long evolutionary process, better adapted to their environment than to artworks. Schlick nevertheless concedes that mimetic art can involve ways of abstracting from the objects it copies to produce idealised regularities that are not found in the original. Schlick thus concludes that art teaches its audience how to perceive the world in this abstract and idealised manner. This type of environmental aesthetics constitutes a means for reaching Schlick’s utopian ecological vision of a future in which culture will become harmonised with nature.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49225765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Aristotle’s First Moves Regarding Perception: A Reading of (most of) De Anima 2.5 亚里士多德关于知觉的第一步:解读《论阿凡达》第2.5章(大部分)

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-04 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2020-0143

Andreas Anagnostopoulos

引用次数: 1

Rudolf Meer, Der transzendentale Grundsatz der Vernunft. Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte Band 207, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2019, 314 pp. 鲁道夫。海，理性的更高级原则佐证辩证辩词附录的功能和结构，慕尼黑/波士顿版207册，沃特·德鲁耶特，2019页

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2021-2020

Michael Lewin

引用次数: 0