斯宾诺莎的一元论一：排除永恒的时间因果关系

IF 0.5 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI:10.1515/agph-2021-0056

Kristin Primus

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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要在这篇文章中，我认为斯宾诺莎承认了无限的、永恒的形式现实与非无限的形式现实之间的区别。有限的或不确定的）和非永恒的（即。 e.持久）。我还认为，如果在斯宾诺莎的体系中，只有可理解的因果关系才是真正的因果关系，那么无限的、永恒的形式现实就不能导致非无限的、非永恒的形式实相。然而，否认永恒的持久因果关系会产生一个难题：如果没有一个持久的事物——甚至是由所有有限的、持久的事物组成的永恒的、不确定的个体——是由无限的、永恒的物质引起的，那么斯宾诺莎怎么能始终如一地认为一个无限的、永远的物质是所有事物的原因，所有事物都是该物质的模式？在这篇文章的最后，我勾勒出斯宾诺莎如何否认永恒的持续因果关系，同时仍然认为一个无限的、永恒的上帝是万物的原因，万物都是模式。我在配套文章中进一步阐述了这一解释。1 1在本期刊下一期的“斯宾诺莎的一元论II”中。

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Spinoza’s Monism I: Ruling Out Eternal-Durational Causation

Abstract In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is non-infinite (i. e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i. e., enduring). I also argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causation, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-durational causation generates a puzzle, however: if no enduring thing – not even the sempiternal, indefinite individual composed of all finite, enduring things – is caused by the infinite, eternal substance, then how can Spinoza consistently hold that the one infinite, eternal substance is the cause of all things and that all things are modes of that substance? At the end of this essay, I sketch how Spinoza could deny eternal-durational causation while still holding that an infinite, eternal God is the cause of all things and that all things are modes. I develop the interpretation more in the companion essay.1 1 In “Spinoza’s Monism II,” in the next issue of this journal.

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来源期刊

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.00

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie [Archive for the History of Philosophy] is one of the world"s leading academic journals specializing in the history of philosophy. The Archiv publishes exceptional scholarship in all areas of western philosophy from antiquity through the twentieth century. The journal insists on the highest scholarly standards and values precise argumentation and lucid prose. Articles should reflect the current state of the best international research while advancing the field"s understanding of a historical author, school, problem, or concept. The journal has a broad international readership and a rich history.